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ABSTRACT 
Moral Evaluation in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas 
David William Zettel 
Cornell University 2018 
 
 Two different methods for morally evaluating actions can be found in Albert the 
Great's works. The first, which I call the stages theory, requires that an act be evaluated in 
three stages: 1) its generic quality, or type; 2) its circumstances; and 3) whether it 
proceeds from virtue or vice. According to this theory, an act might be generically good, 
but done badly, or generically bad, but done well. 
 The second method is an all-or-nothing principle. It requires that an act be good in 
each of a number of ways in order for it to be good overall. I call it the Dionysian 
principle, after pseudo-Dionysius, who stated that good is from a single complete cause, 
while bad is from any particular defect. It is not clear how these two methods go together, 
and at least one formulation of the Dionysian principle appears to be inconsistent with the 
stages theory.  
 Thomas Aquinas, who studied under Albert, resolves the tension between the two 
methods by rejecting the stages theory and embracing the Dionysian principle. I argue 
that this disagreement between Albert and Aquinas leads them to describe certain hard 
cases very differently. Albert can maintain that agents in resolvable moral dilemmas 
perform a bad action, although it is the right action in the circumstances; Aquinas cannot, 
but rather claims that the agent in an apparent dilemma does not in fact perform the act he 
appears to perform. Finally, I draw out these differences by comparing both the stages 
theory and the Dionysian principle to certain Stoic antecedents. 
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Introduction 
 
 Albert the Great's ethics is an ethics of virtue. In his two earliest ethical treatises, 
De natura boni (DNB) and Summa de bono (SDB), however, Albert begins by discussing 
goodness in its widest sense before proceeding to discuss moral goodness, beginning with 
the features of good and bad actions. This is not accidental; Albert builds his theory of 
the virtues on his metaphysics of action. As we shall see, Albert thinks that human 
actions are structured in a particular way, and that the moral evaluation of an action 
requires taking into account the different parts of that structure. 
 Consider two important questions about the moral act: 1) "What shall I do?" and 
2) "Was this action right or wrong?" The first question provides action guidance. The 
second gives action assessment: was this action right or wrong? Was it praiseworthy? 
Merely permissible, or supererogatory? Yet these two questions, although related, are 
distinct.  A moral theory might direct an agent to perform an action while denying that 
the action is right, as for example in the case of a resolvable, self-imposed moral 
dilemma.1 
 Now Albert does not distinguish explicitly between action guidance and action 
assessment. Nevertheless, his treatment of the morality of actions both at the generic 
level and at the level of circumstances is largely framed in terms of the evaluation or 
assessment of actions. Albert deals much more explicitly with action guidance in his 
discussions of prudence, or practical wisdom. There he approaches action from the 
perspective of the agent's psychology: the practically wise person has a particular kind of 
                                                 
1 See Hursthouse (1999), 49-51. 
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knowledge, Albert thinks, and she deliberates in particular ways. My focus in this 
dissertation will be primarily on action assessment, or evaluation. 
 In framing my discussion this way I do not mean to imply that Albert's prudens 
does not take into account the generic quality or the moral circumstances of an action 
when she deliberates about it. It seems likely that these are exactly the sorts of 
considerations that will enter her mind, and I find no reason to think Albert would deny 
it. But he devotes considerable attention to our assessment of actions, and I will follow 
his lead in focusing on Albert on action assessment or evaluation.2 
 I contend that Albert advances two different methods for morally evaluating 
actions. The first is what I will call his stages theory, which can be found prominently in 
Albert's first known work, the DNB. According to this theory, we should consider the 
moral character of an action through a series of stages. According to this theory, an action 
is susceptible to three different levels or stages of moral evaluation. The first stage is 
generic goodness and badness; the second is moral circumstances; and the third is virtue 
and vice. This structure proceeds from lower to higher degrees of moral specificity, and 
allows for a nuanced and complex evaluation of any individual action.  
 In the first chapter, I examine the notion of generic good and bad, and trace its 
development chronologically through Albert's writings. I will argue that the generic 
goodness of an action gives us a pro tanto reason to value the action (and possibly also a 
pro tanto reason to perform the action), and that the generic badness of an action gives us 
a pro tanto reason to disvalue it. For example, feeding the hungry is a generically good 
                                                 
2 For accounts of prudence (prudentia) in Albert's thought, see Payer (1969); Payer (1979); Celano (1995); 
Stammkötter (2001); and Tracey (2010). Houser (2004) places prudentia within the context of the cardinal 
virtues and their relation to each other (56-64). I discuss prudence in a more limited way below when I 
discuss the connection of the virtues. 
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act; any act of that type is morally good in at least a limited way, and Albert holds that it 
is more "inclined" to be good overall. I examine how this idea evolves in his works, 
starting with his earliest known work, the DNB, and working my way through the major 
works in which he discusses ethics. 
 Then in the second chapter, I turn to the second stage of moral evaluation, that of 
moral circumstances. According to the stages theory, a generically good or bad action can 
be done well or badly, and this is determined by the circumstances which "surround" it. 
Feeding the hungry might be done badly in the wrong circumstances, for example if it is 
done for the wrong reason, e.g., so that others might think more highly of us. (The last 
stage – virtue or vice – takes us partly beyond the domain of this dissertation, since 
Albert's writings on virtue are voluminous, but the role of virtue in the stages theory will 
be addressed in chapter 2, since it intersects in important ways with the role of 
circumstances.3) By examining his accounts of how moral circumstances interact with 
generic goodness or badness throughout his career, I will show that Albert's commitment 
to the stages theory becomes more ambivalent later in his life. While he never explicitly 
renounces the stages theory, he takes up positions that appear inconsistent with it, and 
presents it as a theory advanced by others rather than as his own. 
 In discussing circumstances, Albert also advances a quite different principle for 
evaluating actions: what I will call the Dionysian principle. This principle gets its name 
from pseudo-Dionysius, whom Albert usually cites when articulating it. In his On the 
Divine Names, pseudo-Dionysius claimed that good is from one whole cause, whereas 
                                                 
3 The literature on moral virtue in Albert has grown recently, partly as a result of increased interest in virtue 
ethics generally. Important contributions include Cunningham (1969), Cunningham (2008), Houser (2004), 
Müller (2008), Tracey (2008), and Tracey (2013).  
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bad is from many particular defects.4 Albert takes this claim as a starting point for the 
principle that a good act requires that each of several different components or aspects of 
the act be good; if any one of these components is bad, then the act itself is bad. This 
principle is first introduced in the SDB, and it is reformulated and refined at several 
points in Albert's corpus. 
 There is, I claim, a tension between the Dionysian principle and the stages theory. 
I explore this tension in chapter 3, along with some possible motivations for adopting 
either theory. It is not clear whether Albert himself was aware of this tension, but I argue 
that a thinker clearly influenced by Albert was: his student Thomas Aquinas. While 
Aquinas also discusses generic goodness and badness, he has altered the concept to make 
it fit within the Dionysian principle, while rejecting the stages theory. 
 Having outlined this disagreement between Albert and Aquinas, which partly 
reflects a tension within Albert himself, I attempt to shed light on the reasons one might 
have for adopting either the stages theory or the Dionysian principle, as well as the 
consequences of adopting either one. I do this in three ways. First, I compare Albert's 
discussion of a difficult case from the literature to Aquinas'. The case involves a judge 
who knows that an accused man is innocent of the crime for which he is being tried. 
However, the allegations at the trial go against the innocent man, requiring that the judge 
pronounce a guilty verdict, and sentence the innocent man to death. Albert and Aquinas 
agree that in certain circumstances, such a judge may be morally required to order the 
death sentence. However, they give quite different descriptions of what the judge is 
doing, since Albert uses the stages theory in his analysis, whereas Aquinas rejects the 
                                                 
4 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, paragraph 31 (PG 3,732): "Bonum ex una et tota est 
causa, malum autem ex multis et particularibus defectibus." 
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stages theory and embraces the Dionysian principle. Their differing accounts of the 
judge's action help to show what is at stake between the two theories. 
 Second, I compare Albert's and Aquinas' views on the evaluation of actions with 
their accounts of the moral status of agents, specifically as revealed in their accounts of 
the connection of the virtues. Albert holds that the moral virtues are only weakly 
connected, with the result that it is possible to possess one moral virtue but not another. 
Aquinas, by contrast, holds that the moral virtues are more strongly connected, such that 
it is not possible to possess one without the others. I suggest that the conjunction of the 
stages theory with a weak connection of the virtues in Albert is evidence of an approach 
to ethics that allows for 'mixed' assessments of both agents and good actions, such that 
they can be good in one respect but bad in another. At the same time, the fact that 
Aquinas defends both the Dionysian principle (while rejecting the stages theory) and a 
strong connection of the virtues indicates an 'all or nothing' stance; both agents and good 
actions must be good in every respect, if they are to count as good overall. 
 Finally, I compare both the stages theory and the Dionysian principle to 
antecedents found in Stoic ethical theory. The threefold structure of the stages theory runs 
parallel to a threefold division in the way the Stoics evaluate actions. At the same time, 
the Dionysian principle's insistence that an act be good in every respect in order that it be 
good overall is mirrored in the Stoic claim that a right action is one that "fills all the 
numbers" of virtue.  
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Historical Background 
 In his ethical works Albert draws on an array of classical and early medieval 
sources. Aristotle (384 to 322 B.C.E.), Cicero (106 to 43 B.C.E.), Nemesius (late 4th 
century), Augustine (354 to 430), Boethius (480 to 524-525), Pseudo-Dionysius (late fifth 
to early sixth century), and John of Damascus (676 to 749) all figure prominently in his 
writings on moral philosophy and theology. He is also indebted to philosophers in the 
Islamic world, particularly Avicenna (980-1037), though this influence is less 
pronounced in ethics than it is in, say, his metaphysics. 
 More proximately, Albert is also the heir of a tradition of ethical inquiry in the 
high medieval Latin world. Among the more important thinkers in this tradition is Peter 
Abelard (1079 to 1142), who argued that actions in themselves are indifferent, and that 
the goodness and badness of actions derives entirely from the intentions with which they 
are performed.5 This position was condemned at the Council of Sens (1141), but it 
nevertheless exerted an important influence over the thinkers who came after him, as did 
Abelard's ethical thought more generally. 
 Peter Lombard (1095-1100 to 1160) was known during his lifetime as "the 
famous theologian", and served as canon of Notre Dame Cathedral before becoming 
Bishop of Paris in 1159. His Sentences Divided into Four Books (Sententiae in quatuor 
IV libris distinctae), appearing in its first edition in 1154 and then in a second edition in 
1158, was by Albert's time the standard theological textbook in the Christian West; it 
would be replaced gradually only in the 16th century by Thomas Aquinas' Summa 
Theologiae.6 It consists of quotations from the Bible and from the fathers of the Church, 
                                                 
5 See Marenbon (1997), 255-257. 
6 Roseman (2004), 3. 
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divided by subject matter, along with Lombard's own comments. Bachelors of theology 
were expected to comment on the Sentences, and Albert's own commentary on the work 
is an important source for his ethical thought. 
 In the 13th century, Paris became the most prominent centre for theological and 
philosophical work. Albert drew extensively on the works of the theologians who had 
taught in Paris before him, in particular Gilbert Prevostin, William of Auxerre, and Philip 
the Chancellor. Gilbert Prevostin (1140-1150 to 1210), whose name is rendered 
alternately in Latin as Prepositivus, Prepositinus, and Preostinus, served as chancellor of 
the University of Paris from 1206-1210. His most important work for our purposes is his 
Summa Theologiae, which includes a discussion of the virtues and which is heavily 
indebted to the Sentences of Peter Lombard.7 
 William of Auxerre (1140-1150 to 1231) became a master in theology at Paris at 
some point before 1228.8 He is best known for his Summa Aurea (ca. 1215-1220), a 
sweeping work of theology covering topics from the incarnation of Christ to the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit. It is written in disputed question format: each chapter consists of a series 
of questions pertaining to a given topic. After stating the question, William then provides 
arguments for one answer to the question. Then he offers a solution, in which he either 
concedes or rejects the preceding arguments, and provides his own resolution of the 
question. Finally, he responds to the initial arguments. This format arose out of the 
practice of disputation in medieval universities, in which a master of theology would 
propose a question, take arguments from his students, and then provide his own solution 
                                                 
7 See Lacombe (1927), 167. 
8 For more on William see Coolman (2004). 
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along with responses to his students' arguments. Both Philip and Albert would use this 
format in their Summae de bono. 
 By far the most important 13th century influence on Albert's moral thought was 
Philip the Chancellor (ca. 1160 to 1236). Philip served as the Chancellor of the 
University of Paris, and was an early patron of the Dominicans. Perhaps as a result, his 
work exercised an important influence over Dominican thinkers like Albert and Aquinas.9 
Philip's Summa de bono (1225-1228) is an original and important work in many ways, 
but especially because of his use of the concept of the good as an organizing principle for 
the work.10 Albert will draw heavily on Philip's Summa for his own work of the same 
name; indeed, Bernard Geyer, the editor of the critical edition of Albert's Summa de 
bono, states that Albert had Philip's Summa always before his eyes when composing his 
own.11 
 One other figure deserves mention here: Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1175 to 1253), 
Bishop of Lincoln from 1245 to 1253. While Grosseteste wrote a number of original 
works in theology, he is important for our purposes as the translator of the Nicomachean 
Ethics from Greek into Latin. This translation was put in circulation in 1246 or 1247, and 
Albert would write two important commentaries on it. Prior to his acquaintance with 
Grosseteste's translation, Albert had access to only parts of the NE: the Ethica vetus 
(books 2 and 3), the Ethica nova (book 1), and a fragment of book 7.  
 
                                                 
9 Houser (2004), 42-43 suggests as much. 
10 As McCluskey (2010) points out. 
11 Geyer (1951), XIV; see also Tracey (2009), 269-271. 
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Albert's Life and Works12 
 Albert was born ca. 1200, probably in Lauingen, into a military family of lesser 
nobility. He was sent to Padua to study as a young man, where he joined the Dominican 
order in the 1220s. He spent the 1230s working as a lector in various German Dominican 
priories: Cologne, Hildesheim, Regensburg, and Strasbourg. The lector in the Dominican 
priories was expected to give theological lectures on some book of the Bible to the 
community; we also know that Albert lectured on the Sentences during this time, and that 
he composed his first work known to us, the De natura boni. 
 In the early 1240s, Albert was sent to Paris to lecture on the Sentences, in order 
that he might become a master in theology; he would attain that rank in 1245. During his 
time in Paris, Albert completed his Summa de Creaturis, a collection of different works 
including the Summa de bono and the De homine. He also wrote his commentary on the 
Sentences, and began commenting on the works of pseudo-Dionysius. In 1246, Thomas 
Aquinas arrived in Paris as a young Dominican, and apparently caught the attention of 
Master Albert. 
 In 1248, Albert was sent to Cologne to teach at the new Dominican studium 
generale there, and he took Aquinas with him. There he lectured on the full text of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which had just recently been translated into Latin by Robert 
Grossteste. He also began his series of paraphrastic commentaries on the corpus of 
Aristotle, a task which would occupy much of the latter half of his career. In 1254, Albert 
was elected provincial of the German Dominicans, a position he would hold until 1257. 
He then returned briefly to his job as lector at the studium in Cologne, until he was 
                                                 
12 For this brief summary of Albert's life, I have relied on Tugwell (1988), Resnick (2013), and Weisheipl 
(1980), "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great." 
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appointed bishop of Regensburg in 1260. He apparently accepted the appointment 
reluctantly, and resigned a year later. After spending some time at the papal court, he 
returned to Germany, where he would perform a plethora of ecclesiastical tasks over the 
decade that followed, while continuing to write his Aristotelian commentaries and 
various theological works. He spent most of the 1270s in Cologne, and died on 15 
November 1280. 
 The dates for Albert's works are often difficult to establish. In what follows I give 
the generally received years in which Albert is thought to have written or completed a 
given work, and note discrepancies among historians where they arise. I do not provide 
here a complete list of Albert's works; I mention only those works which are of primary 
importance to a study of his ethics. 
1. De natura boni (DNB). This is Albert's first work.  Lottin claims that it was written 
prior to 1240;13 Cunningham thinks it was written between 1236 and 1240;14 and 
Canavero has it ca. 1236-1237.15 De Libera thinks that it may be as late as 1243.16 By 
contrast, Möhle et alia indicate that it may be as early as 1233.17 These authors are agreed 
(with the possible exception of de Libera) that the DNB should be dated before Albert 
moved to Paris in the early 1240s. It is incomplete. 
 The DNB is composed of two treatises. The first concerns the good of nature, 
while the second, much longer tractate deals with political virtue. It's clear from the 
introduction that Albert had much greater designs for the DNB. He mentions five more 
treatises, beyond the two he completed: on the good of grace, on the good found in the 
                                                 
13 Lottin, PEM III, 714. 
14 Cunningham (2008), 28. 
15 Canavero (1987), 55. 
16 De Libera (1990), 21. 
17 Möhle et al. (2011). 
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gifts, the good of happiness, of the fruits of the Spirit, and finally of beatitude. The 
section on political virtue is divided into three parts: on the good of political virtue in 
genere, on the good of circumstance, and on the good of virtue proper.  The latter was 
intended to include the four cardinal virtues and their parts. We do not possess the section 
on courage, which may have been excised; the section on temperance quickly gets 
sidetracked into a long discussion of virginity, widowhood and conjugal continence.  At 
this point, Albert apparently abandoned his project. 
2. De homine. Albert’s massive work of philosophical anthropology is an important 
source for his early views on conscience, synderesis, and the practical syllogism. It is one 
of the works included in Albert's so-called Summa de creaturis (also sometimes called 
the Summa parisiensis or the Summa theologica prior, or even simply the Summa 
theologiae - not to be confused with his later Summa theologiae!), a collection of works 
written while Albert was at the University of Paris. The Summa de creaturis is not really 
a Summa, however. Each of the works included in it is an independent, self-contained 
treatise, and Cunningham, among others, objects to the practice of grouping them 
together.18 The De homine was written in the early 1240s, sometime before Albert 
became a Master of theology. 
3. Summa de bono (SDB). Written at some point between 1242 and 1245, the SDB covers 
a lot of the same ground as the DNB.  The format of the SDB is different, however: it is 
entirely in the mode of a disputation, and it probably originated in oral disputations 
Albert held at the University of Paris. Like the DNB, it is unfinished. Albert indicates that 
he will be later discussing duties, and friendship, as well as the theological virtues and 
gifts of the Holy Spirit, yet these do not appear in the text. According to Lottin, these 
                                                 
18 Cunningham (2008), 32. 
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questions are not taken up here because Albert turns to them in his Sentences 
commentary, written shortly after or even possibly at the same time as the Summa de 
bono.19 The work as it stands is divided into five treatises. The first is on the good in 
general, and the next four are on each of the cardinal virtues, in this order: courage, 
temperance, prudence, and justice. Albert offers a very thorough consideration of each 
virtue, as well as its 'parts' - the virtues which are allied or associated with a cardinal 
virtue.  
4. Commentarii sententiarum; also known as the Super sententiarum. This work appears 
in four books, corresponding to the four books of Lombard's Sentences. Books I and III 
were likely written around 1243. Book II was completed around 1246, while book IV was 
probably finished in 1249.20 
5. Super Ethica (SE). This is Albert's first commentary on the NE. It is derived from a 
series of lectures in disputed questions at the newly founded Dominican studium generale 
in Cologne, where Albert was sent to be the rector. Based on Grosseteste’s translation, 
which was made available in 1246-1247, the SE was probably compiled between 1250 
and 1252. It alternates between summaries of Aristotle's text and disputed questions 
arising from problems both in the text of Aristotle and in the texts of the Greek 
commentators on the NE, which Grosseteste also translated into Latin. 
6. Ethica. Albert's second commentary on the NE, the Ethica is a (sometimes loose) 
paraphrase of Aristotle's text, containing no disputed questions. It was written in the early 
1260s. 
                                                 
19 Lottin, PEM VI, 269-270, n. 3. 
20 Möhle et al. (2011). 
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7. Summa theologiae; also known as the Summa de mirabili scientia dei. Canavero places 
it between 1268 and 1274,21 while de Libera claims that it was written in or after 1270.22 
Möhle et al. put book I after 1268, and book II after 1274. There is some doubt about the 
authenticity of book II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Canavero (1987), 56. 
22 De Libera (1990), 21. 
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Chapter 1: Generic Goodness 
 
1.A Generic Good before Albert 
 
 Discussion of the generic good and bad in medieval philosophy grows out of a 
response to Peter Abelard's contention that all external acts are in themselves indifferent, 
and that an agent's merit depends solely on her intention or consent. In his Scito te Ipsum, 
Abelard approaches the morality of actions by examining the concept of sin. He presents 
the following three descriptions of sin:  
1) "To consent to what is inappropriate, so that we do it or renounce it."23 The 
second part of this description indicates that what we consent to are actions (and 
not, say, desires).  
2) "Scorn for God."24 It was generally accepted in medieval theology that we 
cannot do any injury to God, since God is unchanging and therefore impassable; 
nevertheless, we can show scorn or contempt for God. 
 3) "Not to do for his sake what we believe we ought to do for his sake, or not to 
renounce for his sake what we believe ought to be renounced."25 Given his first 
definition, this third description seems incomplete without the addition of 
consent: we should understand Abelard to mean: "not to consent to do for his sake 
what we believe we ought not to consent to do for his sake", etc. 
                                                 
23 Scito te ipsum, 7. As Spade (1995) points out in his translation, this sentence is elliptical: "The idea is 
either that we do what should not be done, or go without doing what should be done" (p.2, footnote 3). So 
to sin is to consent to do what is inappropriate, or to consent to omit doing what is required. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., 8. 
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 Jean Porter suggests that Abelard's definitions of sin should be understood as an attempt 
to address the second-order question, "when is an agent guilty for a sinful act?", rather 
than the first order question, "what are the criteria by which an act is determined to be 
morally acceptable or morally wrong." Thus Abelard is especially concerned with which 
states of mind are necessary for the attribution of moral responsibility, without which a 
person could not be judged guilty of sin.26 As we shall see, however, many theologians 
after Abelard took his claims as a starting point for addressing the first order question. 
 At any rate, it is uncontroversial that for Abelard, actions are not prohibited; 
rather it is consenting to an action that is wrong. External acts are indifferent. Thus the 
goodness or badness of an action proceeds entirely from the goodness or badness of the 
intention with which it is done.27 This position was condemned at the Council of Sens 
(1141), one year before Abelard died, but it nevertheless exerted an important influence 
over the thinkers who came after him, as did Abelard's ethical thought more generally.28 
 Most subsequent thinkers rejected the view that actions are indifferent. However, 
this left them with the task of trying to define the moral value of an action apart from the 
                                                 
26 Porter (2000), 371-372. 
27Scito te ipsum, 48: "... any kind of carrying out of deeds is irrelevant to increasing a sin. Nothing taints the 
soul but what belongs to it, namely that consent that we've said is alone the sin, not the will proceeding it or 
the subsequent doing of the deed." See also Scito te ipsum, 106, and Marenbon (1999), 255.  
28 On the Coucil of Sens, see Mews (2002) and Verbaa (2005). While I know of no proof that Albert knew 
Abelard's works directly, it is interesting to note that Albert in the DNB uses many of the same examples 
and illustrations that Abelard uses in Scito te ipsum. Thus Abelard in Scito te ipsum 58 gives the example of 
the act of hanging a criminal, done by one person out of a zeal for justice and by another out of hatred; his 
point is that the same (external) action can be good or bad depending on the agent's intention. In DNB 
2.1.1, Albert states that the act of killing the one who ought to be killed (intereficere interficiendum) is 
generically good, and he gives the example of a judge sentencing a criminal to death; but it can be done 
badly, as when it is done from envy and hatred.  
  Albert also uses the example, found in Abelard (Scito te ipsum 81), of the judge who knows that the 
defendant brought before him is innocent, but who is compelled to give a guilty verdict because he cannot 
refute the testimony, given in court by false witnesses, against the defendant. For Abelard, this example 
shows that (earthly) punishments and sin can come apart, and that we should not be surprised to see 
someone punished who committed no sin. For Albert, the example shows that the generically bad act of 
killing an innocent person can be done well -- indeed, it seems required in this case. 
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intention with which it is performed. In his Sentences, Peter Lombard remarks on the 
position of certain theologians who distinguish between a threefold goodness of acts. 
There is the essential goodness of an act, which pertains to every act inasmuch as it is an 
act. This goodness need not imply anything about the "essence" of an act. Rather, 
essential goodness attaches to act insofar as it has being: whatever exists is made by God 
and therefore is good, insofar as it exists. To say that an act is good "essentially" is to say 
that it is good simply in virtue of the fact that it has being. 
 There is also the generic goodness of an act, of which he gives the example of 
feeding the hungry, which falls under the genus of acts of mercy. This might look like a 
bad example, since an act's being an act of mercy (misericordia) seems to imply 
something about the agent's reasons and motives, which takes us beyond a mere action 
type.29 The genus in the term 'bonum in genere' appears to be a genus of virtuous acts 
(such as acts of mercy); but virtuous acts are necessarily done for the right reasons and 
from a good will – elements of an action that are not included in its generic goodness. So 
it seems wrong to submit an act of mercy is an example of a generically good act. 
 Proponents of this view can respond to this objection by distinguishing between 
acts of mercy (opera misericordiae) and properly merciful actions. It is common for 
medieval thinkers to describe acts characteristic of specific virtues. For example, risking 
death in battle is an act characteristic of courage. But not all instances of risking death in 
battle are courageous – some are foolhardy, for example. In order for such an act to be 
virtuous, one must do so at the right time, for the right reasons, etc. Similarly, to say that 
an act of feeding the hungry is good in respect of its genus, because it falls under the 
genus of acts of mercy, is not to say that every such act will be merciful. 
                                                 
29 Thanks to Scott MacDonald for this point. 
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 Finally, there are acts which are absolutely or perfectly good, which in addition to 
essential and generic goodness, also have a good end and proceed from a good will.30 The 
account as described by Lombard can be summarized as follows: 
Division of Three Types of Goodness as Reported by Peter Lombard 
Goodness of an Act Example 
    
Essential goodness  (Applies to every human act) 
Generic goodness  Feeding the hungry 
Perfect goodness Feeding the hungry from a good will and with a good end 
 
 Lombard himself neither endorses nor attacks this position, but he does give his 
own opinion about a related matter: it was also a common view that certain acts are in se 
or per se (also ex se, secundum se) good or bad. Per se good acts are such as cannot be 
done badly, whereas per se bad acts are such as cannot be done well. Lombard denies that 
there are any per se good acts, arguing that a bad intention can make any action bad, all 
things considered; but he allows that there are some per se sins, acts which circumstances 
can never justify.31 
 These issues would become standard in 12th and 13th century discussions of 
ethics. Closer to Albert, William of Auxerre (d. 1231) distinguishes between two 
meanings of 'generic goodness': 
The generic good can be taken in two ways. In the first way the generic good is 
called that which in itself has goodness adjoined to it in a general way 
(generaliter), and of necessity; for example, having charity. In a second way that 
is called generically good which, in itself and insofar as it is in itself, is good in a 
                                                 
30 Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, lib. 2, dist. 36, Quaracchi ed., 504. 
31 Ibid., dist. 40, 520-522; See Lottin, PEM 2, 421-424. See chapter 2 below for a discussion of intention in 
Lombard and in Albert. 
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general way, unless some circumstance deforming it from the outside is present; 
and in this way to give alms is generically good.32 
William's first way seems to correspond roughly with Lombard's per se good acts. He 
claims (in his reply to objection 2 of the same question) that giving alms is not 
generically good in the first sense because it is not good "of necessity"; and this seems to 
mean that it can be done badly. Thus the generic good in the first sense consists in those 
actions which can only be done well. William's example appears at first glance to be 
unhelpful here: "having charity" isn't an action at all, and we might wonder whether he 
thinks that there are specifically charitable actions, which are always and only done from 
charity.  
 We should keep in mind that charity is a theological virtue infused by God into 
the soul. For William, there is no particular action type associated with charity, since it 
directs one's interior dispositions and is at the root of all the truly charitable person's 
actions. This is why William says that this first sort of generic good has goodness 
attached to it "in a general way" (generaliter). It does not refer to specific kinds of 
actions, like feeding the hungry. Rather, it is an internal quality or disposition of the 
person that makes her good. This is obviously quite different from the sense of generic 
goodness that Lombard reports, and it will not be taken up by later thinkers. 
 The second sense of generic good is more important here, and both Philip the 
Chancellor and Albert will adopt it. Here too William is less clear than one would like. 
He claims that a generically good action is good "unless some circumstance deforming it" 
                                                 
32 William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea, lib. 3, tract. 10, cap. 4, quest. 5, art. 1, Ribailler ed., 159: "Bonum in 
genere duobus modis accipitur. Primo modo dicitur in genere bonum quod secundum se habet generaliter 
sibi annexam bonitatem, et ex necessitate, ut habere caritatem. Secundo modo dicitur bonum in genere 
quod in se et quantum in se est, generaliter est bonum, nisi aliqua circumstantia deformans ipsum 
extrinsecus adveniat; et secundum hoc dare elemosinam est bonum in genere." 
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is present, which indicates that it is sometimes good (when there is no deforming 
circumstance), but sometimes not good (when there is a deforming circumstance). But if 
it is not good when a deforming circumstance is present, then it is hard to see why one 
would continue to call it "generically good". It may be that William is trying to express a 
distinction that Albert will make much more clearly, between pro tanto and all things 
considered judgments of goodness. Or it is possible that William thinks of the generic 
good deformed by a bad circumstance as good counterfactually: it would be good, were it 
not for this particular circumstance. 
 Making a parallel distinction between two senses of 'generically bad', William 
states that fornicating is generically bad in the first sense, whereas killing a human being 
is generically bad in the second sense.33 Fornicating is bad secundum se, and thus can 
never be done well regardless of the circumstances, whereas killing a human being is 
only bad in a general sense (universaliter), not secundum se. In some circumstances, 
killing a human being might be morally required, despite the fact that it is generically 
bad. 
 Philip the Chancellor (c. 1160 - 1236) also outlines a view of the generic good in 
his Summa de bono, distinguishing between three types of goodness in action: an action 
can be good generically, good from the circumstances, and good from grace. As an 
example of the first, he gives feeding (reficere) the hungry; as an example of the second, 
giving to the needy as much as will suffice for them, or as much as they need; as an 
example of the third, giving to the needy as much as they need, from an infusion of grace 
and from the right intention.  To describe the way these three sorts of goodness are 
related, Philip adopts the Aristotelian division of first potentiality, second 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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potentiality/first actuality, and second actuality.34 The generic good is a first potentiality, 
while the good of circumstances is a second potentiality dispositam (or first actuality), 
and the good of grace is a second potentiality completam (or second actuality).35  To act 
well, then, we will need all three sorts of goodness pertaining to action. Philip generally 
does not distinguish between moral goodness and the good of grace; and it is interesting 
to note that in the DNB, Albert follows the same structure as Philip, but substitutes 
political virtue for grace. Of course, Albert intended to discuss grace in the third treatise 
of his unfinished work; yet even in this early period of his career, he appears to think that 
political virtue can account for the third and already (in some sense) complete level of the 
goodness of action. 
Division of 3 Types of Goodness According to Philip the Chancellor 
 
Goodness Example 
Generic goodness  Giving to the needy 
Good from circumstances Giving to the needy as much as they need 
Good from grace Giving to the needy as much as they need, from grace and right intention 
 
 When Albert comes to these issues, then, he is dealing with a long tradition. 
While Albert places generic good and bad in the context of a discussion of ethics36, the 
concept is both ethical and metaphysical. That is, to call an action generically good is to 
make a metaphysical evaluation of that action; yet as we shall see, this metaphysical 
evaluation has moral implications. It is thus helpful to see Albert's discussion of the 
generic good as lying at the intersection of action theory and ethics. Albert is attempting 
                                                 
34 See De anima II.1, 412a20-28. 
35 Philip the Chancellor, Summa de bono I , 327-352. 
36 Albert clearly conceives of generic goodness as a moral concept. In the DNB, he discusses it in the 
treatise on political virtue. In SDB I.2.4, p. 29, lines 11-23, generic goodness is the first topic to be 
explored after Albert transitions from a metaphysical treatment of the good to an account of the moral 
good, where he begins by saying: "Consequenter quaerendum est de bono moris." 
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to describe the fundamental constituents of an action: each action, inasmuch as it is an 
action, proceeds from deliberation and choice; but it also has a sort of natural suitability 
(as the act of feeding is taken to be naturally suited to the hungry person as its object), or 
a natural unsuitability (as with the act of feeding someone who has already sated), or (by 
the time he writes the SDB) a kind of indifference between those two options. This 
generic level is part of the structure of any action, and to make judgments of good or bad 
at this level is to make a judgment about whether the action has this sort of natural 
suitability; it is not, however, to make a judgment about the moral rightness or wrongness 
of the action. Nevertheless, generic goodness and badness have moral implications, and 
part of the difficulty in interpreting Albert lies in deciphering what those implications are. 
 Before discussing Albert's theory of generic goodness, a note on his views on 
goodness more generally. Albert has a complex account of goodness as a transcendental, 
which forms a part of his metaphysics of the transcendentals more generally. This 
broader account is beyond the scope of this dissertation.37 It will suffice to note here that 
for Albert, God can be identified as goodness itself, and the source of the goodness of all 
other things.38 By contrast, every created thing is good precisely because it is created by 
God. And since nothing exists which is not created by God, Albert accepts Boethius's 
claim that those things which are, are good.39 Since actions exist, each one is good, at a 
pre-moral, metaphysical level. Thus Albert will agree with those theologians cited by 
Peter Lombard, who said that every human action has "essential goodness", though this 
                                                 
37 For more on Albert and the notion of goodness as a transcendental, see MacDonald, "Goodness and the 
Transcendentals" (1991). 
38 DNB I.1 
39 SDB I.1.7; Boethius, De hebdomadibus, PL 64,1311D. 
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does not prevent it from being morally bad. What follows will be a discussion only of the 
moral goodness and badness of acts in Albert's thought. 
 In the DNB, Albert's account of the generic good and bad has three important 
features: 1) It is that which is first in the order of morals.40 There are different stages of 
consideration in the evaluation of an act, going from the more general to the more 
specific. The level of generic goodness and badness is the most general level, the first 
thing to consider when approaching an act from a moral point of view. This is a very low 
level of description, but it is to this description that we can add more richly moral 
qualities, which in turn will allow for a full moral evaluation of the action. 2) It is 
characterized in terms of an act either on its appropriate matter (the generic good) or on 
some inappropriate matter (the generic bad).41 Probably the most helpful example here is 
feeding the hungry: the hungry are such that the act of feeding is properly fitted to them. 
By contrast, feeding the sated is generically bad; those who are already full are an 
inappropriate object for the act of feeding. 3) Each can be done well or badly, depending 
on the circumstances.42 A generically good act will be done badly if done with a bad 
intention, for example. A generically bad act will be done well if it is done in suitable 
circumstances. Thus the generic level does not tell us whether an act may be morally 
required or forbidden or permitted; indeed, Albert thinks that some generically bad acts 
are not merely permissible, but required. 
 This picture leaves open many questions. For one thing, it is difficult to 
distinguish the appropriate or inappropriate matter from one of the circumstances, namely 
the object of the act. If we have established that the person we are feeding is hungry, is 
                                                 
40 DNB II.1, 8, 51-53. 
41 DNB II.1, 8-9, 65-6. 
42 DNB II.1, 9, 7-21. 
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this not already a circumstance? One might also wonder what role the generic level plays 
in the overall evaluation of an act, given that an all things considered judgment of the act 
may be such that a generically good act is forbidden, or a generically bad act is required. 
 As I show below, the SDB account of generic goodness and badness adds 
considerable nuance to the relatively simple picture of the DNB. Albert changes his 
position concerning what is first in the order of morals: this is no longer the generic good 
and bad, but rather the "voluntary act directed toward what is willed in accordance with 
choice and deliberation."43 Thus the most general level of evaluation is not valenced 
toward goodness or badness, but rather provides the conditions for an act to count as 
morally good or bad. There is also a new characterization of the generic good in the SDB 
as what is more inclined or ordered to virtue, whereas the generic bad is what is more 
inclined to vice.44 Finally, in SDB Albert introduces the notion of the good in species, 
which to my knowledge has not been discussed in the literature.45  
 My aim in the next sections will be to get clear on the notions of generic and 
specific good and bad.46 I will aim to describe in which ways the generic good abstracts 
from circumstances, and in which ways it does not.47 Further, in contrast to the DNB 
picture, where Albert gives examples of generic goods such as "killing the one who 
should be killed" and "liberating the one who should be liberated", the SDB provides a 
                                                 
43 SDB I.2.4, 29, 43-49: "Simpliciter autem primum in moribus est id  quod est possibile ad condicionem 
laudis, quae est virtus, vel vituperii, quae est vitium, et hoc est voluntarius actus secundum eligentiam et 
deliberationem existens super volitum. Iste enim actus possibilis est ad utrumque contrariorum et 
aequaliter." 
44 SDB I.2.4, 29, 49-53. 
45 See SDB I.2.4 ad 5, 30, 22-36. 
46 The generic good and generic bad have not been given much attention in the literature. Lottin notes 
Albert's debt to Philip the Chancellor, and draws attention to the relations between the bonum in genere, the 
bonum in se, and the bonum secundum se (PEM 2, 451-460). Cunningham (2008) argues that the generic 
good is for Albert the material cause of virtue, and remarks briefly on Albert's relation to the tradition 
which preceded him (124-127). 
47 See e.g. SDB I.2.4 ad 2, 29, 67-74. 
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much narrower range of examples of such acts,48 and claims that some action types 
cannot be described at the generic level at all, but can only be understood in conjunction 
with a range of circumstances. I will argue that Albert adopts a much more complex and 
nuanced picture of the relation between the generic good and moral circumstances in the 
SDB precisely because the DNB picture provides no way of describing generic goods and 
bads without appealing to circumstances. While Albert is able to avoid some of those 
difficulties in the SDB account, it is still beset by formulations which are imprecise and 
unclear. 
  
---------------- 
 
1.B Generic Goodness in the DNB 
 
 The DNB is Albert's earliest known work, and is thus our source for his ethical 
views at their earliest stage of development. Albert begins the DNB by distinguishing 
between two senses of the word 'good'. There is what is good per se and substantially; 
and this is God, who is goodness itself. While everything that exists is good precisely 
insofar as it has being, only God is substantially good, identified with goodness itself. 
There is also the created good, which is not good substantially but owes its goodness to 
God. Albert then announces his intention to discuss the created good from the perspective 
of morals. Unlike in the later SDB, there is no extended metaphysical treatment of 
goodness; his focus in this early work is strictly on ethics. He intends for the work to be 
                                                 
48 SDB I.2.4 ad 8, 29-30, 80-6; ad 7, 30, 42-60. 
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composed of seven treatises, focusing on seven different kinds of goods: natural good, 
political virtue, grace, gifts, beatitude, the fruit of the Spirit, and finally happiness.49 The 
work is unfinished, however, at least in the form available to modern readers. Only the 
first treatise is complete. Albert planned to discuss the four cardinal virtues in detail in 
the section on political virtue, but we have only an examination of temperance, and even 
that unwieldy section is incomplete. 
 The generic good is discussed at the beginning of the second treatise, on political 
virtue. But the first treatise introduces the natural good (bonum naturae), which is also 
clearly a moral concept (unlike, say, an act's essential goodness as discussed by Peter 
Lombard). Its presence at the beginning of the DNB might suggest that our evaluation of 
actions should start not with the generic good, but rather with the natural good. Albert 
makes it clear, however, that the natural good is primarily a property of agents, not 
actions. It is thus analogous to virtue, an innate predisposition toward acting well which 
will need to be completed by virtue (as well as grace, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc.).50 
 At any rate, the DNB appears to be the only work in which Albert discusses the 
natural good at length. When he gets to the section on moral goodness in the SDB, Albert 
begins with the generic good, neglecting even to mention the natural good. The natural 
good also seems to have no bearing on the discussion of generic goodness and political 
virtue that follows in the DNB. The treatise on the natural good is noteworthy for 
containing Albert's first reflections on the role of intention in ethics, and I will return to 
this topic in chapter 2. But the natural good does not seem to have the significance that 
the generic good will for Albert's thought. 
                                                 
49 DNB, proemium, 1. 
50 I return to the subject of the natural good in Chapter 2, as the broader topic under which Albert first 
discusses intention as an ethical concept. 
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 After a short summary of some 12th-century views on generic goodness and 
badness, Albert proceeds to describe it as that which is first in matters pertaining to 
morals. And he elaborates as follows: 
Just as in nature there is one primary thing, which is the subject of natural forms, 
namely matter, and sometimes it has a beautiful form and sometimes an ugly one, 
so also in morals, namely in the acts of our will, there is one act (opus), which is 
the subject of circumstances, and this is called the generic good and the generic 
bad and sometimes it is clothed with good circumstances, sometimes with bad 
circumstances, etc. In this way the generic good is the mere act brought to bear 
upon its appropriate (debitam) matter, such as feeding the hungry and killing 
those who should be killed and freeing those who should be freed.  For the matter 
of an action is that about which our action is concerned. Similarly, the generic bad 
is an act brought to bear upon inappropriate (indebitam) matter, such as feeding 
(reficere) the sated or killing those who should not be killed. And others should 
be understood in the same way.51 
Here we see Albert describing the generic good or bad as an action at a fairly low level of 
description. We can identify three components: 1) the act; for example, feeding; 2) the 
matter; for example, the hungry person; and 3) the appropriateness or inappropriateness 
of the matter for the act. It is the third characteristic that determines the valence of an 
action at the generic level: if the matter is appropriate for the act, then it will be 
                                                 
51 DNB II.1.1, 8-9, 58-6: "Sicut in natura est res una prima, quae est subiectum formarum naturalium, 
scilicet materia, et quandoque habet formam pulchram et quandoque turpem, sic etiam in moribus, in 
operibus scilicet voluntatis nostrae, est opus unum, quod est subiectum circumstantiis, et hoc dicitur bonum 
in genere et malum in genere et quandoque vestitur circumstantiis bonis, quandoque malis etc. Sic bonum 
in genere est actus solus super materiam debitam, ut pascere esurientem et interficere interficiendum et 
liberare liberandum. Materia enim operis est id circa quod est opus nostrum. Similiter malum in genere est 
actus super indebitam materiam, ut reficere saturatum vel occidere non-occidendum. Et sic de aliis 
intelligendum est." 
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generically good, while if it is inappropriate for the act, it will be generically bad. (In the 
SDB, as we shall see, a third valence is added: some actions are generically indifferent.) 
 Albert compares the generic quality of an action in ethics to matter in natural 
philosophy. Matter is supposed to be primary, or "first", in nature inasmuch as it is the 
subject of natural forms. Presumably Albert has in mind a kind of conceptual priority 
here; in order for natural forms to exist at all, it is necessary that there be matter to be 
formed. Natural forms cannot be understood except inasmuch as they organize matter in a 
particular way. So Albert is indicating that moral circumstances are similar to natural 
forms: they only exist as modifying generic goods and bads. This analogy that sees 
generic goodness as matter and circumstances as forms piggybacks upon the analogy 
built into the concept of generic goodness, according to which an act is like a form joined 
to the (appropriate) matter. 
 Unfortunately, Albert doesn't say much about the primacy claim beyond the 
analogy with natural forms. And we might question Albert's claim that generic goodness 
is what is first in the order of morals. When evaluating an action, we might be inclined to 
start with one of the circumstances – 'why', for example. That is, we might want to start 
with an agent's reasons for acting, and then later proceed to the details of the action in 
question. It seems further that Albert would be sympathetic to this line of questioning, 
since the details of one's actions will be filled in by other circumstances (where, when, 
with what instruments, etc.), and as we shall see in chapter 2, he tends to prioritize 
intention above the other circumstances. So beyond the analogy with natural forms, is 
there any reason to think that generic goodness should come first in a moral evaluation? 
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 When he speaks of circumstances as "added" to generic goodness, or of generic 
goodness as "clothed" with circumstances, Albert indicates that generic goodness is 
something basic, akin to a substance to which accidental forms can be added. 
Circumstances only exist as "clothing" for a bare act underneath. His idea seems to be 
that for any evaluation to proceed, we must have some general idea about the sort of act 
that was performed. This general notion is inadequate, and will need to be specified in 
many ways by the circumstances, but it is nevertheless a crucial starting point. Our most 
pressing question when assessing what someone did might be "why did you do that?" But 
in order to ask this question, we need to have some sense of what "that" is. An act's 
generic quality provides the basis for further evaluation. 
 This leads Albert to make an essential claim about acts at the generic level: 
generically good acts can be done badly, and generically bad acts can be done well. 
Whether an act is done well or badly depends on the circumstances within which the act 
is performed. I will look at the case of generically good acts done badly first. For Albert, 
to say that a generically good act was done badly frequently means that it was done for 
the wrong reasons. Thus he gives first the example of someone who feeds the hungry for 
the sake of vanity, or to enhance her own reputation.52 As a contemporary parallel, one 
might say that in this example, feeding the hungry was still the right action; but that it 
wasn't "morally motivated", or that it lacked "positive moral worth", as Kant would say.  
 However, the circumstance cur is only one of the seven circumstances. Other 
circumstances might make it the case that the action is no longer a right action; they 
might even make it the case that the action is forbidden, despite the fact that it remains 
generically good. Consider Albert's second example of a generically good act done badly: 
                                                 
52 DNB II.1.1, 9, 10-11. 
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"killing someone who should be killed on account of malice and revenge, not as the 
upholder of the order of law".53 This example is similar to the first, in that it involves 
acting for the wrong reasons. But the further qualification that the agent was not an 
officer of the law seems to indicate that the act ought not to have been done. Malice and 
revenge lead the agent to kill a person, who really ought to be killed, in the wrong way 
(extrajudicially, we might imagine). In order for the agent in this example to act well, it 
would not be enough for her to perform the same action from different motives; she 
would also need to perform the action of killing at a different time, in a different place, 
following the proper procedures, etc., but most importantly, she would need to be acting 
in that capacity of an "upholder of the order of law" -- an executioner, or instance. Still, 
the person who fails to preserve the order of justice when killing someone who ought to 
be killed performs a generically good act. The act is appropriate for that matter, and the 
fact that it is clothed with bad circumstances doesn't change that. 
 It is also possible for a generically bad act to be done well. Albert's most vivid 
example (which we also find in Peter Abelard's Ethics) is of a judge who puts to death a 
person he knows is innocent, because the allegations and evidence all point to her guilt.54 
In this case, Albert thinks the judge is compelled to condemn the innocent person to 
death: this is what he ought to do, all things considered. Yet the action doesn't cease to be 
generically bad; it is always bad to kill an innocent person, even if in some cases it is 
morally required. 
                                                 
53 DNB II.1.1, 9, 11-12: "similiter occidere occidendum propter livorem et vindictam non servator ordine 
iuris." 
54 DNB II.1.1, 9, 15-21; Abelard, Scito te ipsum, 81; see footnote 10 above. I discuss this example in 
greater detail below; see chapter 3, section E. 
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 These examples show how an evaluation can proceed in the stages Albert 
identifies. At the first stage is the generic good and bad, which are at a very low level of 
moral determinacy. The generic goodness or badness of an act is a real metaphysical 
feature of an act, and it has clear moral implications: if someone is engaged in an act of 
feeding the hungry, we have a genuine reason to value the act. Yet this act can be done 
badly, and a full evaluation of the act will depend upon other features of the act and of 
the agent -- i.e., the moral circumstances.55 
 We can think of these stages as each providing a pro tanto reason for valuing the 
action.56 A pro tanto reason to value an act is (unlike a prima facie reason) not merely an 
apparent reason to value the act. On the other hand, it does not give us an all things 
considered reason to value it. Albert's account of generic goodness and badness is in 
some ways similar to W.D. Ross's prima facie duties. These are not in fact duties, as Ross 
himself notes, but are characteristics of action "related in a special way to duty".57 Nor 
are they prima facie, in the sense of only being apparent: Ross describes them as real 
moral features of an action, which retain their force even when overridden by another, 
stronger prima facie duty. (For this reason, people today generally refer to Rossian prima 
facie duties as pro tanto or contributory reasons). Distinguishing prima facie duties from 
"duties proper", Ross conceives of prima facie duties as features of an action that give us 
reasons to act: if an act is prima facie wrong, then we have a moral reason not to do it.58  
                                                 
55 There is also a third stage: the moral disposition from which an action proceeds, be it virtue or vice. I will 
have more to say on that below. 
56 For a discussion of pro tanto reasons for valuing, see McGonical (2010). See also Jonathan Dancy's 
discussion of the contributory in his (2004), especially pages 15-37.  
57 Ross (1930), 20. 
58 Because I interpret Albert's account of generic goodness as primarily one of action assessment rather 
than action guidance, I have described the generic goodness of an action as providing reasons for valuing 
the act, rather than reasons for acting. My account of Ross on prima facie duties is drawn in part from 
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 Thus, like Albert's generic goodness and badness, Ross's prima facie duties 
consist of a characteristic or feature of an action, along with a positive or negative 
valence. Ross expresses the valence in terms of rightness or wrongness; Albert expresses 
it in terms of goodness or badness. At this point, however, they part ways. For Ross, right 
acts (i.e., those which we ought to do all things considered) are "those which, of all those 
possible for the agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance of prima facie 
rightness, in those respects in which they are prima facie right, over their prima facie 
wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima facie wrong...".59 There is no simple 
algorithm for determining where the greatest balance of prima facie rightness over prima 
facie wrongness lies, however; there are no general rules for determining which 
obligation is stronger. Quoting Aristotle, Ross claims that "the decision rests with 
perception".60 
 For Albert, on the other hand, whether an act is done well cannot be determined 
by comparing generic goodnesses and badnesses. Indeed, Albert nowhere considers the 
possibility that an act might be generically good in one respect, and generically bad in 
another respect. Instead, whether an act is done well or badly depends on the 
circumstances. Unlike actions at the level of generic description, many circumstances do 
not have a preset valence. Some do; acts done from the intention of envy or malice, for 
example, are always done badly. But many do not, and Albert makes no attempt to divide 
the circumstances into positive and negative, good and bad. Albert's discussion of 
circumstances in the DNB contains a relatively sparse theoretical apparatus (the Boethian 
                                                                                                                                                 
Stratton-Lake (2002), in particular pages xxxiii-xxxv, and from Dancy (2004), especially pages 5-7 and 18-
19. 
59 Ross (1930), 41. 
60 Ibid., 42; Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b23, 1126b4. 
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division of the different kinds of circumstances), along with a rich array of scriptural 
examples, and the reason for this seems to be that he has very little to say about the moral 
impact of any given circumstance in the abstract. The way in which any circumstance 
will affect our evaluation of an action varies widely from case to case. I will return to this 
issue in the next section. 
 In the DNB Albert does not explain in much detail what it would mean for some 
matter to be appropriate (debita) for a kind of act. He says that the generic good consists 
in an appropriate proportion of our act to some matter, and he describes the matter as the 
thing (res) which the act is about. He further states that the generic good displays itself in 
us "when we do what we ought to do, and when we omit what we ought to omit".61 These 
remarks do very little to clarify what sort of proportion he has in mind. On the other 
hand, he provides a large number of examples of generically good acts. These include not 
only the traditional ones, like feeding the hungry (pascere esurientem), but others like 
killing the one who should be killed (interficere interficiendum) and liberating the one 
who should be liberated (liberare liberandum).62 From his comments on scriptural 
examples it is clear that Albert thinks that there are a great many other generic goods. He 
quotes Job 29:17, "Conterebam molas iniqui et de dentibus illius auferebam praedam" ("I 
broke the jaws of the wicked and snatched the plunder from his teeth"), and comments 
that to break the jaws of the wicked is to break what ought to be broken (conterere 
conterendum), while snatching the plunder from his teeth is liberating what ought to be 
liberated.63 It is not hard to imagine how such descriptions might proliferate. 
                                                 
61 DNB II.1.2, 9, 29-34. 
62 DNB II.1.1, 9, 2. 
63 DNB II.1.2, 9, 40-44. 
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 Now Albert describes most of his examples of generic goods simply by joining an 
infinitive to the accusative gerund of the same verb. The gerund of itself provides no 
information about the matter beyond the fact that it is the suitable recipient of the action 
indicated by the infinitive. And we might worry that Albert comes by his "proportions of 
act to matter" too easily. What makes it the case that a person ought to be killed, or 
liberated, or whatever? To make those determinations, we will need to know a lot more 
about the situation. Indeed, it seems that we will need to know a lot of the circumstances 
surrounding a person before we can determine whether she indeed ought to be killed. For 
instance, we will need to know something about the circumstance quid, which includes 
the act's object -- i.e., the person to be killed: what has she done such that she deserves to 
be killed? Did she do it knowingly? Does she constitute a threat to society? And so on. If 
these moral circumstances are somehow presupposed by the generic good, then it seems 
that Albert is wrong to describe the generic good and generic bad as what is first in 
morals, to which we can later add circumstances.64 
 To this worry Albert could of course reply, as he does later in the SDB, that 
generic goodness is not supposed to be distinct from all moral circumstances, but only 
from some of them. We need certain circumstances to define a given generic good or bad, 
which is then "clothed" with other circumstances. But in that case, it seems that we 
should want an account explaining why some circumstances help characterize the generic 
good while others do not. Consider the generic good 'interficere interficiendum', killing 
the one who should be killed. The 'should' implied in the gerund is not an all things 
considered 'should'. It might be the case that someone who should be killed, at the generic 
                                                 
64 See chapter 2 for Albert's account of moral circumstances, as well as the increasing attention given to 
quid and its association with the object of an act. 
34 
 
level, should not be killed, all things considered; or that the generic good might be done 
badly, depending on the circumstances. So what we need is a way to distinguish the 
circumstances that underlie the generic good from those which make it the case that it is 
done badly. And Albert simply doesn't provide this in the DNB. For a more sophisticated 
discussion of generic goodness and badness, we must turn to his much larger and more 
comprehensive moral treatise, the SDB. 
 
1.C Generic Goodness in the SDB  
 Albert wrote the SDB during his extremely productive period at the University of 
Paris in the 1240s. Unlike the DNB, it is organized as a collection of disputed questions: 
its five treatises are divided into questions, which are in turn divided into articles. Albert 
is clearly dealing with a much wider array of sources. Thus in trying to determine what it 
would mean for an act to be generically good, Albert considers the various accounts of 
genus and species that he finds in Aristotle and in Boethius, especially in the latter's 
second commentary on the Isagoge. As a result, his answers to these questions are much 
more sophisticated.  
 After considering several different possible meanings for the word 'genus', taken 
mostly from Aristotle's Metaphysics and Porpyry's Isagoge, Albert first states that the 
generic good (literally "good in genus") should be understood as a first potentiality 
toward the good, as what is "inclined more to the good than to the bad."65 Later, he 
specifies that 'genus' in 'good in genus' (or generic good) should be taken "as the matter, 
                                                 
65 SDB I.2.4, ad 1, 29, 63-66. 
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and from a likeness to the genus in nature; and the species should be understood in a 
similar way": 
And [species] is taken here in accordance with this definition: 'the species is what 
flows from the genus.' And we do well to concede that, just as in natures the 
matter is disposed to one form by means of a first disposition but can nevertheless 
be under another form on account of a contrary necessity, so also in morals the 
generic bad can be the subject of the good in species, and conversely the generic 
good can be the subject of the bad in species.66 
Here we have a further specification of the claim that generic goods are action types that 
can be done well or badly. If the first level of moral goodness and badness is the generic 
level, the second is moral species. While a generic good is more disposed to good in 
species, it can nevertheless become bad in species; likewise, the generic bad can become 
good in species. I will come to the question what it might mean for an activity to be more 
disposed in this way shortly. 
 The definition of a species Albert provides in the above quotation is a little odd. 
The editor of the critical edition points us to book 4 of Boethius' second commentary on 
the Isagoge. In that passage, Porphyry is providing not the definition of a species, but the 
definition of a difference: "a difference is that by which a species flows from a genus."67 
We might suppose, from this, that the circumstances function like specific differences, 
placing a generic act into its proper species. (Albert makes a similar remark in his 
                                                 
66 SDB I.2.5, 31, 35-44: "Dicendum, quod genus sumitur hic pro materia et ad similitudinem generis in 
natura et species similiter. Et sumitur hic secundum illam diffinitionem: 'Species est, quae abundat a 
genere;. Et bene concedimus, quod sicut in naturis materia disposita ad unam formam prima dispositione 
tamen potest esse sub alia forma propter necessitatem contrariam, sic etiam in moribus malum in genere 
potest esse subiectum bono in specie, et e converso bonum in genere subiectum malo in specie. Et per hoc 
patet solutio ad omnia quaesita." 
67 Boethius, In Isag. Porph. Ed II, IV.9, 262, 4-5: "Differentia est, qua abundat species a genere." 
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Sentences commentary, saying that the good in species flows from the generic good by 
means of the circumstances.)68 
 There are limits to the genus-species-difference framework here, however. When 
Boethius explains Porphyry's definition of a difference, he uses the example of the 
species human being, which "flows" from the genus animal by means of the differences 
rational and mortal, which constitute it.69 Clearly this example is not analogous to the 
generic good, since the genus animal is not plausibly more disposed toward the 
difference rational than to the difference nonrational. Probably for this reason, then, 
Albert refrains from mentioning specific differences altogether in this context.  
 At any rate, Albert now has a concept -- the good in species -- which doesn't 
appear in the DNB, and for which he will need to provide some explanation. Albert states 
that the generic good is in potentiality to the good in species, and that the latter results 
from the addition of the being of a specific good (esse specialis boni) to the generic good. 
He in turn defines the specific good as "the good of a specific virtue in act or in habit; for 
example, praying is the good of the virtue which is called latria, and knowing one's wife 
is the good of the virtue which is continence."70 (He adds that the good in species is still 
in potentiality to the good of merit, which doesn't get much attention in the SDB.) 
 The idea is this: there are specific actions associated with each virtue. The good in 
species is simply the action type associated with a particular virtue. Of course, an action 
which is good in species can still be done badly, since it can be done at the wrong time or 
in the wrong place, or with a bad intention. But the good in species is conceptually closer 
                                                 
68 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 7, 593. 
69 Boethius, In Isag. Porph. Ed II, IV.9, 262, 17-18. 
70 SDB I.2.4 ad 5, 30, 28-31: "Dico autem potentiam ad speciem, quae reducitur ad actum per esse specialis 
boni, et dico speciale bonum bonum specialis virtutis in actu vel habitu, sicut est orare bonum virtutis, quae 
dicitur latria, et cognoscere coniugatam bonum virtutis, quae est continentia." 
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to being a virtuous action than the generic good is, because it indicates a type of action 
which is typically associated with a particular virtue. With this picture in mind, Albert is 
able to respond to the concern I raised above, that the generic good seems to include 
certain circumstances. In the SDB, Albert clarifies that the generic good does not abstract 
from all circumstances; it will include some circumstances, but excludes the one that 
determines the species of a virtue.71 
 We might worry about this way of putting things, however. Couldn't feeding the 
hungry also be an act associated with a particular virtue, such as generosity? And if not, 
what would we need to add to "reduce" this generically good act to one that is good in 
species?  
 Albert's answer in the SDB isn't as clear as one might hope. In the DNB, Albert 
had described the generic good as that which comes first in morals. By the time he writes 
the SDB, he has changed his view on this: what is 'first' in morals is a voluntary act 
resulting from choice and deliberation. The fact that an act is voluntary, chosen, and 
deliberated about indicates that it is susceptible to moral evaluation: it is the sort of thing 
that can be the object of moral praise (i.e., a virtuous action), or of moral blame (a vicious 
action). This is the most basic description of an act, to which we must add more detail 
until we can conclude that the action is praiseworthy or blameworthy.72  
 The generic good, by contrast, is "more ordered" (ordinatum magis) or inclined to 
virtue, whereas the generic bad is inclined toward vice.73 We do not yet have an action 
which is especially associated with a particular virtue (in which case the act would be 
good in species); nor are we in a position to make an all things considered evaluation of 
                                                 
71 SDB I.2.4, ad 2, 29, 67-74. 
72 SDB I.2.4, 29, 43-47. 
73 SDB I.2.4, 29, 49-53. 
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the action (which would require adding the other moral circumstances); but we do have a 
description which is no longer morally neutral (unlike "a voluntary act resulting from 
choice and deliberation", which is neutral between virtue and vice). If an act is good in 
species, it has a greater ordering toward virtue than an act which is merely generically 
good. Unfortunately, Albert does not analyze the notion of being ordered to or inclined 
toward virtue. The fact that an act is generically good clearly gives us a reason to value it, 
though this is not an all things considered reason.  
 I argued above that in the DNB account of generic goodness Albert relies on a 
notion of proportion between an act and its matter which lacks rigour. By the time he 
writes the SDB, he seems to be aware of this problem. An objector argues that the notion 
of what is appropriate (debitum) belongs to justice, so that an act upon its appropriate 
matter belongs to the category of just acts, and not generic goods. Albert replies that here 
we have a different sort of debitum: a given object is the appropriate matter of a particular 
act only if there is a certain "natural" proportion between the act and the matter.74 
 The three examples he gives are feeding the hungry, teaching the ignorant, and 
consoling the sorrowful. The ignorant person, then, is "by nature" the sort of person that 
can be taught; and it is naturally suitable to the sad person to be consoled. Now Albert 
says very little about the notion of natural proportion, and we might wonder whether a 
satisfactory account of it can be given. But he seems to have abandoned the simplistic 
procedure from the DNB of simply joining an infinitive to an accusative gerund. There is 
an intuitive connection between the act of consoling and the sorrowful person, or between 
the act of teaching and the ignorant person. Teaching the ignorant person is not always 
what we ought to do in the circumstances, and consoling the sorrowful person can be 
                                                 
74 SDB 1.2.4, 29, 20-24; 29-30, 80-6.  
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done badly. But at a low level of description, these acts are good, and we have a pro tanto 
reason to value them. 
 Thus while Albert has added more detail to this theory, in the SDB he is still 
explicitly committed to the stages theory: a generically good act can be done badly, and a 
generically bad act can be done well. The concept of the good or bad in species provides 
a further way in which acts at the generic level can be done well or badly, since a 
generically good act can be bad in species, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the theory is 
fundamentally similar to that presented in the DNB. 
 
1.D Generic Goodness in Albert's Sentences Commentary 
 Albert returns to the generic good at various points in his commentary on Peter 
Lombard's Sentences. He covers much of the same territory as the SDB, and embraces 
similar positions, which should not be surprising given that both works were written in 
the 1240s. Given that the Sentences commentary is a work of theology, we find 
discussions of the generic good cropping up in disputed questions about grace. In 
particular, Albert asks whether free decision (liberum arbitrium) is capable of attaining 
any sort of goods without grace.75 This question bears directly on the problem of pagan 
virtue, which it was common for medieval theologians to address from the 12th century 
onward.76 Albert argues that human beings are indeed capable of achieving certain goods 
without God's grace, and the generic good is one of these goods. Elsewhere in the 
                                                 
75 Sentences II, distinction 28, art 1, p. 484-485. Borgnet. 
76 See Marenbon (2015), especially pages 160-163, and Bejczy (2011). 
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Sentences commentary, we find Albert asking whether the act of offering animal 
sacrifices, as the ancient Jews did, was generically good.77 (He concludes that it was not). 
 For our purposes, there are two ways in which Albert expands upon his treatment 
of the generic good in his Sentences commentary. There is also a possible third, much 
more radical change, which seems to follow from the first two, but which is contrary to 
Albert's explicit description of the generic bad. In what follows I will examine the two 
expansions first; then I will outline one area in which the Sentences commentary concurs 
with the SDB, though not with the DNB; finally, I will explore the possible break with 
the earlier works, arguing that the view presented in Sentences commentary II appears to 
be in tension with the stages theory that Albert defended in DNB and SDB. 
 First, he clarifies the ways in which the words "genus" and "species" should be 
taken in the context of the generic and specific goods.78 While in the SDB he works hard 
to explain how these logical terms apply in ethics, in the Sentences commentary he makes 
clear that both should be understood metaphorically when applied to generic and specific 
goodness.79 Rather than understanding generic goodness (bonum in genere) as a genus 
strictly speaking, we should see it as having certain similarities with the logical concept. 
 Why then are the terms genus and species used in this crucial area of ethics? 
Albert points out that the genus can be understood as a subject or substance, to which 
differences can be added, with a species as the result. In this case, the genus is 
substantially "in" the species. Similarly, he claims, the generic good is somehow "in" the  
                                                 
77 Sentences IV, distinction 1, article 8, pages 19 to 21, Borgnet. 
78 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, and article 7, 593. 
79 SDB I, Q. 2, articles 4 and five; Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, solution; Sentences 
Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 7, 593, ad 1. 
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good in species.80 Unfortunately, Albert is not forthcoming with any examples here. Still, 
we might take some of Albert's more frequent examples of generic goods, such as 
clothing the naked or feeding the hungry. By adding various circumstances, we might 
arrive at a description of acts typical of the generous person. The specific good in 
question will then be the act of a particular virtue, generosity. It is not hard to see how  
the generic good is present in the specific good; the act is still one of clothing the naked 
or feeding the hungry, but it is more richly described, with enough detail that the act can 
count as typical of a particular virtue. 
 In addition, and more obscurely, Albert says that the genus can be understood as a 
principle of generation, and this conception of genera also applies to the generic good. 
Now this could be taken to mean that the genus produces (agit) the species, but Albert 
claims that this is the wrong way to understand the generic good as generative. Rather, 
the generic good is a principle of generation because "it remains in the species through a 
decision."81 It is far from clear how the generic good metaphorically generates the good 
in species, but Albert doesn't dwell on this idea, and offers no further explanation of it. 
This point seems to be of little importance to him. 
 More interesting is the second innovation Albert brings to the generic good in the 
Sentences commentary: he explains the generic good in terms of first and second 
potentiality. The classical source for this distinction is Aristotle's De anima, where 
Aristotle speaks of different senses in which someone can be called a knower.82 Every 
human being can be called a knower, simply because human beings fall within the class 
of beings that have knowledge. A particular human being, on the other hand, is a knower 
                                                 
80 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, ad 3. 
81 Ibid. 
82 De anima, Bk II, ch. 5, 417a21-417b2. 
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if she possesses knowledge – say, of grammar – even if she is not currently thinking 
about grammar. Finally, that human being is a knower when she is engaged in what 
Aristotle calls "active exercise" of grammar; for example, thinking that the sentence she 
is reading is a run-on sentence. This discussion led to the traditional distinctions between 
first and second potentiality, and first and second actuality. Simply possessing human 
nature gives us a first potentiality toward knowing grammar; the inactive possession of 
grammatical knowledge gives us a second potentiality, or first actuality; and the active 
exercise of grammar is a second actuality. 
 Albert adapts this apparatus to his ethical thought by calling generic goodness a 
first potentiality: 
But in morals this is the act of the will related to the matter it ought to be about in 
accordance with its own nature; for example, feeding the hungry, and giving to 
the needy, and so on with the others. And the antiqui mean the same thing when 
they define the generic good, saying that it can be done well and badly. For the 
first potentiality in some genus is determinable to either of two contraries by 
means of the differences ordered to the potentiality of the subject.83 
We see some familiar elements here: the generic good is 1) an act of the will; 2) on the 
appropriate matter; 3) in accordance with its own (i.e., the act's) nature. The last item is 
reminiscent of the SDB claim that there is a natural proportion between acts and matter in 
generic goods.84 Albert also supplies a reason for calling the generic good a first 
potentiality: since the first potentiality in a genus is supposed to be open to either of two 
                                                 
83 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, solution. 
84 SDB I, Q. 2, Art. 4, ad 8, 82-6. 
43 
 
contraries, this designation fits well with the traditional definition of the generic good as 
that which can be done well or badly. 
 But if the generic good is a first potentiality, what will play the role of second 
potentiality here? Albert's answer is somewhat surprising: second potentiality is "in the 
other circumstances, excepting the end (praeter finem)."85 Based on what he wrote in the 
SDB, one might expect Albert to claim that, if the generic good is a first potentiality, the 
generic good plus the circumstances is the second potentiality. Here in his commentary 
on the Sentences, however, Albert distinguishes between the end and the rest of the 
circumstances; the second potentiality excludes the end. 
 A clue as to why Albert doesn't include the end in what counts as the second 
potentiality in morals comes later in the same book, where he makes a distinction 
between circumstances and the internal act of the will, adding that "circumstances are 
properly about external acts."86 In the Sentences commentary, it seems that Albert has 
changed his account of circumstances. In the SDB he includes both internal acts like 
intentions and external acts and facts under the broad umbrella of moral circumstances. 
But in the Sentences commentary he has a clear divide between internal and external.87 In 
the next section I will argue that this change results from a focus on intention in the 
Sentences commentary, which leads Albert to treat it as separate from and more 
important than the other circumstances. Suffice to say here that this separation leads 
Albert to conceive of the second potentiality (where the generic good is the first) as the 
generic good along with external circumstances, but excluding the end. 
                                                 
85 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, ad 2. 
86 Sentences Commentary book II, distinction XL, A, article 1, ad 3, page 624. 
87 It might be argued that the end is itself external to the agent, or at least that it is not internal in the same 
way as the intention which is directed toward it. I will take up this problem in the next section; for now, I 
merely note that Albert himself appears to conceive of the end as somehow internal to the agent. 
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 Given that we have both a first potentiality and a second potentiality (first 
actuality), it is natural to ask what the second actuality is here. Albert doesn't say 
explicitly, and it is possible that he didn't intend for the distinction between first and 
second actuality to be applied here. This seems unlikely, however; potentialities don't 
exist apart from some actuality that completes them, and it is hard to believe that Albert 
would distinguish between a first and second potentiality in the moral act without having 
in mind some second actuality as well. There is also a logical candidate: if the first 
actuality is the generic good along with the circumstances excluding the end, the second 
actuality may be the generic good along with the circumstances including the end. And 
while he doesn't call it a second actuality, Albert does refer to this fuller, more complete 
description of the moral act, calling it "the unqualifiedly absolute good" (bonum 
absolutum simpliciter), and saying that it is perfect "with respect to the form of the good 
from the circumstances and the end."88 Later Albert makes a threefold distinction 
between the generic good, the good from circumstances (which he explicitly states should 
be understood as external circumstances), and finally the "good in action", which also 
includes internal acts.89 Here is a quick summary, along with Aristotle's example of 
knowing grammar: 
 
 Activity First potentiality 
Second potentiality/ first 
actuality Second actuality 
Knowing grammar 
(Aristotle's De 
anima) 
A human being A human being who possesses 
knowledge of grammar 
A human being exercising 
her knowledge of grammar 
Acting well 
(Albert's 
commentary on the 
Sentences) 
A generically good act A generically good act + 
external circumstances 
A generically good act + 
external circumstances + the 
end 
  bonum in genere bonum ex circumstantia bonum in actione 
                                                 
88 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 7, ad 2, page 593. 
89 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 40, A, article 1, ad 3, page 624. 
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  Thus in the Sentences commentary we see Albert using new conceptual tools to 
explain the idea of generic goodness, and its relation to the other forms of goodness that 
are possible in a human act. 
 There is one aspect of Albert's thinking on the generic good which is substantially 
the same between the SDB and the Sentences commentary. As we have seen, a standard 
definition of the generic good is as an act upon the appropriate matter (debita materia). 
There are some types of actions, however, that have no appropriate matter. Rather, for the 
purposes of moral evaluation they are inseparable from their circumstances. He gives the 
same two examples in both works: killing (i.e., killing a human being), and having sexual 
intercourse.90 In the SDB, Albert explains why these two acts cannot have a matter which 
is naturally adapted to them: each has a certain "proneness to evil" (pronitas ad malum) 
on the part of the agent; it is much harder to act well, and easier to act badly, when 
performing them.  
 Nevertheless, both killing and sexual intercourse can be specific goods (bonum in 
specie). This is because they are the acts of specific virtues; killing is an act of the virtue 
of justice, while sexual intercourse is the act of conjugal continence. So in certain 
circumstances, these acts are not only good, but necessary for acting virtuously. 
Nevertheless, without these circumstances they are "always bad", and the temptation to 
perform them in the wrong circumstances is significant.91 For this reason, our moral 
evaluation of them does not begin at the generic level, but rather with circumstances 
already present.  
                                                 
90 SDB I, question two, article 4, ad 7; Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 7, solution, page 593. 
91 SDB I, question two, article 4, ad 7, 56-60. 
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 Note that this view contradicts Albert's thinking in the DNB, where one of his 
examples of a generic good is "killing the one who should be killed" (occidere 
occidendum), while "killing the one who should not be killed" (occidere non-
occidendum) is given as a generically bad act.92 In the SDB, however, Albert states 
explicitly that occidere occidendum is not generically good, and argues that the word 
"occidendum" already implies the circumstances that would make killing an act of 
justice.93 As noted above in section B, by the time he writes the SDB, Albert has 
abandoned his earlier practice of naming generic goods by joining together an infinitive 
with the gerund of the same verb. Instead he explains generic good in terms of a natural 
fit between the act and the matter, and he continues to do so in the Sentences 
commentary.94 
 Having outlined the account of generic goodness presented in the Sentences 
commentary, we are now in a position to ask: is Albert still committed to the stages 
theory? More specifically, does he continue to hold that generically bad acts can be done 
well? The answer to this question appears at first to be a straightforward yes. In Sentences 
IV, Albert describes the generic bad as "what can be done well in some circumstance".95 
The text is unambiguous. 
 But while that text is clear, it is at least noteworthy that Albert makes no similar 
claim in Sentences II, which contains his account of generic goodness and badness. The 
Sentences IV text appears in a question about purgatory, and Albert mentions generic 
                                                 
92 DNB II, part 1, chapter 1, lines 11, 15; in the same chapter he also uses the phrase interficere 
interficiendum (line 2), which means the same thing. 
93 SDB I, question two, article 4, ad 7, 51-56. 
94 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 36, K., article 6, 592, solution. 
95 Super IV libros Sententiarum, Lib.IV, dist.21, art.4, p.867: "est malum in genere quod bene possit aliqua 
circumstantia fieri." 
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badness there only in order to distinguish it from venial sin. Of course the fact that Albert 
doesn't make the same claim in Sentences II does not mean that he doesn't hold it; 
perhaps he took it for granted. But there is another possibility, namely that at this  point 
he has conflicting views, and that the account he presents in book II of the Sentences  
commentary may be in tension with the position he later reiterates in book IV. 
  How does the book II account seem to contrast with the stages theory? First, the 
notion that the generic good is "in" the good in species, and that it is also a principle of 
generation for the good in species, raises the question whether the generic bad can also 
play this role. Albert says that the word 'species' indicates the property of the species by 
which it flows (abundat) from the genus. That is, circumstances are added to the generic 
good, producing the more specified good.96 
 Can the good in species "flow" in this way from the generic bad? Recall that the 
doctrine of the SDB was that it could: the generic bad could form the substrate for the 
good in species. In the Sentences commentary, Albert does reject the claim that the 
generic good is always the substrate for the good in species, and that the generic bad is 
always the substrate for the bad in species. However, the reason he gives for rejecting this 
claim is not that the generic bad can be the substrate for the good in species (his position 
in the SDB). Instead, he appeals to the acts for which the right circumstances are implied 
in the act and the matter, in such a way that they have no proper description at the generic 
level, independent of the surrounding circumstances. These, as we saw, are acts like 
having sexual intercourse or killing. Having sexual intercourse in the right circumstances 
is good in species – it is the act of the virtue of conjugal continence. If it is not done in 
the right circumstances, it is bad in species. In both cases, there is no corresponding 
                                                 
96 Sentences Commentary II, Distinction 36, K., article 7, ad 1, p. 593. 
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generic good or bad. So it is for this reason that Albert denies that the generic good must 
always be the substrate for the good in species: because some acts that are good in 
species have no generic substrate.97  
 This rather leaves open the question whether the generic bad might form the 
substrate for an act that is good in species. Of course this text does not show that it 
cannot; Albert in no way contradicts himself here. But in light of later texts from Albert's 
Ethica and Summa theologiae, the fact that he does not state the stages theory explicitly  
while discussing a claim that denies it is at least worth noting.  
 
 
1.E Generic Goodness in Super Ethica and Ethica 
 In the late 1240s, Robert Grosseteste's new translation of the full 10 books of the 
Nicomachean Ethics became available. Albert would go on to write two commentaries on 
them. As the generic good is not an Aristotelian idea, it does not figure as prominently in 
them as it did in his earlier moral treatises. Nevertheless, Albert does discuss generic 
goodness and badness in two articles in his first commentary on the NE. In SE II.7, he 
comments on NE 1107a, where Aristotle claims that some actions and passions are 
inextricably intertwined with evil (convoluta sunt cum malitia): passions such as envy 
and joy taken in evil, and actions such as adultery, theft, and homicide.98 Aristotle claims 
that there can be no virtuous mean concerning such actions and passions. 
 For Albert, this Aristotelian text provides him with an opportunity to discuss the 
generic quality of actions. Some of the discussion is familiar from his earlier writings. He 
                                                 
97 Sentences Commentary II, Distinction 36, K., article 7, solution, p. 593. 
98 Super Ethica II.7, pp. 124-126. 
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defines the generic good as an act upon its appropriate matter, and states that it can be 
done well or badly.99 There are also some differences. Albert compares the generic good 
to two other sorts of goodness: the per se and the secundum se. Secundum se goodness 
comprehends "the complete nature of a good moral act"; an act which is good secundum 
se is fully morally specified and is good in all the relevant ways, including especially the 
end.100 Per se good acts are on a lower level of description, but include the external 
circumstances. Finally, generic goods are at the lowest level of description, standing 
under (substare) the goodness that comes from having appropriate circumstances and a 
good end.101 Albert's claim from the SDB that the generic good doesn't abstract from all 
circumstances is nowhere to be found here. 
 On the other hand, he explicitly denies that "killing someone who should be 
killed", one of his favourite examples of a generic good in the DNB, is in fact an act upon 
its appropriate matter. The act of killing can never have an appropriate matter, he insists; 
rather, it is in accordance with the nature of human beings that we strive to preserve our 
lives, and those of others. Homicide can be made appropriate only through the addition of 
the moral circumstances, and of the end, with the result that killing is never generically 
good, but it is sometimes virtuous -- specifically, it can be the act of the virtue of 
retributive justice. Thus the killing of a human being is an example of a generic bad 
which can nevertheless be done well (or virtuously).102 Again in the SE, we have a claim 
about the natural proportion (or lack thereof) between an act and its matter; and again, 
                                                 
99 Super Ethica II.7, 125, 10-13 and 65-67. 
100 Super Ethica II.7, 125, 21-27. I will discuss the relevant ways in which an act can be morally good in 
the next section, on moral circumstances. 
101 Super Ethica II.7, 125, 10-21. On this threefold distinction see also Lottin, PEM II, 459. 
102 Super Ethica II.7, ad 1, 125, 32-46. On the possibility that a generically bad action can be made 
appropriate (debita) by being clothed with the right circumstances, see also Super Ethica II.7, ad 4, 125, 
62-74. 
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Albert does not explain this concept in detail. What is it about the nature of living human 
beings that makes it the case that their lives ought to be preserved? Is the mere fact that 
human beings strive to preserve themselves enough to establish that it is against nature to 
kill them? There is no answer to these questions in this text. And indeed, apart from the 
comparison to per se and secundum se goodness, there is very little of note in the SE 
questions on generic goodness. 
 Nor does Albert have much to say about it in his second commentary on the NE. 
Unlike the SE, his Ethica has no disputed questions, leaving somewhat less room for 
Albert to introduce topics that interest him but that are not present in the text he is 
commenting on. Nevertheless, generic goodness merits a brief mention, where Albert 
calls it "the first good in which a human being is perfected in this way [viz., morally]".103 
He further describes it as "the first subject of different species and forms", stating that it 
can be done well or badly, depending on the circumstances.104 These comments are brief,  
and they fit within an expanded account of the stages theory, which focus especially on 
the role of the circumstances. For this reason, I will return to it below in the section on 
circumstances in Ethica.  
 It is not surprising that generic goodness and badness are for the most part 
neglected in the NE commentaries. Setting aside the question to what extent Albert 
advances his own views in his Aristotelian commentaries,105 it is surely not a sign of 
one's lack of commitment to a doctrine that one does not discuss it while commenting on 
a work that does not mention it.  
                                                 
103 Ethica, Lib.1, tract.I, cap.VI, p.14A. 
104 Ibid. 
105 The classic piece dealing with this question is Weisheipl's (1980).  See also Moulin (2009), who argues 
that in his paraphrases of Aristotle's works, Albert sometimes transforms and reappropriates Aristotelian 
theses. 
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 On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that Albert had a single, settled 
view on how one should evaluate actions. In fact, I argue that throughout his career, one 
finds in Albert's ethical works two different ways of morally evaluating actions. The first 
is the stages theory, the threefold method of considering first, the generic quality of the 
action, second, the surrounding circumstances, and third, whether the action was done 
from virtue or vice.106 The other is the evaluation embodied in what I will call the 
Dionysian principle. In order to explain how the Dionysian principle works, and why it is 
in tension with the way of evaluating that takes into account generic goodness and 
badness, it will be necessary for me to first present Albert's theory of moral 
circumstances, since it is important for both accounts of moral evaluation. I will then 
discuss the Dionysian principle, and explore Albert's different formulations of it. Finally, 
I will examine the Dionysian principle as it appears in Thomas Aquinas, and argue that 
he saw the tension between Albert's two methods for evaluating actions, and came down 
in favour of the Dionysian principle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 Like Aristotle, Albert thinks that it is possible to act well in the circumstances, but without acting from 
virtue. He calls this acting from the mode of circumstance (modum qui est ex circumstantia), and contrasts 
it with acting from the mode of habit (modum qui est ex habitu) (SDB I.4.2, ad 14, 50, 57-66). On this 
distinction see Michaud-Quantin (1966), 170-171. 
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Chapter 2: Moral Circumstances 
 My description of generic goodness in the preceding section necessarily makes 
ample reference to moral circumstances, with the result that we have already seen some 
of the ways in which Albert conceives of circumstances, how they fit into his theorizing 
about the moral act, and how his views on circumstances changed over the course of his 
career. In this section, I will examine Albert's views on circumstances in more detail. Not 
only do they provide an interesting framework through which an action can be analyzed 
and morally evaluated, but they will also lead us to a crucial question about moral 
species: what makes an action, morally speaking, the sort of action that it is? What counts 
as a moral description of an action, as opposed to a mere physical description? There has 
been considerable debate about this issue with respect to Aquinas over the last few 
decades.107 Given that Albert comes to these questions first, however, and also given his 
influence on Aquinas's own thinking about ethics, it is worthwhile looking at Albert's 
views on moral species, as they arise within the context of his thinking about moral 
circumstances. In this section I both draw on, and aim to expand upon, the work of 
Stanley Cunningham, one of the few scholars to have tackled moral circumstances in 
Albert.108 As above, I will begin with the DNB, and work my way through Albert's moral 
works according to the best current estimates about their chronology. 
 In each of the following analyses I will also dedicate space to discussing a 
circumstance that is of particular importance to Albert, and indeed to the entire medieval 
moral tradition: intention. This is a crucial topic which could easily merit its own chapter. 
However, in Albert it is bound up with discussions of circumstances and, especially in his 
                                                 
107 Among others, Brock (1998), Pilsner (2006), and Jensen (2010) have devoted books to the problem of 
the moral specification of actions in Aquinas. 
108 See Cunningham (2008), 129-141; also Tracey (2013). 
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later works, with an account of moral species. In the Super Ethica, in particular, it would 
be foolhardy to attempt to disentangle these three issues, since Albert treats them as 
essentially interconnected. For this reason, I have found it necessary to include 
discussions of moral ends, intentions, and moral species within the context of Albert's 
account of circumstances. 
 
2.A Albert's Account of Moral Circumstances in DNB and SDB 
 After discussing the generic good, Albert proceeds in the DNB to discuss the 
good associated with circumstances. These are what we might call the "particularizing" 
features of an action.109 Every action will have these additional characteristics, and they 
will be relevant to a moral assessment of the act. For example, an act of feeding the 
hungry can be done out of compassion for the hungry person. It can also be done out of 
vainglory, with the intention that others should see and think well of us because of our 
charitable activities. 
 Medieval theologians had already made use of the notion of a moral circumstance 
before Albert, particularly in canon law and in penitential literature: confessors in 
particular were supposed to take into account the circumstances in which a sin was 
committed.110 However, as Cunningham notes, there had as yet been no systematic 
attempt to construct a theory of moral circumstances:  
"Albert's De natura boni appears to have been the first known instance in which 
an attempt, more structured and serious than a brief mention or mere enumeration, 
                                                 
109 The term comes from Stump and Kretzmann (1991), 113. 
110 Cunningham (2008), 128; cf. Jonsen and Toulmin (1988), 100. 
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has been made to incorporate a theoretical analysis of the role of circumstances 
into a wider moral synthesis."111  
Perhaps because they had no real medieval antecedent, Albert's account of circumstances 
in the DNB can sometimes feel strained; he relies heavily on examples to explain each 
circumstance. 
 He tells us that his list of circumstances is taken from Cicero112, though it also 
owes much to Boethius. As Cunningham observes 113, Cicero never used the term 
'circumstance', but rather wanted to identify the particulars that enhance the credibility of 
a rhetorician’s account. Albert names the seven traditional circumstances (who, what, 
why, when, where, how, and with what instruments (quibus auxiliis)), and then divides 
these seven into two groups: the circumstance attributed to the person, or ‘quis’, and the 
circumstances attributed to the work or business at hand (the other six). 
Albert's treatment of circumstances involves sometimes copious detail devoted to 
issues the moral import of which varies widely. For example, the circumstance ‘quis’ is 
divided into 11 different circumstances: one’s name (which doesn't make our action 
better or worse, which would be strange; rather, in some instances the person's name 
indicates what sort of person has done the act, which can be illuminating; for instance, 
Jacob is called "Israel", which according to Albert means "a most just man", which tells 
us that he was very virtuous indeed); one's nature - and here Albert discusses one's sex 
(some things, he says, are baser for a woman than for a man, and some things are 
required of a woman which are not required of a man, as for example wearing a veil (1 
Cor. 11:56)); one’s nation (and here the examples concern Israel, which, since it is a holy 
                                                 
111 Ibid. 
112 DNB II.2, 11, 3-5, 14-17; cf. Cicero, De inventione, I, ch. 24, n. 34. 
113 Cunningham (2008), 129. 
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nation, makes sins committed within its borders worse); one's homeland (patria) (and 
here Albert quotes Genesis: "the men of Sodom were pessimi"; it would sense to see 
patria as a circumstance affecting the morality of their actions if they are blamed in part 
for violations of hospitality -- Sodom is the place where obligations to be hospitable 
would obtain for them114); one's family (because people frequently imitate their relatives 
and ancestors; one might think that this would be reason for leniency, but that is 
apparently not Albert’s view, as he quotes the Old Testament passage "I am a jealous 
God, punishing the sins of fathers in their sons in the third and fourth generation among 
those who hate me;"115 it seems that if our ancestors are good, and we follow them, we 
deserve greater praise, however); and age (because many things are reproved in old age 
but not in childhood).  
The next circumstance under ‘quis’ is ‘victus’, or one's manner of living - which 
includes how we are educated, what sort of things we keep, etc.  There is the 
circumstance of fortune - as for example whether we are rich or poor, noble or ignoble, 
etc., and also the circumstance ‘habit.’ ‘Habit’ is divided into six kinds, four pertaining to 
the soul and two to the body: the latter are health and weakness; the former are: 1) 
whether one is tempted or not (we are praised more for doing well in the midst of 
temptation); 2) whether we are graced or not (someone who has received grace and then 
sins is more blameworthy than someone who has not received grace); 3) whether one acts 
from malice, ignorance, or weakness (and here Albert has a trinitarian interpretation of 
the Gospel passage concerning the sin against the Holy Spirit: to sin against the Father is 
to sin from weakness, to sin against the Son is to sin from ignorance, and to sin against 
                                                 
114 I we this point to Scott MacDonald. 
115 Exodus 20:5. 
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the Holy Spirit is to sin from certa malitia, which is forgiven only with difficulty); and 4) 
whether a sin is from fear or obstinacy. 
Of the circumstances attributed to the business at hand, two, namely ‘quid’ (or the 
nature of the act, what precisely is done - killing one's father, quickly, with a sword, and 
then burying him, for example), and cur - the reason why one acts - are "contained" in the 
act, whereas the other four are contained in the performance (gestio) of the act. These are 
the time, place, manner, and the instruments (auxiliis) one uses. 
This discussion of circumstances will be repeated in the Summa de bono, almost 
word for word, although there he omits the long section of scriptural examples, and adds 
more about what circumstances are and how they affect the morality of an act.  The 
circumstances Albert discusses clearly have different levels of moral importance, and 
some of them receive very little attention aside from a few scriptural illustrations. In the 
next section, I will focus especially on one circumstance which Albert discusses in some 
detail: intention. 
Given these lists and examples of circumstances, a more pressing question 
concerns their role: how should we conceive of circumstances with regard to the moral 
evaluation of actions? What does it mean for them to "clothe" a generically good (or 
generically bad) act? The DNB is mostly silent on these questions. Albert seems more 
interested in classifying and providing examples of circumstances than in giving an 
account of them. Tracey notes that Albert compares an act's generic quality to its matter, 
and its circumstances to its form, claiming that this point is "arguably the chief 
contribution of his otherwise rather unoriginal discussion of circumstances."116 Yet even 
                                                 
116 Tracey (2013), 357. The reference here is DNB 2.2.1.1, 10-11. Cunningham (2008) also refers to 
circumstances as "the formal cause of virtue" in Albert's ethics (127). 
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there, Albert makes it clear that the comparison of human acts to matter subject to natural 
forms is only an analogy, and doesn't dwell on it. 
 In the SDB, by contrast, Albert devotes an article to the nature of circumstances. 
He supplies a definition from Boethius: circumstances are "those things which are 
suitable to produce the substance of a rhetorical question."117 Two problems immediately 
arise for Albert: first, this definition is of a rhetorical concept, not an ethical one. It 
relates to judicial procedures: the rhetorician will adduce circumstances as part of the 
defense or prosecution of an accused person. But the considerations that are of interest in 
rhetoric may not be relevant or important in ethics. Albert clarifies that strictly speaking, 
the ethicist is not interested in circumstances at all.118 Circumstances are general features 
relevant to a particular rhetorical question, which can be used in a rhetorical syllogism. 
The ethicist is not concerned with circumstances, thus understood, but rather with 
"singulars".  
 As understood by the rhetorician, circumstances must be in at least some sense 
universals. Albert emphasizes that circumstances produce (efficiunt) the rhetorical 
question, which in turn gives rise to (innititur) the rhetorical syllogism, or enthymeme.119 
But even the rhetorical syllogism, however much it may fall short of the demonstrative 
syllogism, cannot concern itself with true particulars. Thus the circumstances that the 
rhetorician discusses are not the "singulars" that interest the ethicist. In ethics, we must 
deal with the concrete situation in which an action is performed. Albert gives an example: 
'person' is not a circumstance, but this or that particular person is.120 The idea is that the 
                                                 
117 SDB 1.3.1, obj. 1, 37; Boethius, De diff. top. 1.4 (PL 64,1212C). 
118 SDB 1.3.1 ad 4,5, 38. See Cunningham (2008), 133. 
119 SDB 1.3.1 ad 1, 38. 
120 SDB 1.3.1 ad 4,5, 38. 
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rhetorician will be interested in circumstances relating to the person in the abstract, 
whereas the ethicist will only be interested in the circumstances of a particular person in 
the context of his life and actions. And so when the ethicist talks about circumstances, 
what she really means is singulars. 
 The second problem for Albert with Boethius' definition of circumstance lies in 
the word 'substance'. Albert distinguishes between what is intrinsic to an act, or its 
substance, and what is extrinsic to it. The view seems to be that we can isolate the "act 
alone", or the act as an ontological item which is not yet morally valenced. Recall that in 
his discussion of the generic good, Albert states that that which is unqualifiedly first in 
morals is "the voluntary act existing upon what is willed according to choice and 
deliberation."121 Considered as such, the act is capable of being good or bad, 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. Judgments of generic goodness or badness bring us into 
the realm of moral evaluation, but they are only the first stage of evaluating an act. The 
next stage, that of circumstances, deals with features of the act which are extrinsic to it, in 
the sense that they can be distinguished from the "act alone", or the act in itself. 
 Thus when the Boethian definition specifies that circumstances "produce the 
substance" of a rhetorical question, Albert clarifies that applied to ethics, we should not 
understand this to mean that circumstances produce the act itself. Rather, they give a 
special kind of being (esse) to an act -- specifically moral being: 
...such things [viz., circumstances] do not give being to an act, inasmuch as it is 
an act, but they give being to it inasmuch as it is honorable or blameworthy, and 
for this reason, although they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless they are not 
extrinsic to the honorable or the blameworthy. But the being of the honourable is 
                                                 
121 SDB 1.2.4, solution, 29. 
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taken from the mode rather than from the act itself, so that all the circumstances 
are called modes.122 
So although the circumstances are extrinsic to the act qua act, as modes or features they 
determine whether an act is honorable or blameworthy, good or bad.123 While Albert does 
not explain what he means by "modes" here, it is worth noting that he sometimes refers to 
accidents as modes of substances.124 Since he refers to the act alone as the substance of 
the act, we can continue the analogy with natural substances by understanding 
circumstances as accidents. But while they may be accidental to the act understood as a 
pre-moral, ontological item, they are not accidental to the moral being of that act, but 
rather determine it.125 
 In addition, circumstances also "give being to an act according to the species of 
virtue or vice."126 Thus for example, having relations with one's wife is an act of the 
virtue of conjugal continence; having relations with someone who is not one's wife is an 
act of adultery. The circumstance of being married or not being married determines the 
moral species of that act. For this reason, Albert says that one circumstance will 
sometimes be "more principal" than the others. 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 SDB 1.3.1, ad 1, p. 38. 
123 As Cunningham (2008) puts it: "It is clear that Albert draws a line between the act conceived as a 
psychophysical entity, and its supervenient moral qualities or accidents" (134). 
124 Klima (2011), 1226. 
125 Since he holds that the moral being of an act proceeds from an act's "accidents" and not from its 
substance, it is not difficult to see how Albert will arrive at the conclusion that good and bad are accidental 
to actions (Sentences II, Distinction XL, A, Article 1, 624). For a critique of this position see Hoffmann 
(2003), especially pages 80-82, which I discuss below. 
126 SDB 1.3.1, ad 6, 38. 
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2.B The Dionysian Principle in the SDB 
 Nevertheless, the mere fact that an act is in the species of virtue does not make it a 
morally good act; for that, all the other circumstances must also be good.127 In making 
this point, Albert articulates for the first time in his corpus the Dionysian principle, 
deriving it from texts in both Aristotle and pseudo-Dionysius. The meaning of the texts 
that Albert cites is hardly obvious, however. In the Ethica Vetus (books 2 and 3 of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, translated into Latin in the second half of the 12th century), we 
read: "For men are good without qualification, but bad omnifariously."128 Slightly more 
cryptic is this quotation from the Latin translation of Pseudo-Dionysius' On the Divine 
Names: "The good is from one whole cause, but the bad is from many particular 
defects."129 Albert himself, in the question on circumstances in the SDB, attributes to 
Aristotle and pseudo-Dionysius the view that "virtue is from one, sole, whole cause, but 
vice is omnifarious."130 This remark might lead us to conclude that the Dionysian 
principle doesn't pertain to the evaluation of actions at all, but rather to virtues and vices. 
In the context, however, it is clear that Albert is primarily concerned with actions: he is 
arguing that the circumstances give being to an act (circumstantiae dant esse actui), 
making it either virtuous or vicious. And he claims that one circumstance cannot give to 
an act the species of virtue without all the other circumstances participating, whereas one 
bad circumstance is enough to make the action bad or vicious.131 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ethica Vetus p. VI, 26 (Nicomachean Ethics 1106b35): "Boni quidem enim simpliciter, mali autem 
omnifarium." Cf. Geyer (1951), SDB, p. 38, note for line 68. 
129 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ch. 4, paragraph 31 (PG 3,732): "Bonum ex una et tota est 
causa, malum autem ex multis et particularibus defectibus." 
130 SDB, I.3.1, ad 6, 38, 68-70: "virtus est ex una tota et sola causa, vitium autem omnifarium." 
131 SDB I.3.1, ad 6, 38, 61-67. Cunningham (2008) describes the Dionysian principle as it is found in the 
SDB, and also mentions its presence in Albert's Summa theologiae. He focuses only on its application to 
virtue, however, and not its application to action (the sole application found in Albert's Sentences). 
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 Elsewhere in the SDB, Albert attributes to the Pythagoreans and to Dionysius the 
principle that "the good consists in a sole, whole cause, but the bad is omnifarious."132 
And he explains this principle as follows: 
...for the existence of virtue all the circumstances are needed along with the end 
combining with the act upon its appropriate matter (actum super debitam 
materiam), but for the bad and for vice the corruption of any one of these per se is 
sufficient.133 
Albert is claiming that for an action to be virtuous, not only do all the circumstances need 
to be good, but the act must be on its appropriate matter, Albert's description of the 
generic good. This passage shows him attempting to combine the stages account with the 
Dionysian principle. I will argue below that this attempt is ultimately unsuccessful. 
Perhaps Albert came to the same conclusion; as we shall see, his articulation of the 
Dionysian principle in the Sentences commentary makes no mention of the act on its 
appropriate matter.  
 
2.C Intention in DNB and SDB 
 In addition to the general account of circumstances, it will be useful to describe 
intention, and the way it evolves over Albert's career. There are two reasons to give it 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cunningham writes: "Virtue results from a unified convergence of all the elements for causes required, 
whereas the corruption or defectiveness in any one of the attendant condition suffices to bring about 
evil"(p. 140); and again: "Whereas pseudo-Dionysius speaks of the good and evil in general, however, 
Albert specifically applies the principle to virtue"(p. 140, footnote 58). 
132 SDB I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 20-21: "bonum constat ex tota et sola causa, malum autem omnifarium." 
133 SDB I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 22-25: "Extrema autem sunt in particularibus privationibus et defectibus, sicut 
dixerunt Pythagorici et beatus Dionysius consentit in IV capitulo De divinis nominibus dicens, quod 
'bonum constat ex tota et sola causa, malum autem omnifariam', intelligens per hoc, quod ad exisentiam 
virtutis exiguntur omnes circumstantiae cum fine convenientes ad actum super debitam materiam, ad 
malum autem et ad vitium sufficit corruptio uniuscuiusque per se." 
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special attention here: first, because Albert himself devotes more space to it than any 
other circumstance. Indeed, sometimes he treats it simply as one of the circumstances, 
designating it by the terms cur or cuius gratia. In other places, we see him treating 
intention separately from the "external" circumstances. The considerable effort Albert 
devotes to describing intention and its role in the moral life suggests its importance 
within his moral theory as a whole. Second, intention will play a role in the Dionysian 
principle, one of Albert's two methods for evaluating actions. Thus it will be necessary to 
see how Albert understands intention in order to appreciate how it functions within the 
Dionysian principle. Thus in this section I will examine Albert's comments on intention 
in the DNB and SDB. In the next section will look at the treatment of intention in his 
Sentences commentary, where we see considerable differences compared to the early 
works as well as increasing sophistication in his account.  
 As we saw above, Albert begins the DNB by narrowing down his subject matter. 
He distinguishes between that which is good substantially and is its own goodness (God), 
and that which is not its own goodness (created things).134 The subject of the DNB will 
be primarily the created good, though it will also discuss God insofar as he is the good 
which all desire.135 He then announces that he will be discussing the good "more morally 
than substantially", and then outlines his plan for the treatise according to the various 
ways in which the moral good presents itself.136 In Book I he will describe the natural 
good or good of nature (bonum naturae).  
                                                 
134 DNB, proemium. 
135 Albert here quotes from book 1 of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which during the composition of the 
De natura boni he knows as the Ethica Vetus: 'bonum enuntiant, quod omnes exoptant'(NE 1094a2-3). He 
interprets these words not merely as conceptual analysis of the word 'good', but as pointing toward God as 
the ultimate end of human life. 
136 Albert's goal is to write his treatise and seven books, describing the goods of: 1) nature; 2) political 
virtue; 3) grace; 4) gifts (i.e., gifts of the Holy Spirit); 5) beatitude; 6) the fruits of the Holy Spirit; and 7) 
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 It is difficult to define precisely what Albert means by the "natural good" in the 
DNB. It is clearly a concept pertaining to moral theology, and Albert provides scriptural 
examples of good conduct to illustrate it. At the same time, Albert presents it as 
preliminary to the concepts of generic goodness, moral circumstances, and virtue. Given 
that generic goodness is "that which is first in things pertaining to morals,"137 the natural 
good must in some way precede a properly moral consideration of action. Albert 
characterizes it as an aptitude (habilitas) toward good138, and says that it displays itself in 
human beings by means of an inborn goodness (ingenita sibi bonitate).139 Thus natural 
goodness is not a property of actions but of human beings; it is an innate disposition to 
act morally, and to orient ourselves toward God as our final good.140 But while it is 
innate, it is not fixed; Albert discusses not only how it presents itself in human beings, 
but also how it may be lost and recovered. 
  Given this description, it may seem strange that Albert discusses intention at 
length in the treatise on natural goodness, and not in the later treatise on political virtue, 
where he examines circumstances. At this early point in his career, Albert appears to 
conceive of intention more as an aspect of our natural dispositions toward moral conduct, 
and less as a specific element in human actions, understood as subject to moral 
evaluation. This will change in the 1240s, as Albert grapples with Peter Lombard's 
Sentences and the question of the specific role intention should play in moral evaluation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
felicity. The treatise remains unfinished; Albert apparently stopped partway through his discussion of 
political virtue. 
137 DNB 2.1.1. 
138 DNB 1.2.3. 
139 DNB 1.2.1. 
140 Tracey (2013) calls natural goodness "a kind of innate readiness or habilitude to act in ways consonant 
with one's nature"(354).  
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 Early in the DNB, Albert describes the natural good as consisting in mode, species 
and order, a definition he gets from Augustine.141 Mode he identifies as the "limit" of a 
thing's nature; species is the form and perfection of a thing; and order is the "inclination 
to the appropriate end" of a thing's nature.142 Applied to human beings, this account sees 
someone as naturally good who tends not to go to excess, who fulfills the potentialities of 
human nature, and who habitually intends the ends consonant with that nature.143 This of 
course sounds like a description of the virtuous person, and at least one scholar has 
understood the agent possessing natural goodness as "naturally virtuous".144 But while 
natural goodness is analogous with virtue, it is not a settled disposition, engaging the 
reason and the will, which cannot be used badly and which is intimately connected with 
happiness – all important characteristics of virtue for Albert.145  
 Albert discusses intention in relation to order. What precisely is order as an aspect 
of the natural good? Albert calls it the pondus of our actions.146 Pondus literally means 
weight, and Albert provides an analogy with physical objects. Just as a thing (res) tends 
by its weight toward its proper place (suum locum), so an action by its pondus (that is, its 
order) tends toward its own end. And this order displays itself in human beings through 
their intentions. 
                                                 
141 Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iv, 3. 
142 DNB 1.1.1. 
143 This is an example of Albert using Augustinian concepts for his own purposes. As Scott MacDonald has 
pointed out to me, for Augustine mode, species, and order apply to things insofar as they exist, and are not 
qualities one acquires by acting or being a certain way. It is possible that Albert simply misunderstands 
Augustine here, but I think it more likely that he is giving Augustine's metaphysical claims a moral twist. 
144 Tracey (2013), 354. 
145 DNB 3.1.1.1, 30-31. 
146 DNB 1.2.1. 
65 
 
 The DNB provides a series of descriptions of intention.147 Intention a) 'orders and 
informs' our acts toward the glory of God; b) is an act of the will ordered to an end; and 
c) is a determination of the end in the act of an agent. In part, these different descriptions 
reflect Albert's various sources, which include Augustine and "a certain philosopher". 
Albert says little to elaborate on a) or b); to explain c) he adds: "for whoever acts and 
does not determine for himself an end from intention is ignorant of what he does."148 
There is no attempt to harmonize these different descriptions, or to give something like a 
unified account of intention. Instead, he gives three conditions that must be met in order 
for our actions and indeed our lives to be properly ordered: our intentions must be 1) 
simple, 2) not vain, and 3) not bad. These conditions require some explanation. 
 When Albert says that our intentions must be simple, he means that they must aim 
at one thing in an act: the glory of God. Intentions which lacks this simplicity fall victim 
to the "twist of double-mindedness" (plica duplicitatis).149 Must this intention always be 
conscious? Is an intention still simple if one intends other things as a means toward 
accomplishing the glory of God? Curiously, Albert doesn't consider these questions. 
Although the DNB is a formal work of moral theology, at times it seems almost 
hortatory: Albert is encouraging his readers to direct their actions toward the glory of 
God. 
 To explain what it means for an intention not to be vain, Albert draws on two 
different senses of the word vanus. It can mean empty, and in this sense he states that an 
intention is vain when it aims at something that it does not obtain (non consequitur) -- 
where "does not obtain" should be understood strongly, closer to "cannot obtain". But he 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 DNB 1.2.1. 
149 This excellent translation is from Tracey (2013), 355. 
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appeals to another sense of vanus when he specifies that what the vain intention aims at is 
praise. Why is it not possible to aim at and also get praise? Albert gives two reasons: 
first, because human beings are prone to envy, and thus are rarely willing to praise 
anyone else; and second, because even if other people do praise you, this is not "true 
praise" (vera laus). To illustrate what he means by true praise, Albert quotes John 5:44: 
"How can you believe, who receive glory from each other, and do not seek the glory 
which is from God alone?" The point seems to be that praise from other people is 
worthless, and will not satisfy the vain person's desires. So the person who strives for 
praise from other people has an intention which is empty, in that it will never attain what 
he ultimately wants, which is the true praise or glory that comes from God. 
 As for the third condition, that one's intention not be bad, Albert connects it with 
the per se peccata, i.e. "the sins of which Augustine says that they are bad in such a way 
that they cannot be done well."150 On Albert's view, these actions are always conjoined to 
a bad intention; it is not possible to do an act which is bad per se -- adultery was a 
common example -- with a good intention.151 
 While this description of intention provides Albert with a starting point, it lacks 
complexity and does not engage with many of the questions and debates surrounding 
intention that he would address in his Sentences commentary. Intention merits a few other 
mentions in the DNB, though they add little to the picture painted in the first treatise on 
the natural good. Albert says that the circumstance quomodo (how, in what manner) 
                                                 
150 "...finis malus est in peccatis, de quibus dicit Augustinus, quod ita sunt mala, quod non possunt fieri 
bene" DNB 1.2.1. 
151 This position is similar to that of Alan of Lille, who argued that per se mala can never be done with the 
good will. See Lottin, PEM III, 321-322. 
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includes intention, "for he more gravely sins while intending than while not intending."152 
So one way to answer the question how an act was doneis to say it was done 
intentionally. He provides no further explanation of intention in his account of 
circumstances. Later, intention is mentioned to describe how fortune works,153 and in 
praise of the Virgin Mary.154 
 Turning to the SDB, we find some significant differences in the way Albert 
characterizes and presents the topic of intention. To begin, although the structure of the 
work closely resembles that of the DNB, he does not cover intention in the section on 
natural goodness. In fact, we find that by the time he writes the SDB Albert has radically 
revised his understanding of the natural good. He treats it as a metaphysical concept, not 
a moral one. Abandoning the DNB picture of the natural good as natural disposition 
toward good conduct, Albert describes it in the SDB as a threefold ontological goodness, 
consisting in number, weight, and measure, which we find in all human beings, and 
which reflects the divine Trinity.155 After discussing this natural good, Albert states: 
"Consequently we must ask about the moral good" (consequenter quarendum est de bono 
moris), at which point he proceeds to describe the generic good. Given this change in his 
conception of the natural good, it is not surprising that the SDB articles on natural 
goodness do not contain an account of intention. 
 Instead, Albert discusses intention in the question on moral circumstances, where 
he connects intention with the circumstance cur (why). In the DNB he had not mentioned 
intention in his discussion of cur, instead associating it with quomodo. In the SDB, Albert 
                                                 
152 DNB 2.1.2. 
153 DNB 2.1.4. 
154 DNB 2.2.3. 
155 SDB 1.2, articles 1-3. 
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devotes a long article to a question "what are the circumstances?", and the two objections 
and replies which address cur are devoted entirely to problems and controversies about 
intention.156 It is clear that by the writing of this work, Albert thinks that to ask the 
question "why did this agent do what she did?" is to ask about her intentions. 
  A third way in which the SDB account of intention differs from that of the DNB 
lies in his use of sources and his awareness of contemporary debates about intention. The 
DNB discussion of intention quotes copiously from the New Testament, as well as from 
Augustine and Aristotle. The SDB cites Augustine, but it also quotes the more recent 
Glossa ordinaria. In addition, it refers to two sayings (dicta) which "have tended to be 
cited in this context" (quae consueverunt ad hoc adduci).157 These two sayings, to be 
discussed below, are two different versions of a quotation from Ambrose, and Albert 
probably knows them from reading Lombard's Sentences.158 Both the Glossa ordinaria 
and the Sentences were heavily cited by theologians throughout the 13th century, and 
Albert's engagement with these sources is a sign of his own progression as a theologian. 
It also leads him to ask more complex questions about intention and its role in the moral 
life, as we see in the SDB and especially later in his Sentences commentary. 
 The main problem about intention in the SDB is Abelardian: to what extent does 
the moral character of your intention determine the moral character of your act? Albert 
quotes two of the Interlinear glosses: "one does good to the extent that one intends it", 
and "one also does bad to the extent that one intends it."159 These glosses appear to yield 
                                                 
156 SDB 1.2.2, objections 10 and 11. 
157 SDB 1.3.2, 19-20, p.42. 
158 SDB 1.3.2, obj 10, 4-6, p.41. Ambrose, De off. 1.1 c.30 n.147 (PL 16,66); Cf. Peter. Lombard, II Sent. 
d.40 c.unic. (p.518); "Mali vero simpliciter dici debent, qui perversam habent causam et intentionem. Unde 
Ambrosius ait: 'Affectus tuus nomen operi tuo imponit.'" 
159 These are both glosses on Matthew 12:35. 
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the principle that the goodness or badness of one's act depends entirely on the goodness 
or badness of one's intention. Albert links these quotations to the two Ambrosian dicta: 
"the intention imposes its name on the act", and "the affect imposes its name on the 
act".160 Since affectus in this context was often understood to mean intention, these two 
sayings could be understood to mean the same thing.161 While the implications of an 
intention giving an act its name are hardly clear, the saying was often taken to offer at 
least prima facie support to Abelard's contention that an act's goodness or badness derives 
entirely from the intention with which it is performed. Thus for example Simon of 
Tournai (1130–1201) uses the Ambrosian "your affect imposes the name on your act" as 
a springboard to consider the question: "Is that good which is done with a good 
intention?"162 At issue here is whether one can separate the morality of the act from the 
morality of the agent's intention. 
 While Albert is asking more sophisticated questions about intention in the SDB, 
his answer is strangely curt. He begins by distinguishing between simple intention and 
intention directed by faith. Simple intention exists "when reason sets up (praefigit) the 
end of the act while not considering the quality of the act, or the end, or the order of one 
thing to another."163 It scarcely needs to be said that this is "foolish intention" (intentio 
stulta). Neither the glosses nor the Ambrosian dicta should be understood as applying to 
simple intention; rather, they are about intention directed by faith. Albert gives two 
examples here of doctrines that faith teaches: 1) that fornication is a mortal sin and 
                                                 
160 SDB 1.3.2 ad 10, 19-22, p.42. 
161 Lottin provides background on the way this saying was interpreted, and in particular on the way the 
word affectus was understood, during the 12th and 13th centuries. PEM IV, 309-477. 
162 Simon de Tournai, Disputationes, disp. 1966-67. See Lottin, PEM IV, 335. 
163 SDB 1.3.2 ad 10, 6-8, p.42. 
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cannot be done with a good end, and 2) that what is less bad is a lesser sin and is less 
worthy of punishment. 
 This explanation raises a number of questions. The second of the interlinear 
glosses states that one does bad to the extent that one intends it; how does this apply to 
intention directed by faith? Surely one does not intend something bad by means of an 
intention directed by faith. While it is true that faith teaches us about the nature of sins, 
their gradations, their worthiness of being punished, etc., it is not clear how this is 
supposed to address the question Albert has raised here, viz., whether the goodness or 
badness of an action derives entirely from the intention with which the action was 
performed. 
 It is obviously significant that Albert's first example of what faith teaches is that 
fornication cannot be done with a good end. Here Albert would seem to be associating 
himself with the position of, e.g., Alan of Lille, who argued that there are certain action 
types that can never be done with a good intention.164 This was in contrast to the position 
taken by Peter Lombard, who argued that the per se mala constitute an exception to the 
general Abelardian rule that acts are judged good or bad according to their intention; on 
Lombard's view, these acts are bad even if the intention with which they are done is 
good.165 Does Albert mean to take Alan's position, ruling out Lombard's? His answer in 
the SDB is unclear. 
 Further, the distinction between foolish intentions and intentions directed by faith 
appears to imply that any intention not directed by faith is foolish. Of course, it is 
possible that Albert does not think of this distinction as exhaustive. But if that's the case, 
                                                 
164 Lottin, PEM III, 321-322. 
165 Lombard, Sentences II, distinction 40, chapter 1, 519-522; see Lottin, ibid., 318-319. 
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why does he not then complete it? On the other hand, if he does mean that every intention 
is either foolish or directed by faith, then his account appears to rule out plenty of 
perfectly ordinary cases. Foolish intentions fail to consider the quality of the act, or the 
end, or the order of one thing to another. It seems silly to argue that anyone who lacks 
faith necessarily fails to consider these things. Indeed, the only way to make this 
plausible would be to understand the verb "consider" (considerare) to mean something 
like "consider in the light of faith". But if that's what Albert intends, it is hard to see why 
he doesn't qualify the quite general word 'consider'. 
 It might be objected that Albert's distinction between simple intention and 
intention directed by faith describes the two different types of intention found in a 
believing Christian. SDB is, after all, a work of theological ethics. So perhaps Albert 
simply isn't concerned here with the person who lacks (Christian) faith. If that's the case, 
then it becomes easier to see how the lack of consideration that defines a foolish intention 
may be qualified. The Christian whose intentions are not informed by faith fails to 
consider the nature of the act, the end, etc., in light of what she knows by faith. This is 
foolish, because by faith she can know certain truths about ethics which she cannot know 
by reason alone. And if her intention is properly informed and directed by faith, then her 
acts will be good insofar as her intention is good -- in what seems like a sleight-of-hand, 
the faith-directed intention considers even the "quality of the act". It is also true that her 
acts will be bad insofar as her intention is bad -- although the set of bad acts committed 
with faith-directed intentions will always be empty. 
 While it is possible that Albert wants to restrict his account of intention in SDB to 
this theological context, there are reasons to be skeptical of this interpretation. In the 
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same work Albert demonstrates an awareness of how a philosophical approach will differ 
from a theological approach to ethics, and takes pains to describe how each will answer a 
given question. Indeed, earlier in the same treatise Albert does this with respect to the 
question whether some acts of the will are morally indifferent.166 He answers that no act 
of the will, done with deliberation, can be indifferent according to the theologian, while a 
given act may be indifferent according to the ethicist (secundum ethicum). And he goes 
on to explain why these two approaches will differ: the ethicist, he thinks, does not posit 
a virtue that motivates all voluntary acts, whereas the theologian does -- charity is a 
"general mover" applying to all voluntary acts, with the result that none of them can be 
indifferent: all charitable acts are good, while all uncharitable acts are bad. Since the 
ethicist posits no such general mover, there is room for acts that are neither good nor 
bad.167 Far from ignoring the possible application of this question in non-theological 
contexts, Albert spells out how the ethicist would answer this question, and explains why 
his answer would differ from the theologian's. So if such an analysis is available for the 
question of the morally indifferent, why could it not be applied to problems about 
intention as well? 
 If Albert's treatment of intention in SDB seems puzzling and incomplete, the text 
itself suggests that we should be looking elsewhere for a fuller treatment. After using his 
distinction between foolish intention and faith-directed intention to answer the question at 
hand, Albert states: "But what intention is has been explained elsewhere."168 He doesn't 
direct the reader to a particular work for this explanation, however. Could he be referring 
to the section on intention in the DNB? This seems unlikely, since the SDB covers so 
                                                 
166 SDB 1.2.7, p.33.-35. 
167 SDB 1.2.7, 26-35, p.34. 
168 "Quid autem est intentio, expeditum est alibi." SDB 1.3.2, ad 10, 24-25, p.42. 
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much of the same ground as the DNB; we find Albert reworking his material from the 
DNB, but not referring back to it. The De homine seems like a promising place to look, 
since we know he was working on the SDB at roughly the same time he was writing it. 
But while the word intentio appears rather frequently in the De homine, it is usually used 
as a technical term referring to mental items in the theory of sense perception, and not (as 
it is in the SDB) as an ethical concept capturing an agent's act of aiming at ends in her 
action. In the one place in the De homine where he could be construed as giving an 
account of what an intention is, Albert distinguishes between that intention which tends 
toward an end without cognition, which exists in all natural powers in nature, and that 
which tends to an end which it predetermines by means of cognition.169 This description 
is too general to shed much light on the problems about intention broached in the SDB. 
 Where then is the "elsewhere" to which Albert directs us for an account of what 
intention is? The editors of the Cologne edition of the SDB, completed in 1951, point us 
to book 2 of Albert's commentary on Peter Lombard's sentences.170 There we do find a 
rich discussion of intention and of its role in the moral life. Recent scholarship tends to 
place the completion of the SDB around 1242, however, the same year Albert arrived in 
Paris. Book II of Albert's Sentences commentary, written while Albert was in Paris 
between 1242 and 1248, was likely completed around 1246.171 Is it possible that Albert is 
referring in the SDB to an explanation of intention that he hasn't yet written? Or had he 
                                                 
169 De homine, p. 102, lines 12-24: "Dicendum ergo ad primum quod substantia carnis est per intentionem 
in potentia nutritiva et non per substantiam. Sed duplex est intentio, scilicet tendens in finem tantum et non 
praedeterminans ipsum per cognitionem, et haec est intentio omnium virtutum activa-  
rum | in natura; omni enim cui attribuitur finis, attribuitur intentio in finem illum. Est 
etiam intentio tendens in finem praedeterminans ipsum per cognitionem, et haec est intentio artis." 
170 SDB, p.42, note to line 25. 
171 See Möhle et alia (2011), 29-32. Importantly, in the Sentences (II, distinction 41, D, Article 5, p. 645), 
we find Albert arguing that, although pagans (infideles) are not capable of merit, which is the result of 
grace, they can nevertheless be moved by natural piety and by political virtue, which are available to them 
because they possess the light of natural reason. 
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already begun working on his commentary on Sentences II, only to put it aside and finish 
it years later? The evidence is inconclusive. What is clear is that for Albert's considered 
thoughts on intention, we must turn to his Sentences commentary. 
 
2.D Moral Circumstances and Intention in Albert's Sentences Commentary 
 As with generic goodness, Albert revisits the topic of moral circumstances at 
various points in book II of his Sentences commentary. The positions he takes there are 
similar to those found in the SDB, which is not surprising, given that Sentences II was 
probably written no more than four years after the SDB.172 There is one development 
worth noting in the Sentences commentary, however. Albert explicitly treats 
circumstances as distinct from the end of the action. In both the DNB and the SDB, 
intention and end appear on the lists of circumstances, and neither is given pride of place 
in those lists.173 In the Sentences commentary, by contrast, Albert begins to use the 
locution "the circumstances and the end".174 More explicitly, he distinguishes between 
the "interior act", or the act of the will, and circumstances, which "strictly speaking 
regard external acts".175 This may seem like a small and even insignificant change, but it 
paves the way for Albert to expand on his treatment of intention as distinct from the 
circumstances, while relegating moral circumstances to factors external to the agent's 
beliefs and desires. As I will aim to show, commenting on Lombard's Sentences gives 
                                                 
172 Möhle et al. (2011) estimates that the De bono was written around 1242, and that book 2 of the 
Sentences was completed around the year 1246. 
173 As will be seen below, Albert does give an extended treatment of intention in the section on the good of 
nature in DNB, but this is distinct from the discussion of circumstances. 
174 Sentences II, Distinction XLI, C, Article 2, solution,  
175 Sentences II, Distinction XL, A, Article 1, 624. 
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Albert the opportunity to closely examine the place of intention in his moral theory, 
which has important ramifications for his views on how actions ought to be evaluated. 
 The Sentences of Peter Lombard were written around the year 1150 and by 
Albert's day had become a standard theological text. As first a student (beginning in 1241 
or 1242) and, by 1245, a regent master in theology at the University of Paris, Albert was 
expected to lecture on Lombard's Sentences. His massive four-volume commentary 
consists of short outlines of the text, typically followed by disputed questions about 
issues raised by Lombard. It is a rich source for Albert's views on theology, and in 
particular for arguments concerning theological ethics.176 Since this work is a 
commentary, it will be useful to say something about Lombard's own writing on 
intention, before turning to Albert's comments on it -- not least because it influences 
Albert in important ways. 
 
Lombard on intentio 
 When he tackles the issues surrounding acting for an end, Lombard attempts to 
distinguish between the related terms voluntas, intentio, and finis. And he notes that these 
terms can be used in a variety of different ways. While the word 'will' (voluntas) can be 
used to designate the general appetitive power that is closely allied with reason, in moral 
contexts Lombard identifies it as referring to the interior act by which we will 
something.177 The "will's end" can refer either to the immediate object of our willing, or 
                                                 
176 It s true that Albert thinks that the position of the ethicus will sometimes diverge from those of the 
theologus, and Albert occasionally highlights those questions where they will give different answers. But 
there is also a substantial common ground between them, and much can be learned about Albert's ethics 
from his theological works. 
177 Lombard: Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 38, cap. 4, #356: "voluntas est qua volumus aliquid". Cf. Lottin, PEM 
4, 315. 
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to some further end for the sake of which we will that object.178 Having described the will 
and its end in this way, Lombard then states that the word "intention" can be taken either 
to refer to the will, or the will's end. He then adds another complication: "will's end" can 
also indicate the good or bad pleasure toward which each person strives.179 
 Lombard attempts to clarify this taxonomy with an example: I want to feed a 
hungry person in order that I might have eternal life. My will is to feed the hungry 
person. The immediate end of that will is the feeding of the hungry person, though the 
"supreme end", to which that end is referred, is eternal life. The intention, meanwhile, is 
"that by which I will to arrive at life", viz., eternal life (intentio vero qua sic ad vitam 
pervenire volo).180 Here he seems to identify one's intention with the act of the will 
inasmuch as it is directed at the ultimate end of that act. Nevertheless, the looseness with 
which Lombard sometimes transitions between the concepts of intention, end, and will 
leaves later commentators with the task of further specifying these terms.181 
 Before examining how Albert defines these terms, it will be necessary to outline 
Lombard's position, already mentioned above in the section on intention in the SDB, on 
the question: does the moral status of an act derive entirely from the intention with which 
it is performed? In other words, how does he respond to Abelard, who argues that it does? 
Lombard confronts the view that all acts are in themselves indifferent, becoming good 
and bad by means of the agent's intention. He doesn't name the proponents of this view 
(though he might have named Abelard, or Hugh of St. Victor182). Attributing it only to 
                                                 
178 Ibid: "finis vero voluntatis est, vel illud quod volumus, per quod impletur ipsa voluntas: vel potius aliud 
propter quod illud volumus." 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., #357. 
181 As Lottin notes in PEM 4, 341. 
182 See Lottin, PEM 4, 318. 
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"certain people" (quibusdam), he immediately opposes it to the position of (again 
unnamed) "others", who argued that some acts are bad in themselves (in se), in such a 
way that they are always sins, even if they have a good cause. Likewise, these others also 
claim that some acts are good in themselves, in such a way that they can never be done 
badly.183 
  In this way Lombard sets up a dichotomy between the Abelardian position that 
says the moral status of every act depends entirely on its intention, and an opposed 
position that sets up two classes of exceptions to this rule: per se good acts, and per se 
bad acts. Lombard proceeds to rule out per se good acts: no matter how good an action 
type may be in itself, it can always be done with a bad intention, and thus will be done 
badly.  
 But he accepts the other class of exceptions: there are indeed acts which are and 
remain sins even if they have a good cause.184 As examples Lombard provides the thief 
who steals while intending to give the money to the poor, and the man who commits 
adultery in order that, "through her with whom he does it", he might free a man from 
death.185 These he takes to be counterexamples to the Abelardian principle: some acts are 
sinful in themselves, and remain sinful even if they are done with a good intention. 
Nevertheless, Lombard accepts that principle, with the per se mala exception added as a 
proviso, summarizing his position as follows:  
                                                 
183 Lombard: Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 40, B. 
184 Lombard: Sententiae, lib. II, dist. 40, C. 
185 "...et eum qui se fecisse adulterium ostendit, ut per illam cum qua fecit, hominem de morte liberet." Ibid. 
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"Therefore every human act is judged good or bad according to its intention and 
cause, except those which are per se bad, that is, those which cannot be done 
without transgression."186 
Lombard is thus already quite close to Abelard. He even goes further, acknowledging a 
different account of the per se mala which saves the Abelardian principle. According to 
this account, the per se mala can never be done with a good intention; at best, the ends 
and intentions that accompany these acts will be only apparently good. Lombard finds 
support for this view in Augustine, and while he doesn't endorse it, he clearly sees it as a 
defensible position. Other 12th-century thinkers, such as Alan of Lille, did endorse this 
second view of the per se mala. In the words of Odon Lottin, Alan was "a faithful disciple 
of Peter Abelard."187 
 
Albert on intentio: definitions 
 When Albert comes to Lombard's text, then, we find him setting for himself two 
tasks: first, defining intention, and the related terms of end and will, more carefully and 
precisely than Lombard had done; and second, defining the relation between intention 
and the goodness or badness of action. His response to the second task is particularly 
important for the purposes of this dissertation, because it leads him to articulate the 
Dionysian principle. Odon Lottin has argued, convincingly in my view, that Albert is 
especially influenced here by the Franciscan master Eudes Rigaud (c.1210-1275); I will 
                                                 
186 "Omnia ergo hominis opera secundum intentionem et causum judicantur bona vel mala, exceptis his 
quae per se mala sunt, id est, quae sine praevaricatione fieri nequeunt" Ibid. 
187 "Il convenait d'exposer avec quelque ampleur la position d'Alain de Lille; car elle le révèle comme un 
disciple fidèle de Pierre Abélard. " Lottin, PEM IV, 332; Lottin's account of Lille on intention runs from p. 
320 to 332. 
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discuss the relevant text from Rigaud's commentary on Lombard's Sentences below. First, 
however, it will be necessary to see how Albert defines his terms. 
 While Lombard was satisfied to report on the varied usage of the word "intention" 
(sometimes it means will, sometimes end), Albert aims to give a detailed account, 
distinguishing intention from will and end. He begins by emphasizing that an intention is 
an act of the soul.188 In this, he is consistent with his remarks on intention in the DNB, 
where he defined it as an act of the will ordered to an end. In the Sentences commentary, 
he repeats that intention is an aiming or tending (tentio) toward an end.189 He adds, 
however, that it involves both reason and will, and explains this by pointing to three ways 
in which an intention can intend an end: in action, in judgment, or in both combined. In 
the first way, intending the end in action, Albert compares intention to a traveler aiming 
toward the end of his road (finem viae) – that is, toward his destination. In this sense, 
intention is an act of the will: "...and in this way intention is a will tending toward an end; 
or, as is better said, the tending of a will toward an end."190 According to the second way 
of intending an end, namely in judgment, intention is in reason (in ratione), which Albert 
here distinguishes from the will. He compares this sense of intention to someone standing 
on a road and pointing with his finger toward his destination. The third description of 
intention, which includes action and judgment together, Albert describes as belonging to 
                                                 
188 Sentences, Dist. 38, G, article 5, solution, p. 615. To the objection that while defining virtue Aristotle 
had named only three things in the soul, namely powers, dispositions, and passions, Albert rejoins that this 
is not an exhaustive list, and that there are many other things in the soul, such as acts, species, etc. 
189 Sentences, Dist. 38, G, article 5, ad 1, 615. 
190 Ibid.: "et sic intentio est voluntas tendens in finem viae:  vel, ut melius dicatur, tentio voluntatis in 
finem." 
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a "directed will" (voluntatis rectae), which is a will regulated by reason; and he clearly 
regards this last sense of intention as the most complete.191 
 Having defined intention as an act of a will regulated by reason tending toward an 
end, Albert can distinguish intention from end: intention does not refer to the end, except 
"speaking materially", where by intention we really mean that which is intended (ut 
intentio ponatur pro intento). As it turns out, however, there are different sorts of ends, 
and our understanding of intention and its role in the moral life depends on which ends 
are being aimed at. Albert undertakes his classification of ends while attempting to 
explain how intention affects or determines the moral goodness or badness of an action in 
distinction 38 of Sentences II. 
 
Albert on the Role of Intention in Moral Evaluation: First Answer (Distinction 38) 
 Albert begins with a seemingly obscure question: is the quantity of a will 
measured from the end?192 He musters arguments that clarify the sort of quantity 
involved: it is first a quantity of worth (valor), then a quantity of goodness. So the 
problem might appear to be: does the goodness of a will depend on the end? But Albert 
quickly specifies that his real concern is with the goodness of acts; insofar as the will is 
involved, it is the will to perform specific actions. Thus the sed contra provides two 
counterexamples to the claim that the quantity of the will is measured from the end: 1) a 
                                                 
191 Defining intention as an act of both reason and will was not the norm before Albert. We saw Lombard 
identifying intention either with a will, or with a will's end. Closer to Albert, Alexander of Hales argues in 
his De intentione, written at some point before 1236, that intention consists of two acts of the will, namely 
choosing and willing (electione et voluntate), and distinguishes it from credulitas, the purely cognitive act 
which precedes, or ought to proceed, intention. (See Lottin, PEM 4, 410). Thus it is significant for Albert to 
argue that intention is not merely an act of the will, but an act of the will regulated by reason. In this he 
joins the company of Eudes Rigaud, who had emphasized before Albert that intention is both rational and 
volitional (Lottin, PEM 4, 434). 
192 Sentences, Dist. 38, A, Art. 1: "Utrum voluntatis quantitas pensetur ex fine?" 
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man fornicates with a woman so that, by getting close to her, he might persuade her to 
abandon her heresy; and 2) someone steals in order to feed the poor. In both these cases, 
the end is good, but the act (opus) is bad. The question might then be rephrased as 
follows: does the goodness or badness of an act depend on the goodness or badness of the 
end? 
 In his response, Albert first brings up one of the canonical sayings he had 
discussed in the SDB: the Glossa ordinaria-inspired quantum intendis, tantum facis. He 
first reports at length the view of the "old teachers" (antiquorum doctorum), which he 
attributes to Prévostin (c.1135-1210), Stephen Langton (c.1150-1228), and William of 
Auxerre, but which is in fact much closer to the accounts given by Hugh of Saint-Cher 
(c.1200-1263) and John of La Rochelle (1200-1245).193 This position claims that 
quantum intendis, tantum facis applies "generally" with respect to bad and indifferent 
acts, but not to good acts; it is not always the case that you do good to the extent that you 
intend it, so that for goods, "the particular is the rule."194 
 A couple examples help to illustrate this view. If you do some morally indifferent 
act, like picking up a stick, but you do it out of contempt for God and in order to provoke 
him, you thereby sin mortally; the badness of the act is determined by the intention with 
which it is performed. But now take some good act, like giving money to the poor. 
Suppose you are able to give a large amount, but only give a small amount. Nevertheless, 
you intend the merit you would receive from giving much more. In this case, you do not 
thereby merit as if you had given the larger amount. While this view of the role of 
                                                 
193 Lottin, PEM 4, 451. Lottin points out (footnote 1) that it was much more difficult for medieval 
theologians to double-check a text than it is for us, and that the medievals were at any rate much less 
worried about historical accuracy than we are. 
194 Sentences, Dist. 38, A, Art. 1, Solution, p. 604. 
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intention in moral evaluation could be fleshed out at greater length, and indeed was by 
the likes of Hugh and John, this general outline reveals what Albert took to be the 
consensus view of his predecessors. 
 Albert never endorses this view, but instead introduces his own solution with the 
words: "nevertheless it can without prejudging be said otherwise…"195 Interestingly, his 
own solution ignores the saying that had preoccupied the "older teachers", viz. quantum 
intendis, tantum facis; Albert neglects it here, but will come back to it later in his 
commentary.196 Instead, he focuses his attention on the Ambrosian dictum, intentio 
imponit nomen operi. In what sense is this dictum true? His answer begins by 
distinguishing between ends and things referred to an end, then makes a set of 
distinctions which can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
                                                            That which is referred to an end 
In general Applied to morals 
R1: Natural cognates of the end MR1: Good action is cognate with a good end 
R2: Obliquely related to the end MR2: Bad action is oblique to a good end 
R3: Imposed on the end 
MR3: Indifferent action is in potentiality to a good 
or bad end 
  
                                                                             Ends 
In general Applied to morals 
E1: End that completes a thing in being, or in 
being well 
ME1: The form of charity completes us in being 
well 
E2: Ultimate end in which an agent rests ME2: Happiness (beatitudo) is our ultimate end 
E3: End in which the whole intention of motion 
rests ME3: Our whole intention rests in God 
                                                 
195 Ibid.: "Potest tamen sine praejudicio aliter dici..." As Scott MacDonald has pointed out to me, this looks 
like a conventional courtesy, in which Albert is rejecting a view without saying so explicitly. 
 
196 Sentences, Dist. 41, C, Art. 3, Solution, p. 644. See below. 
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Both ends and that which is referred to an end are divided into three kinds.197 Each of 
these six kinds is then adapted to morals. To begin with what is referred to an end: Albert 
calls the natural cognates of an end (R1) those things ehich are "naturally ordered" to the 
end. The moral application is straightforward: good actions (MR1) are naturally ordered 
to good ends. He doesn't explain the idea of an oblique relation to the end (R2), but the 
implied physical metaphor is useful: instead of aiming straight toward the end, something 
referred to an end obliquely is slanted or tilted away from it. Bad actions (MR2) are 
oblique to a good end, bent in the wrong direction. Finally, something referred to an end 
might be neither naturally ordered to nor oblique to the end, but "imposed" on it (R3). 
This is the case for indifferent actions (MR3), which are in potentiality to either good or 
bad ends; they are not naturally ordered toward good ends, but neither do they slant away 
from them. 
 As for the ends themselves, the first sort (E1) is an end that disposes a related 
thing to itself, and here Albert has examples: the terminus of a motion is an end that 
defines the motion; and the new form is an end that defines an act of generation. This 
kind of end completes a thing, either in being or in being well (vel in esse, vel in bene 
esse). The moral version of this end is the form of charity (ME1), which disposes the 
agent to be charitable, thereby completing or perfecting the agent. Talk of charity as an 
end might strike us as odd: isn't charity a virtue, a disposition to seek certain ends in 
certain ways, perhaps, but hardly an end in itself? Here, Albert clarifies that the 
                                                 
197 It would be tempting to use the word "means" to refer to that which is referred to an end (id quod 
refertur ad finem), as Lottin does (PEM 4, 451: "On distinguera d'abord entre fins et moyens."). This could 
be misleading, however, since as will be seen, the second category of things referred to an end are not 
actually means to the end. For this reason, I will use the clunky translation, "that which is referred to an 
end." 
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proximate end the charitable person aims at is a charitable action. This action is 
"informed" by the form of charity, which makes the action charitable. At the same time, 
performing charitable actions perfects the agent, completing her capacity for moral 
goodness; she is herself "informed" by charity. The other two sorts of ends are the 
ultimate end in which the agent rests (E2), which is beatitudo (ME2), or the happiness 
that can only be attained in heaven; and the end in which the whole intention (tota 
intentio) rests (E3), which is God (ME3). 
 Having completed this rather complicated taxonomy, Albert is prepared to give 
his first, preliminary answer to the question: how does intention affect the morality of an 
act? Using Ambrose's dictum, Albert states that intention imposes the name on the act by 
means of the "proximate or first end" (E1), both in those things which are cognate to it 
(R1), and in those things which are not oblique to it (R3). Applying this analysis to 
morals, the intention to perform a charitable act aims at the form of charity (ME1), thus 
making both the good action (MR1) and the indifferent action (MR3) charitable (and thus 
imposing the name 'charitable' on those actions.) The intention does not impose the name 
on that which is oblique to the end (R2), that is to say, bad actions (MR2). 
 What then of the counterexamples? Do not the man who fornicates in order to  
convert his lover, or the thief who steals in order to give to the poor, commit bad actions 
but with good ends? Albert replies that such examples do not involve a relation through 
the nature of the act (per naturam operis), but only through the thought of the agent.198 
The relation in question appears to be that between the action and the end. Although he 
                                                 
198 Sentences, Dist. 38, A, Art. 1, "Ad ea...", p. 604: "Ad ea autem quae objiciuntur, dicendum quod non 
valent: quia non est in talibus relatio per naturam operis, sed tantum per cogitationem agentis: et de tali 
relatione non loquitur hic Magister: quia illa stulta est, si applicat fini quod non est applicabile ei. Et per 
hoc patet solutio ad totum." 
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doesn't make it clear, Albert appears to be gesturing toward a distinction between end as 
an intrinsic feature of an action, and end as a further reason for performing that action. If 
I steal money in order to give it to the poor, the end intrinsic to the action is to steal the 
money; my reason for stealing the money (the end which I am thinking about as I steal it) 
is to give to the poor. Albert doesn't develop this distinction any further in the Sentences 
commentary, but we will see it again and in further detail in the Super Ethica. 
 What sense can be made of this account of ends and intentions? Much depends on 
what is meant by good and bad action (actio bona, actio mala). The vocabulary may 
strike the reader as odd.  Albert usually uses either opus or operatio to describe moral 
acts; opus is often used for acts at a general or hypothetical level of description, operatio 
for more highly specified acts. Nor was this unusual; Lombard often uses opus, as do 
many of Albert's contemporaries, such as Alexander of Hales (1185-1245) and Eudes 
Rigaud (c.1210-1275). In this particular context, however, Lombard uses the word actio, 
and Albert summarizes Lombard's concern as regarding good and bad actiones.199 Since 
actio is not a technical term that Albert typically uses, however, it is somewhat difficult 
to determine what meaning he attaches to it. 
 One place in the Sentences commentary where we find Albert using the word 
actio is in his discussion of generic goodness, in distinction 40, where he introduces the 
concept of good in action (bonum in actione).200 The good in action is defined as the 
generic action clothed with good circumstances and done with a good end. In distinction 
38, by contrast, actions are distinguished from ends; the good action is "referred to" a 
                                                 
199 Sentences, Dist. 38, divisio textus, p. 603. 
200 Sentences Commentary II, dist. 40, A, article 1, ad 3, page 624; see above. 
86 
 
good end, to which it is a natural cognate. So the good in action (bonum in actione) 
appears to be a different concept from the good action (actio bona).  
 On closer inspection, however, it seems that the concept of actio bona does 
include ends, just not the ones he mentions here. After all, the tripartite distinction of 
ends in distinction 38 seems radically incomplete, restricted as it is to the form of charity, 
heavenly happiness, and God. What about other, more down-to-earth sorts of ends such 
as "to feed the hungry", or "to kill this person". Albert recognizes these as ends in other 
contexts, and it seems likely that they are built into the concepts of good action and bad 
action as he uses them here. Thus the action of collecting donations in order to feed the 
hungry might count as a good action, which can then be directed toward a further end, 
namely the form of charity. Finally, it is this form of charity which "imposes" on the 
action of collecting donations in order to feed the hungry the name "charitable". 
 But if this interpretation is correct, we are left with one single action type – 
charitable actions – to which the Ambrosian formula ("the intention imposes the name on 
the act") applies. If I truly intend the form of charity as my end, my action is in fact a 
charitable one. Perhaps this is as far as the Ambrosian formula goes, for Albert. Even if 
that is the case, we are still likely to have further questions about the role intention plays 
in determining the moral status of actions which are not charitable. Since Albert denies 
that all non-charitable actions are bad, this will include some good actions. Indeed, we 
find Albert arguing in distinction 41 that the infidelis can do good "insofar as he is moved 
by natural piety, or by the goodness of political virtue."201 It would be interesting to learn 
what role good intentions play in the goodness of those actions. Though Albert doesn't 
                                                 
201 Sentences II, distinction 41, D, article 5, ad primum, p. 645: "Homo autem malus in se bene potest 
bonum facere, non in quantum malus, sed in quantum motus pietate naturali, vel bonitate virtutis politicae." 
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address this issue in distinction 38, he quickly returns to the question of the relation 
between intentions and moral acts in distinction 41, to which I now turn. 
 
Albert on the Role of Intention in Moral Evaluation: Second Answer (Distinction 41) 
 We find a reconsideration of the moral import of intention in distinction 41 of 
Albert's Sentences commentary, but he sets the stage for it in distinction 40. There he 
asks whether an act might be both good and bad. A preliminary argument takes the 
affirmative position: 
Further, this [viz., that an act that is one in number can be both good and bad] 
seems to be confirmed by a continuous act which someone does first for God, and 
afterwards, before he finishes, changes his intention toward vain glory; for then 
the act is one, because the agent is one, the time is one, and the terminus of the 
motion is one; and nevertheless it is first good, and later bad.202 
Thus we have a case that purports to show that an act which is one in number can be both 
good and bad, by assuming the diachronic identity of the act. If the act remains the same 
act over time, but the intention changes from good to bad (or indeed from bad to good) at 
some point during the duration of the act, then the same act is both good and bad, though 
at different times. As in the text from distinction 38 examined above, the argument hinges 
on what is meant by an act (actus or actio). But here Albert explicitly addresses this 
problem in his reply: 
                                                 
202 Sentences II, distinction 40, D, article 5, obj. 5, p. 636: "Praeterea, Videtur hoc verificari de aliquo actu 
continuo, quem aliquis primo facit propter Deum, et postea antequam finiat, convertit intentionem ad 
inanem gloriam : tunc enim actus est unus, quia agens unus, et tempus unum, et terminus motus unus : et 
tamen est primo bonus, et postea malus : ergo una numero actio potest esse bona et mala, quod videtur esse 
impossibile, cum bonum et malum sunt opposita, vel ut contraria, vel ut privatio et habitus, ut supra 
determinatum est." 
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To the next it should be said that in such an action there are two moral actions, 
although there is one naturally. And regarding its parts, it is informed in different 
ways by intention. For intention is principally the mover in morals. And since 
there are two intentions there, there are two movers, and two actions, not one, 
follow the two movers.203 
As we saw above in the discussion of circumstances in the SDB, Albert distinguishes 
between an act qua act, or the "substance" of the act, and an act as a moral entity.204 Here 
he makes the same distinction in terms of natural actions and moral actions. Natural 
actions seem to be distinguished by pre-moral descriptions which do not refer to what the 
agent intends. Moral actions, by contrast, are distinguished by the intentions which 
"inform" them. The principle here seems to be: the number of moral actions will always 
be equal to the number of intentions. Intention individuates moral actions in virtue of its 
role as the principal mover in morals.205 
 Yet although intentions are either good or bad,206 and intentions individuate moral 
actions, Albert insists that good and bad are not "constitutive differences" of these 
actions. That is, good and bad are not essential features of voluntary actions, but are only 
accidental to them. Now this seems like an odd position for Albert to take. After all, he 
claims that an action cannot be good and then later become bad while remaining the same 
                                                 
203 Sentences II, distinction 40, D, article 5, ad 5, p. 636-637: Ad aliud dicendum, quod in tali actione sunt 
duae actiones morales, licet una sit naturaliter : et quoad diversas sui partes ab intentione diversimode 
informatur : est enim in moribus intentio principaliter movens : et cum ibi sint duae intentiones, sunt duo 
moventia, et ad duo moventia sequuntur duae actiones, et non una. 
204 SDB 1.3.1, ad 1, p. 38; see also Cunningham (2008), 133-134. 
205 Hoffmann (2003) argues that in Albert's Sentences, "morality tends to be considered more from the 
perspective of the action itself than from that of the agent. Thus the predominantly ontological perspective 
obscures the specifically moral character of actions"(81). Given that we see Albert arguing here that moral 
actions are individuated by the agent's intention, which is the principal mover in morals, we have at least a 
prima facie reason to question the accuracy of Hoffmann's criticism. 
206 I am setting aside the question of the morally indifferent here, since it is a complicated question in its 
own right, and deserves a separate treatment.  
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action. Since the goodness or badness of an action is inseparable from the (moral) action 
itself, the action's goodness or badness would seem to be essential to it. His claim that it 
is not has drawn criticism from contemporary scholars, notably Tobias Hoffmann, who 
argues that "Albert's account is too closely tied to the ontological viewpoint."207 That is, 
Hoffman charges that by focusing on actions as ontological items, Albert ends up 
downplaying their moral significance. That he treats good and bad as merely accidental to 
action is evidence of this neglect of the specifically moral aspect of actions. 
 In order to evaluate Hoffman's critique, it will be necessary to examine Albert's 
account in more detail. Albert concedes that goodness and badness are inseparable (non 
transmutabile) from good or bad actions.208 But he points out that there are accidents 
which are inseparable from their subjects. One prominent type of such accidents is the 
per se accident, which "flows from the principles constituting the being" of some species; 
a common medieval example was risibility with respect to human beings. Another is the 
"accident of an individual", which can relate only to a subject, or to both a subject and a 
cause. For our purposes, the accident of an individual that relates only to a subject is the 
relevant one.209 This sort of accident also comes in two kinds, depending on whether the 
subject is permanent or successive. An accident of an individual related to a permanent 
subject will be separable from that subject. Albert gives the example of black and white 
with respect to human beings: skin colour is an accident that can change while the subject 
remains one in number. An accident of an individual related to a successive subject is 
inseparable from that subject. The one example Albert gives of successive subject is 
                                                 
207 Hoffmann (2003), 80. 
208 Sentences II, distinction 40, A, Article 1, Solution, p. 625. 
209 Albert also provides an account of accidents of an individual that relate both to a subject and to a cause, 
which are of two types: one where the subject names a per se cause of the accident, and the other where the 
subject flows (fluat) toward one of the causes of the subject. 
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motion: the same motion cannot be both fast and slow; if there is a change from fast to 
slow, then we have a new motion. So fast and slow are accidents of individual motions 
that cannot be separated from those motions. 
 This taxonomy of accidents allows Albert to explain how good and bad are 
accidental to action: they are accidents of an individual, and the subject to which they 
relate is successive, similar to motion. Good and bad with respect to action are like fast 
and slow with respect to motion; if an action changes from good to bad, it is no longer the 
same action. In this way, the goodness of a good action is inseparable from the action 
without being essential to it.  
 Still, it is not yet clear why Albert insists that goodness and badness are accidents 
of actions. He has only shown that they can be accidental while still being inseparable 
from the actions they modify. Why not instead say with Hoffman that they are essential 
features of actions?210 
 The answer concerns specification. Essential features of an action are those which 
make it the sort of action that it is. In scholastic terms, they determine the action's 
species. Above we saw Albert claiming that intentions individuate moral actions, 
distinguishing one from another. In an article on the status of goodness and badness with 
                                                 
210 Hoffmann (2003) himself points to three arguments from the Sentences text for the claim that good and 
bad are accidental features of actions: 1) badness is a privation, and privations do not specify things; neither 
can they specify a moral action; 2) good and bad can be in actions of the same species; for example, sexual 
intercourse is one action in species, but one instance of it may be good, another bad; and finally 3) every 
action is caused by God, and if badness were substantial to an action, then God would also be the cause of 
badness, which is impossible.  
Hoffmann does not think these are good arguments, and he cites them as evidence of the "predominantly 
ontological perspective" which obscures Albert's thinking about ethics (81). Note, however, that these three 
arguments are found not in Albert's solution, nor in the replies, but in the Sed contra section of the disputed 
question (Sentences II, distinction 40, A, Article 1, p. 624-625). It is therefore not obvious that Albert 
himself endorses these arguments. Further, the second argument seems to be inconsistent with Albert's own 
views. Sexual intercourse may be a species of natural action, but as we have seen, moral actions are 
distinguished by intentions. So we have good reason to doubt whether Albert would endorse these three 
arguments from the Sed contra. At any rate, Albert also provides a different argument, which I discuss in 
what follows. 
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respect to actions, he focuses on the ends toward which those intentions are directed. An 
objection argues that in morals, actions are specified only by goodness or badness, so that 
good and bad should be considered substantial forms of an action.211 Albert replies by 
denying that goodness and badness play this role of specification: 
To the next it should be said that an action in morals is specified by its term, just 
like all motions, because it exists on account of that term, and it [the term] is its 
end; but good and bad, as will be made clear below, are not caused in this way by 
the end, but also by other things."212 
In morals, the end aimed at by the agent specifies an action, allowing us to distinguish it 
from other sorts of actions and to identify it as a particular species of action. Still, since a 
particular end is either good or bad, will the goodness or badness of the end not therefore 
also specify the action? We are interested in moral specification, after all; if it is the end 
that plays this role, surely the goodness or badness of the end will be relevant here. 
 While the goodness or badness of the end is relevant to the goodness or badness 
of the action, it does not specify the action because the end is not the sole cause of an 
action's goodness or badness. When Albert says that good and bad are not caused "in this 
way" (sic) by the end, he means that they are not caused only by the end -- they also have 
other causes. Thus there is a potential divergence between the moral status of the end, 
and the moral status of the action. To see why this is the case, I will now turn to Albert's 
second attempt in the Sentences commentary to answer the traditional question about the 
                                                 
211 Sentences II, distinction 40, A, Article 1, obj. 2, p. 624. 
212 Sentences II, distinction 40, A, Article 1, ad 2, p. 625: "Ad aliud dicendum, quod actio in 
moralibus specificatur in termino suo, sicut omnis motus : quia propter illum terminum est, et ipse est finis 
ejus : sed bonum et malum, ut infra patebit, non sic causantur ex fine, sed etiam ex aliis." 
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relationship between the goodness or badness of an act and the intention with which it is 
performed. 
 Albert addresses this question explicitly in an article that asks: "Does intention 
make an act good and bad?"213 His answer contains an explicit formulation of the 
Dionysian principle, and is therefore worth quoting in full: 
It should be said that good and bad in an act are not caused in one way; but the 
good, as Dionysius says, is from one whole cause; that is, for the constitution of 
the good it is necessary to bring together all the circumstances and the end and the 
form in the acting will. And it is constituted only by all these things together in 
the mode of an integral whole, which is constituted by all its parts taken at the 
same time. But the bad, as Dionysius says, is omnifarious, that is, from any 
particular defect, just as an integral whole is destroyed by any given part taken 
separately. And thus it is that the good does not exist without a good intention, 
although it is not good from intention alone; just as a house does not exist without 
a wall, although it does not exist from the wall alone.214 
Here we see why Albert thinks that good and bad cannot perform the function of moral 
specification, and therefore must not be essential to moral actions. In morals, an action is 
specified by the end intended by the agent that performs it. But the goodness or badness 
of the action is not determined by the end alone, with the result that the moral status of 
what specifies the action can differ from the moral status of the action itself. So good and 
                                                 
213 Sentences II, distinction 41, B, Article 2, p. 642: "Utrum intentio facit bonum vel malum opus?" 
214 Sentences II, distinction 41, B, Article 2, solution, p. 643: "Dicendum, quod bonum et malum in opere 
non causantur uno modo : sed bonum, sicut Dionysius dicit, ex una tota causa est, id est, ad constitutionem 
boni oportet convenire omnes circumstantias et finem et formam in voluntate agente : et non constituitur 
nisi ab omnibus his simul per modum totius integralis, quod constituitur ab omnibus suis partibus simul 
acceptis. Malum autem, ut dicit Dionysius, fit omnifariam, id est, ex quolibet particulari defectu : sicut et 
totum integrale destruitur qualibet parte divisim destructa. Et ideo est, quod bonum non est sine intentione 
bona, licet non sit bonum ex sola intentione : sicut domus non est sine pariete, licet non sit ex solo pariete. 
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bad are not essential features of actions, but only accidental features. Note here that the 
reason Albert holds that good and bad are accidental is that goodness and badness 
proceed not only from what is essential to an action, understood morally, but also from 
accidental or extrinsic features of the action, such as the circumstances. Albert is not 
privileging an ontological perspective on action here; rather, he distinguishes actions 
understood "naturally" (i.e., ontologically) from actions understood morally; the 
Dionysian principle applies only to the latter, and the non-essential character of goodness 
and badness with respect to actions follows from that principle. 
 Hoffman's critique of Albert on the morality of action extends to the Dionysian 
principle, however. He argues that Albert's account, which requires that several factors 
taken together constitute the morally good action, "reveals a weakness intrinsic to 
Albert's account of moral goodness, because he does not indicate any order of priority 
among those factors. Clearly, the end of the action has no privileged role in Albert's 
explanation."215 The strength of this objection depends on the sort of priority one is 
looking for, and one's reasons for valuing that priority. Hoffman contrasts Albert with 
Aquinas; on his view, Aquinas gets the better of the argument between them.216 I will 
argue later that Aquinas's own use of the Dionysian principle is similar to Albert's, and is 
clearly influenced by him. At this point, I would argue only that Albert does privilege the 
end. The end does the work of specifying actions; if someone changes her intention while 
performing some (natural) action, then there is a new moral action. The categorization of 
moral actions results from the distinction between different intended ends. While the 
external circumstances are also important, they do not play a role in moral specification. 
                                                 
215 Hoffmann (2003), 82. 
216 Hoffmann (2003), 83-89. 
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The intention of the end is also essential in a particular way to charitable actions, as we 
have seen. Finally, as I show below, intention plays a special role in bad actions, as it can 
determine how bad those actions are, and thus how blameworthy the agent is.217 The end, 
and the agent's act of intending it, clearly play an important and peculiar role in the 
goodness or badness of a moral act.218 
  Turning to the account of the Dionysian principle, there are several differences 
between its presentation in the SDB and its portrayal in the Sentences commentary.219 In 
the SDB Albert attributed it to both Dionysius and Aristotle; in the Sentences 
commentary the reference to Aristotle is omitted. In the SDB, the principle concerned the 
causes of virtue and vice -- a result, it seems, of Albert combining texts from both 
pseudo-Dionysius and Aristotle.220 In the Sentences commentary, Albert is explicit that 
his concern is good and bad in action -- the application to virtue and vice seems to have 
dropped out of the account.  
 We also have different metaphors: in the SDB, Albert compared the performance 
of a good action to the discovery of the centre of a circle.221 Like a virtuous action, the 
centre of the circle exists only "in one way", namely at that point from which all lines 
going to the circumference are equal in length. Failing to be in the centre of the circle is, 
like a vicious action, "omnifarious" -- it can happen in many different ways. In the 
Sentences commentary, an action is compared to a house; there can be no house without a 
                                                 
217 Sentences II, distinction 41, article 3, solution, p. 644. 
218 Hoffmann acknowledges that for Albert, the end plays a primary role "from the theological point of 
view", in particular because charity is a unifying virtue (82).  
219 The comparison is between SDB 1.3.1, ad 6, p. 38, and Sentences II, distinction 41, article 2, solution, 
page 643. 
220 The editors of the Editio coloniensis make this point in the note to line 68 on page 38 of the critical 
edition of the SDB. 
221 This example is from the Nicomachean Ethics II.9, 1109a24-26); Aristotle uses it to illustrate the 
difficulty of attaining moral virtue, which is an intermediate between extremes. 
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wall, just as there can be no good action without a good intention; but a house requires 
more than walls, just as a good action requires more than a good intention. 
 This new metaphor illustrates not only the Dionysian principle, but also the 
category with which Albert now associates it: the good act is an integral whole (totum 
integrale). Albert introduces this familiar concept from medieval mereology in order to 
explain the unity of the good act's goodness. The integral whole results from the parts 
being arranged together, and unlike the universal whole, is not predicated of any of its 
parts, but differs from each of them in quantity and in composition.222 In an integral 
whole, the whole implies each of the parts, but none of the parts taken by itself implies 
the whole.223  
 We can contrast the integral whole, as Albert understands it, with a potential 
whole, like the soul. The soul is a potential whole because the fullest account of the soul 
will include various powers and capacities. But as Andrew Arlig has noted, "it does not 
follow from this that any given particular soul will have all of the powers and capacities 
on the list."224 By contrast, an integral whole will cease to exist without each of its 
constituent parts. Thus the example of a house: a house is more than its walls, but without 
the walls, there can be no house. 
 In the same way, the goodness of a good act depends on any one of its 'parts' 
being good. This explains the divergence between the way we evaluate acts as good or 
bad. A bad intention is enough to make the whole act bad, but a good intention is 
insufficient to make the whole act good, since bad circumstances or a bad form can also 
make the act bad: 
                                                 
222 Liber divisionum (ed. de Loë, 1913), tract.2, cap.5, p.34. 
223 De generatione et corruptione (ed. Borgnet, 1890), Lib.II, tract.3, cap.9, p.454b. 
224 Arlig (2015). 
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 ...for the bad, a corrupt intention suffices, even though [the bad act] is also caused 
 by other corruptions. But for the good, integrity (integritas) of intention does not 
 suffice; for there can be many other corruptions of the act.225 
The word integritas is significant here: Albert does not typically use it to describe 
intentions. Integritas can have the sense of innocence or blamelessness, or integrity as an 
ethical quality; but in an article in which Albert argues that a good act is constituted "in 
the mode of an integral whole", we might also understand integritas in this passage as a 
kind of wholeness. One's intention needs to be whole or intact -- and thus good226 -- but 
that intactness is only a part of the act as an integral whole. The integrity of the parts is 
necessary for the integrity of the whole, and the corruption of any part is enough to make 
the whole act bad. 
 Lottin traces this idea in Albert to Eudes Rigaud, the Franciscan master who 
became a master of theology at the University of Paris in 1242, around the same time 
Albert was arriving in Paris.227 Rigaud devotes ample space in his own commentary on 
Lombard's Sentences to the topic of intention. Central for our purposes is a question that 
asks: should an act be judged good or bad from its intention?228 Rigaud's position is 
decidedly anti-Abelardian, but he frames his answer in such a way as to save the 
authoritative texts that suggest that the goodness of an act derives entirely from its 
intention.  
                                                 
225 Sentences II, Distinction 40, C, Article 2, ad 1, p. 643. 
226 Albert accepts the Boethian dictum that "everything that is, inasmuch as it is, is good." (See SDB, Tr. I, 
Q. 1, Art. 7). Thus everything bad is in some way incomplete, lacking the being that ought to be there, and 
this goes for intentions as well. 
227 Lottin, PEM 4, 454. On Rigaud's life and dates, see Davis (2006). 
228 See Lottin, PEM 4, 443. I use the text edited by Lottin, and included along with his comments in PEM 4, 
432-450. 
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 He distinguishes between two ways of understanding intention: either as simply 
the soul's gaze (aspectum) upon the end of an action, or as including the ordering of acts 
in relation to the end.229 The use of aspectus to describe intention is somewhat surprising, 
as it suggests that an intention is a purely cognitive act, one of nearly seeing or gazing at 
or grasping an end. This is doubtful, however, since earlier in the same work Rigaud 
describes intention as an act of the will toward an end, though like Albert he thinks it also 
involves reason.230 At any rate, the first sense captures the soul's focus on the end, 
without any consideration of what means one might use to attain it. The second sense of 
intention, by contrast, involves an ordering of acts, which includes determining that 
action by which one will achieve what is intended (actionem per quam perveniat ad 
illud).231 Having defined these two different senses of intention, Rigaud can answer his 
original question: understood in the first way, an intention can be good while the act is 
bad, so that the morality of the act should not be judged by its intention. Understood in 
the second way, an act can be judged by its intention, since intention is defined so 
broadly as to include the act. 
 While it allows for different ways of understanding intention, Rigaud's solution 
makes it clear that two things are necessary for a good act (opus) – both the end which is 
intended (the intentum), and the means towards achieving that end (the actio) must be 
good. For this reason, Rigaud claims that "more things concur for good than for bad."232 
Both conditions must be met in order for the act to be good, but if either fails, the act is 
bad. Rigaud concludes that "from the destruction of a part, the destruction of the whole is 
                                                 
229 Lottin, PEM 4, 444. 
230 Ibid., 433-434. 
231 Ibid. 444. 
232 Ibid., 445: "plura concurrunt ad bonum quam ad malum." 
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brought about."233 This is in essence the Dionysian principle as we find it in Albert; while 
he doesn't describe it in terms of an integral whole, the word he uses for 'whole' – integer 
– may have suggested that concept to Albert.234 
 While likely influenced by Rigaud, in his Sentences commentary Albert differs 
both from Rigaud and from his own earlier formulation of the Dionysian principle in the 
SDB by providing a different list of factors that must be good in order for the act itself to 
be good. Rigaud mentions two: the intended end, and the means toward that end (which 
he also calls the actio). In the SDB, Albert initially says only that all of the circumstances 
must be good. As we saw above, he names seven different circumstances in that work, 
and analyzes them in some detail. He also mentions that one of the circumstances is 
sometimes more principal than the others, insofar as it "gives being to an act in 
accordance with the species of virtue or vice."235 Yet he doesn't give a general account of 
how circumstances determine virtue or vice, and he remarks that with respect to the good, 
one circumstance does not give being without all the others.  
 In the SDB's second formulation of the Dionysian principle, three factors must be 
good for the act itself to be good: 1) the circumstances; 2) the end; and 3) the act upon its 
appropriate matter – in other words, its generic quality.236 The end is thus treated as 
distinct from the circumstances, a trend that continues in the Sentences commentary. 
                                                 
233 Ibid.: "a destructione partis, integri infertur destructio." 
234 The evidence is much less clear as to whether Rigaud influenced the SDB version of the Dionysian 
principle. That earlier text does not mention intention specifically, focusing instead on the circumstances in 
general. So although there is good reason to think that Lottin is right (PEM 4, 454) that when we compare 
Rigaud's text on intention to Albert's commentary on distinction 41 of Sentences II, "on se convainc sans 
peine qu'Albert a sous les yeux le texte du maître franciscain", it is not obvious that Albert takes the idea 
for the Dionysian principle from Rigaud.  
235 SDB 1.3.1, ad 6, lines 61-62, p. 38. 
236 SDB I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 22-25. 
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Generic goodness is also included; as I noted above, this appears to be an attempt to 
merge the stages theory with the Dionysian principle. 
 In the Sentences commentary, the Dionysian principle no longer includes generic 
goodness. Albert again mentions three factors: 1) the circumstances; 2) the end; and 3) 
the form in the acting will. Given that this account is given in the context of a disputed 
question about intention, it might seem odd that Albert neglects to mention it here. But it 
is clear from the responses to the objections that Albert considers intention to be one of 
the factors that must be good in order for the act to be good.237 Here as elsewhere, Albert 
seems to be treating intention and end as a unit. While he considers them distinct and 
defines them separately, he often uses the terms intentio and finis interchangeably when 
discussing their moral significance. The end here is the end insofar as it is intended by the 
agent. Albert has little to say about circumstances in this context, though we should keep 
in mind that in the Sentences commentary, he has begun to speak of the moral 
circumstances as external, as opposed to the internal act of intending the end.238 This is 
by no means a hard and fast distinction; the external circumstances are still things one 
must deliberate about (an internal act), and the end is usually in some sense external to 
the agent. Still, Albert distinguishes them, probably as a means of emphasizing the 
importance of intention and end. 
 The last factor requires some explanation: what does Albert mean by "the form in 
the acting will" (formam in voluntate agente)? The notion of a form in the will does not 
occur elsewhere in distinction 41, and it is possible to be misled here because Albert 
                                                 
237 Sentences II, distinction 41, C, article 2, ad 1, ad 3, and ad 6, p. 643. 
238 Sentences II, distinction 40, A, article 1, ad 3, p. 624. 
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sometimes speaks of the will as being informed by reason.239 The broader context of 
Sentences II makes clear that Albert has something more specific in mind: earlier in the 
book, he states that "the will is a complete cause of a good act through the forms of grace 
and virtue."240 The will is informed by grace or by virtue, in such a way that it produces a 
graced or virtuous act. Albert's view seems to be that it is not enough to act in the right 
circumstances and for a good end; one's act is not good unless one is also disposed to act 
in that way, whether by habituation or by grace. On this understanding, good acts are not 
isolated: they do not exist independently of the agent's character. I will return to this view 
later, when I compare the stages account to the Dionysian principle. 
 While Albert's embrace of the Dionysian principle shows that he rejects the 
Abelardian position that makes intention the sole determinant of an action's moral status, 
he still aims to show that there is some sense in which the dictum quantum intendis, 
tantum facis is true. We saw above (in distinction 38) that Albert is able to save the 
Ambrosian formula intentio imponit nomen operi by showing that it has a narrow, limited 
application: that is, when the intention aims at the form of charity, and the action referred 
to that end is either good or indifferent. In a similar way, Albert wants to save quantum 
intendis, tantum facis, which was derived from the Glossa ordinaria and had become an 
authoritative text for medieval theologians. To do so, he cites and borrows extensively 
from William of Auxerre. 
                                                 
239 Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.23, art.16, p.23. 
240 Sentences II; dist. 34; art. 5; p. 559: "voluntas completa causa est actus boni per formam gratiae et 
virtutis." I translate the singular formam with 'forms' to make it clear that the form of grace and the form of 
virtue are distinct. The Latin is ambiguous between a single form of both grace and virtue, and two forms, 
one of grace and the other of virtue. Since Albert says explicitly elsewhere that one can perform a good act 
from political or civic virtue without the benefit of grace (see Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), 
Lib.II, dist.41, art.5, p.645b), we should understand the form of grace to be different from the form of 
virtue in this passage. 
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 Albert follows William by distinguishing between two different ways of taking 
the words quantum and tantum.241 Both can be understood either nominally, as relative 
pronouns in the accusative case, or adverbially. Then he complicates matters further by 
arguing that understanding them nominally yields different results depending on whether 
quantum intendis, tantum facis is applied to goods or bads. The adverbial meaning is not 
straightforward either; the expression can be true or false depending on the precise way in 
which quantum modifies the verb intendis. Albert's account can be summarized as 
follows: 
Q. Is quantum intendis, tantum facis true or false? 
 
                                                 
241 Sentences II, distinction 41, C, Article 3, Solution, p. 644. 
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 If quantum and tantum are understood nominally, as pronouns in the accusative 
case, then the sense of the dictum quantum intendis, tantum facis is: the quantity or 
degree of goodness or badness you intend, is the quantity or degree of goodness or 
badness which you do. That is, the goodness or badness of the act is equal to the 
goodness or badness of the intention. Applied to goods, this is false, on account of the 
Dionysian principle: a good intention is not sufficient to make the act good, because it 
also requires good circumstances and a good form (i.e., grace or virtue) modifying the 
agent's will.  
 Applied to bads, the saying can be taken in two ways: either ad peius, toward 
what is worse, or descendendo respectu minus mali, "descending" from bad to less bad. 
While Albert doesn't explain this distinction, he provides an example which, along with 
his stated source –William of Auxerre's Summa Aurea –  shows that he is primarily 
concerned with the distinction between mortal and venial sin.242 The case of "descending" 
to what is less bad is simpler: Albert gives the example of intending, by fornicating, to sin 
venially. Fornication is a mortal sin, but the intention, in this example, is only venial. In 
this case, quantum intendis, tantum facis is false; you cannot make a mortal sin venial 
simply by intending for it to be less bad than it is. Mortal sins are such that they are 
mortal, regardless of the intention with which one performs them. 
 As for the opposite direction, going toward something worse, Albert holds that the 
traditional dictum is true as regards guilt (reatus); if you commit a sin that is, of its own 
nature, merely venial, but you intend by doing so to express contempt for God, you are 
                                                 
242 William's treatment of this question is more complex and elaborate; for the question from the Summa 
aurea, edited by Lottin, see PEM 4, 400-401. 
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guilty of a mortal sin. As William puts it, "if you intend to sin greatly, you sin greatly."243 
The dictum is false, however, as regards the turn toward the changeable good (ex parte 
conversionis ad bonum commutabile). This last detail we do not find in William of 
Auxerre; nor is it in Rigaud, who also adopts William's nominal/adverbial distinction to 
explain the dictum.244 The language comes from an Augustinian explanation of sin, 
which Lombard discusses at length in the Sentences: we sin by turning away from 
(avertens) the unchangeable good (i.e., God), toward a changeable good. Albert's point 
seems to be that in aiming at a changeable good, we are intending something worse than 
the unchangeable good.245 The changeable good is still a good, however, and a clever 
sinner might claim that since he intended something good, his act must also be good.246 
Albert rules out this possibility by denying that the dictum applies in this way.  
 The adverbial interpretation of quantum and tantum is less interesting. They can 
denote intention in a general way, as a likeness (similitudo); in this case, the dictum 
means "if you intend greatly, you act greatly."247 In this sense it is true. They can also 
denote intention "specifically, in equality."248 By equality, Albert means that the intention 
would be equal in goodness or badness to the act, and taken in this way the dictum is 
false. 
 
                                                 
243 Ibid., 401: "si intendis multum peccare, multum peccas." 
244 For Rigaud, see PEM 4, 445-448. 
245 Sentences (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.I, dist.2, art.21, p.83a.  
246 For Albert's insistence that the changeable good remains a good even when it is a sin to will it, see Super 
Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.34, art.3, p.551a: "Ad aliud dicendum, quod conversio 
ad bonum commutabile non est mala, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Libero arbitrio, sicut nec ipsum bonum 
commutabile est malum, nec fructus boni commutabilis est malus : sed conversio avertens habet rationem 
mali, et fructus excludens id quo est fruendum, est malus." 
247 Sentences II, distinction 41, C, Article 3, Solution, p. 644: "si multum, multum". 
248 Ibid.: "in specie, in aequalitate". 
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2.E Moral Circumstances in Super Ethica 
 
 In Super Ethica, Albert reaffirms the conception of circumstances he introduced 
in the Sentences commentary: they pertain to matters extrinsic to the agent, in contrast to 
those things which are internal (intra) to her. In an article defining circumstance, two 
objections take it for granted that circumstances are extrinsic, and Albert doesn't deny 
this in his replies.249 Rather, drawing on Cicero's account of circumstances in his 
Rhetoric, Albert defines circumstances as those conditions which give rise to a rhetorical 
argument. Such an argument will do one of four things: 1) excuse a person for some bad 
act; 2) draw attention to factors that make a person more deserving of censure, again for a 
bad act; 3) show that a person is deserving of greater praise for a good act; or 4) show 
that a person is deserving of less praise for a good act.250 These arguments belong 
properly to the sphere of rhetoric and politics (civilem), but Albert points out that ethics 
"prepares the materials" for political reflection.251 
 Albert claims that when it comes to the sorts of judgments about human beings 
for which rhetorical arguments are appropriate, what is internal is irrelevant; only 
extrinsic factors matter. This might seem implausible; 'internal' matters, such as whether 
an action was premeditated, are certainly relevant to arguments made in criminal court, 
for example. But premeditation needs to be argued for based on observable, 'extrinsic' 
evidence, and this seems to be Albert's point: whether you are arguing for a tougher 
sentence, or making the case that someone deserves a public honour, the evidence you 
draw on will be of the extrinsic variety. 
                                                 
249 Super Ethica III, 1, #166, p. 148, objs. 1 and 4. 
250 Super Ethica III, 1, #166, p. 148, solution. 
251 Super Ethica III, 1, #166, p. 148, ad 1. 
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 At any rate, it is clear that Albert means to distinguish circumstances from 
internal features of an action, like intentions. His purpose is not to downplay these 
internal factors. Rather, this distinction allows Albert to give a careful account of 
intention, and to emphasize the role that it plays in moral evaluation. Nor is Albert fully 
consistent here; he still occasionally refers to intentions, or ends of intentions, as 
circumstances. We might understand him as distinguishing between a broad notion of 
circumstance, which encompasses internal elements like intentions, and a narrower one, 
which excludes them. 
 The division of circumstances we find in Super Ethica is similar to the accounts 
Albert gives in DNB and SDB. There is a subtle difference, however: in his earlier works, 
the primary distinction was between the circumstance regarding the agent (quis), and 
those circumstances regarding the action (the other six major circumstances). In Super 
Ethica, the primary distinction is threefold: that which regards the agent (quis), that 
which regards the object of the act (quid), and finally that which is joined it to the act 
(circa quid).252 Albert includes the other major circumstances (time, place, instrument, 
etc.) under the third category. This threefold distinction leads to an extended treatment of 
the circumstance quid, which relates to a question Albert had had difficulty dealing with 
in the SDB: that of moral species. 
 Super Ethica considers objections that take as their starting point the view laid out 
in the SDB and the Sentences commentary: that there is a core ontological item, the act 
itself or the "substance" of the act, and the circumstances that "surround" it. Here, 
however, there is an additional piece of Aristotelian terminology: Albert cites De anima 
                                                 
252 Super Ethica III, 1, #167, solution. 
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to claim that an act has its species from its object.253 The objections he looks at assume 
that whatever determines the species of an act must be its substance, or the act itself. Now 
both quid and circa quid seem to indicate the object of an act, so neither can count as 
circumstances.  
 Albert's replies here are not entirely clear, and require some unpacking. Here is 
his reply to the objection that nothing surrounds (circumstat) itself, and since quid seems 
to indicate the substance of an act or the act itself, it cannot be a circumstance: 
To the third it should be said that an act, insofar as it is considered in its own 
species, surrounds the act which is left over from it, and in this way there is a 
circumstance, as was said.254 
And here is how he responds to the objection that an act has its species from its object, 
and since whatever gives the species must indicate the act itself, it must not be a 
circumstance: 
To the fourth it should be said that the object in general is included in the act, 
because it receives the species from it. But because in specific cases there are 
many differences in that object, from which blame is aggravated, there can be a 
special circumstance; for example, a human being is the object of homicide 
generally, although to kill an enemy and to kill a citizen are not the same with 
respect to blame.255 
                                                 
253 Super Ethica III, 1, #167, obj. 4, 5. 
254 Super Ethica III, 1, #167, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod actus, secundum quod consideratur in 
specie sua, circumstat actum, qui relinquitur ex ipso, et sic est circumstantia, ut dictum est." 
255 Super Ethica III, 1, #167, ad 4: "Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiectum in generali comprehenditur in 
actu, quia ab eo speciem recipit, sed quia in speciali sunt multae differentiae illius obiecti, ex quibus 
aggravatur reatus, esse potest specialis circumstantia, sicut homo est obiectum homicidii generaliter, non 
tamen eiusdem reatus est occidere hostem et occidere civem." 
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 The first quotation distinguishes between an act considered in its own species, and the 
act which is left over from it (relinquitur ex ipso). Albert appears to be affirming here the 
position he took in the SDB: that the act itself, or the substance of the act, exists as an 
ontological item distinct from the act considered morally. Here the substance of the act is 
"left over", or remains, once the moral features of the act have been (conceptually) set 
aside. Thus the act considered in its own species is itself a circumstance of the more 
basic, pre-moral act. 
 But what might this act itself look like? Albert's ethical writings are frequently 
short on examples. Here, he helpfully gives the example of homicide. Homicide is a 
specific kind of act, having an object which gives it a species. That object is a human 
being, generally speaking; at this point in the analysis, we haven't yet added further facts 
about the person being killed, or other circumstances in which the act is performed. But 
without those details, we don't know whether the act is good or bad. Was it a justified 
killing? Or is the killer morally blameworthy? The simple designation of an act as 
'homicide' doesn't tell us. 
 For this reason, Albert calls the object of this act an "object in general" (obiectum 
in generali), and the species that this object supplies is not a moral species. In order to 
evaluate the act morally, we will need to add more details about the object. When we add 
that the person killed is an enemy in battle, this allows us to place the act in a moral 
category, and to distinguish it from the case in which the person killed is a fellow 
citizen.256 
                                                 
256 Note that Albert treated homicide differently in the SDB. There, he argued that killing has such a 
susceptibility to evil that unless it is clothed with good circumstances, it is always bad. See SDB I, q. 2, art. 
4. 
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 Thus when describing an act, Albert begins with a basic, pre-moral act, with its 
own (very general) object. This "act itself" denotes a broad class of actions which are not 
yet susceptible to moral evaluation. How then do we arrive at the moral act? Albert states 
that the moral act can be viewed from two different perspectives: either it can be seen as 
arising from the agent, or it can be seen as open to evaluation by other people.257 Insofar 
as it arises from the agent, the species of the moral act is determined by the agent's moral 
dispositions, i.e., her virtues or vices. This provides us with the "first being" of the moral 
act. But to the extent that acts are open to evaluation by others, we will need a different 
mode of description, since it is extremely difficult to know whether an act is virtuous or 
vicious. For that, we need information about the agent's mental states, and about how she 
would act in other cases. 
 And so Albert posits a second "species of moral act" which exists: 
"...inasmuch as [the act] comes into the judgment of human beings, and inasmuch 
as the quantity of blame or praise varies due to those things which appear 
externally, regarding the person or the business at hand; and [the act] has this 
species from a circumstance, and under this [circumstance] it is a moral act in its 
being."258 
Thus Albert posits two different ways of classifying moral acts: either according to the 
circumstances, or according to the moral dispositions from which they proceed. (Note 
that these two different methods correspond to two of Albert's three stages of moral 
                                                 
257 Super Ethica III, 1, #168, Solution. 
258 Ibid.: "Est autem alia species actus moralis, secundum quod venit in iudicium hominum, secundum quod 
variatur reatus vel laudis quantitas ex his quae apparent extra circa personam vel negotium; et hanc speciem 
habet a circumstantia, et sub hac est quasi secundum esse actus moralis." 
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evaluation from the DNB.) He claims that the moral dispositions are primary here, 
establishing the first being (primum esse) of the moral act.  
 While he doesn't spell out what he means by "first being" here, one might look to 
Albert's other works for clues. In a text on how to form a definition, Albert argues that 
the "first being and principle" of a definition is the genus, and not the specific 
difference.259 His point in that text is that a specific difference is not adequate for 
definition, and that genus is also necessary. He explains that the genus is the primum esse 
of a definition because it relates to potentiality, whereas the difference relates to actuality. 
"First" seems to indicate conceptual priority – the difference cannot exist without the 
genus.260 
 The distinction between actuality and potentiality does not seem to be operative in 
the Super Ethica. Rather, Albert seems to be dividing off the fullest, most complete 
specification of the moral act from the best judgment we are able to make. The reason for 
this distinction is ultimately epistemic: we are usually not in a position to know whether a 
given act proceeded from virtue or vice. Suppose an act appears to be virtuous: in order 
to judge whether it really is virtuous, we will need to have a deep knowledge of the 
agent's character. Even if we know that the agent habitually performs such actions, we 
will also need to know if he performs them for the right reasons, if he does them readily, 
and if he takes pleasure in them. Since it is hard to come by this knowledge, our 
judgments of the actions of others will have to appeal to the circumstances. And in this 
                                                 
259 Super Porphyrium De V universalibus (ed. Borgnet, 1890), tract.5, cap.9, p.110b. 
260 The term 'primum esse' occurs in a number of other contexts in Albert's works. In some texts, primum 
esse refers to God as the first being (e.g., Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.III, dist.7, art.1, 
p.145a). It also takes on other meanings insofar as it relates to a variety of topics, such as sensation (see De 
sensu et sensato (ed. Borgnet, 1890), tract.1, cap.15, p.36b) and sacramental life (Super Sententiarum (ed. 
Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, dist.3, art.1, p.58a). 
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way, we can talk about a species of moral act proceeding from circumstances, and this 
will be particularly useful when apportioning praise and blame. But this is only a second-
best way of talking about moral species.261 
 So when Albert says that the species of an act is from the habitus of virtue, which 
accounts for first being in the moral act, we can understand by 'first being' the full moral 
character of the act itself. To say that an act is courageous or just or temperate is to place 
it in a type, one which involves a rich description of the act, from which we will know 
that the agent herself is virtuous, and that her act proceeds from the virtuous dispositions 
that she has cultivated. 
 What then of the second sort of moral species? Although it gives us only an 
imperfect typology, it is arguably more useful, since we are often not in a position to 
make judgments about the virtuousness (or viciousness) of real-world actions.262 This 
                                                 
261 There is one place in Albert's Sentences where he uses the term 'primum esse' in a moral context. 
Interestingly, the view advanced there is at odds with his position in the Super Ethica: he appears to claim 
that circumstances provide the primum esse of the moral act, and that they diversify it in species:  
 
"Ad aliud dicendum, quod coitus comparatur dupliciter ad potentiam, scilicet generativam quae naturalis 
est : et sic ipse cum quacumque sit, est unius speciei, quia actus generativae discindentis semen ad salutem 
speciei. Comparatur etiam ad potentiam ordinabilem per rationem : et haec informatur multis speciebus 
diversorum subjectorum, sicut delectabilitas in fornicatrice, vel in conjugata, vel in masculo, vel 
consanguineo : et secundum hoc confert novum esse actui suo : et sic actus ille diversificatur in specie 
moris quantum ad primum esse moralium actum." (Super Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.IV, 
dist.16, art.23, p.593a.) 
 
"To the next it should be said that sexual intercourse is related in two ways to potentiality: 1) the generative 
[potentiality] which is natural; and in this way, whoever it is [done] with, it is of one species, because it 
belongs to acts of the generative [power] to deposit semen for the well-being of the species. It is also 
related 2) to the potentiality which can be ordered by reason. And this is informed by many species 
belonging to different subjects, such as pleasure in a woman with whom one fornicates, or in one's wife, or 
in a male, or in a relative. And in this way it confers new being on its own act. And thus that act is 
diversified in moral species with respect to the first being of moral acts." 
 
This may suggest that Albert's views on moral species evolved from the writing of Sentences IV to Super 
Ethica, though I doubt there is a substantial change here. It seems more likely that Albert simply uses 
primum esse differently in Super Ethica.  
 
262 Cunningham (2008) remarks on the distinction between the moral act as specified according to primum 
esse, and that specified according to circumstances: "The distinction is intended to reinforce the 
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second-best form of moral species, Albert tells us, derives from a circumstance. Given 
the large number of moral circumstances by which an action can be judged, however, 
how are we to know which one gives us the species? Or to put this slightly differently: if 
we are to have a moral typology of actions that goes beyond merely 'courageous act', 
'cowardly act', etc., what characteristics of actions should we select in order to identify 
and categorize them? 
 Albert's answer is that moral species in the second sense comes not from just any 
circumstance, but from the end.263 Indeed, there is a sense in which the end that gives the 
species is not a circumstance at all; or rather, it does not produce the species inquantum 
circumstantia. So far, this account is similar to what we saw in the Sentences 
commentary. In Super Ethica, however, Albert aims to explain the idea that the end gives 
the species by distinguishing between two senses of end: the end of the will (finis 
voluntatis) and the end of intention (finis intentionis). The former is closely connected 
with the act itself, with the result that it can tell us something important about the nature 
of the act. The latter, by contrast, is an end the agent aims at by means of the action, and 
which is not intrinsic to the action itself.264  
                                                                                                                                                 
Aristotelian theory that acts that issue from an already acquired state of virtue command higher value in a 
higher order of formal reality because they are not just done, but are 'well done'"(137). Cunningham is right 
that Albert subscribes to this theory: an act which is done from virtue is morally better than an act that is 
merely continent. However, that is not the point of the distinction Albert is making here. Moral species 
derives from circumstance, Albert writes, "inasmuch as [the act] comes into the judgment of human beings, 
and inasmuch as the quantity of blame or praise varies due to those things which appear externally"(Super 
Ethica III, 1, #168, Solution). That sort of species is important in the context of praise and blame precisely 
because we are often unable to judge whether an act is done from virtue or not, and so we must rely on 
"those things which appear externally." Albert makes this distinction not to emphasize the importance of 
virtue (though he does this in many other places in Super Ethica), but because of the epistemic problems 
that arise from attempting to make judgments about the moral character of other people. 
263 Super Ethica III, 1, #168, p. ???, Ad 2. 
264 Aquinas makes a similar distinction between the end of action (finis operis) and the agent's end (finis 
operantis), and he gives the example of housebuilding. The end which is intrinsic to the act of building is 
the completed house, but the builder may aim at something beyond the house, such as money: 
"Considerandum est autem quod quandoque aliud est finis operantis, et aliud finis operis, sicut patet quod 
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 In making this distinction, Albert does not mean to deny that the will is involved 
in intentions; both of these ends are obviously willed in some sense. Rather, the idea is 
that in ethics, we can distinguish different kinds of acts not by relying on external 
descriptions, but rather with reference to some object which the agent wills in the act. But 
the agent may will that object for the sake of some further goal. Albert gives the example 
of shooting an arrow: if I shoot an arrow so that I may teach someone else, teaching is an 
intention beyond the act itself. Now shooting an arrow is not a species of moral act, so 
this analogy is limited. The "end of intention" is that for the sake of which we will 
something: 
 
 End of the will: I will to Φ. 
 End of intention: I will to Φ for the sake of... 
           in order that... 
 
In the Sentences commentary, Albert made a conceptual distinction between end and 
intention, but when discussing their relevance to the morality of an act he often treated 
them as a unit. In the Super Ethica, he distinguishes the end one aims at with an intention 
from the end that helps to specify an action as belonging to a particular type. 
 If Albert's choice of terms here seems odd, it will be helpful to remember the 
continuing influence of Peter Lombard's Sentences. In that work, Lombard had used the 
term finis in two different ways, either to refer to that which we will, or that for the sake 
                                                                                                                                                 
aedificationis finis est domus, sed aedificatoris finis quandoque est lucrum" (Summa theologiae II-II 141.6 
ad 1). Jensen (1993), 60, and Austin (2017), 152 and 165, both discuss this passage, though somehow both 
get the citation wrong: Jensen refers his reader to Summa theologiae II-II, 146, 6, ad 1, while Austin sends 
us to Summa theologiae II-II, 141, 6, ad 2. Aquinas also makes this distinction in three places in his 
commentary on the Sentences (II,  d. 1 q. 2 a. 1 co.; II, d. 1 q. 2 a. 4 co.; and IV d. 16 q. 3 a. 1 ad 3.). 
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of which we will it.265 For Lombard, the latter will be some good or bad pleasure. The 
Sentences also defines voluntas as "that by which we will something" (voluntas est qua 
volumus aliquid), referring not to a faculty but to the interior act by which we perform 
some action. Albert's two senses of finis here mirror Lombard's: the end of the will is 
close to the notion of finis as that which we will, whereas the end of intention is similar to 
Lombard's concept of finis as that for the sake of which we will. Albert does not share 
Lombard's narrow understanding of "that for the sake of which" we will something; as we 
have seen, intentions for Albert include a wide variety of considerations, not merely 
pleasures.266 
 So we have seen that an act does not instantiate a moral species in virtue of some 
external, physical description of the act: moral acts are distinguished according to the 
different ends one aims at in performing them. But of course a single act can have several 
ends, and not any end can play the role of moral specification. How then do we isolate 
the "end of the will", which does perform this role? Albert gives an example of sexual 
sins:  
Just as being related or being married is accidental to a woman, who is the object 
of lust in an act, but nevertheless can be the end of the will, inasmuch as someone 
wants (vult) a married woman inasmuch as she is married, and in this way is 
produced a sin of another species.267 
                                                 
265 Lombard, Sentences IV, lib. 4, dist. 35, cap. 3, 493; see Lottin, PEM III, 317-319. 
266 Though it should be noted that Lombard in ibid. also uses the word intentio in a broader sense. He gives 
the example of helping one's neighbor in order to get to heaven; in this case, getting to heaven is the 
intentio. 
267 "Sicut esse consanguineam vel esse maritatam est accidens mulieri, quae est obiectum luxuriae in actu, 
sed tamen potest esse finis voluntatis, inquantum vult aliquis coniugatam inquantum huiusmodi, et sic 
efficitur peccatum alterius speciei" (Super Ethica III, 1, #168, Ad 2.). 
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Here Albert is discussing acts of lust (luxuria). As Albert makes clear elsewhere in the 
same book, lust is a vice opposed to chastity, which is itself a species of the virtue of 
temperance.268 But there are different sorts of acts of lust, and we can separate those acts 
into distinct species by examining the objects that are willed. If the person one is lusting 
after is a woman, as in Albert's example, it makes a difference morally whether the 
woman is married or not: this can be the difference between adultery and fornication 
(though of course it still depends whether the agent is married). Adultery is worse than 
fornication, because it involves the breaking of promises and harms a marriage; for this 
reason, it matters that these two acts of lust be separable into different moral species. 
 The object willed in an act of adultery is a married woman, and the fact that the 
woman is married provides us with a species of moral act, distinct from, say, fornication, 
in which the woman lusted after must be unmarried. We can also distinguish the end of 
the will in this case from the end of some further intention. Take the following example, 
beloved of 12th century theologians: a man sleeps with a heretic who is not his wife in 
order that, by winning her trust, he may persuade her to renounce her heresy and return to 
the true faith. Setting aside the dubiousness of the strategy of trying to convert a heretic 
by committing mortal sin with her, this example allows us to distinguish between the end 
of the will, which is the married woman (or perhaps more precisely, to have sexual 
intercourse with this married woman), and the end of intention, which is to convert her. 
The latter does not confer a species of moral act, while the former does. 
 At this point, the following objection may trouble us: Albert categorizes acts as 
belonging to different moral species according to either a) the moral disposition of the 
agent that produces the act (species according to "first being"), or b) a circumstance, 
                                                 
268 Super Ethica III, 12, #237, p. ???, Solution. 
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namely the end of the will. But the second way of categorizing is important only because 
we need to make judgments regarding praise or blame, and we make these based on 
"those things which appear externally."269 The end of the will does not seem to appear 
externally, however. Aren't our wills internal, and therefore unavailable to outside 
observers? Has Albert created the second-best category, only for it to turn out to be 
practically useless? 
 In response to this objection, Albert could happily accept that it is possible to be 
mistaken about what somebody has willed. This might be especially likely in cases where 
the agent is ignorant of some crucial fact about her action. Nevertheless, most of the time 
it is possible to make a pretty good guess, particularly if you know enough about the 
circumstances. The end of the will is closely tied to the nature of the act itself. If you can 
describe what the agent did, then that will usually be enough to tell what she willed. For 
an unmarried woman to sleep with a married man is for her to commit adultery; for her to 
sleep with an unmarried man is to commit fornication. There is a complication if she 
sleeps with a married man, believing him to be unmarried, as we noted above; but in the 
usual case, a thorough description of the act will be enough for an observer to deduce 
what the end of the will was in the act. Note, however, that this is not true about the end 
of intention.   
 Thus in the Super Ethica we find a significant development in Albert's thinking 
about circumstances and how they affect the moral quality of an action. The circumstance 
quid includes the object of an act, which in turn specifies the act as belonging to a 
particular moral species. While Albert had already broached the concept of species in his 
discussion of generic goodness in SDB, his comments there were brief, and aimed mainly 
                                                 
269 Ibid. 
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at reconciling the traditional moral concept of generic goodness (bonum in genere) with 
the logical concepts of genus and species. In Super Ethica, by contrast, Albert has 
worked out a theory of moral species which allows him to distinguish acts according to 
their objects. He further clarifies that the specifically moral object of an act is what he 
calls the end of the will, and distinguishes that end from the end of intention. 
 
The Stages Theory and the Dionysian Principle in Super Ethica 
 Unlike in SDB and the Sentences commentary, there is no discussion of the 
Dionysian principle in the Super Ethica account of circumstances and intention. That 
principle does appear in the context of the moral virtues, however. Albert considers a 
problem about the virtue of temperance: why are there so many vices opposed to 
temperance? Shouldn't there be just one, namely intemperance? And he replies that, 
although it is one virtue, temperance is not monolithic, but is rather constituted by several 
distinct factors taken together. The failure of any one of these factors gives rise to a 
distinct vice: 
...temperance, as with any other virtue, is caused by one whole and perfect cause, 
which brings together (colligit) all the appropriate circumstances, and in this way 
one vice can be opposed to it from the corruption of any one of those 
circumstances.270 
While pseudo-Dionysius is not cited by name here, the description is sufficiently 
reminiscent of both the SDB and the Sentences commentary articulations of the 
                                                 
270 "...temperantia enim, sicut etiam quaelibet alia virtus, causatur ex una tota et perfecta causa, quae colligit 
omnes debitas circumstantias, et sic secundum corruptionem cuiuslibet circumstantiae potest opponi sibi 
unum vitium." (Super Ethica, p. 216, lines 24-28). 
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Dionysian principle to remove any doubt that Albert is applying the same concept.271 
Later he applies it to justice, using the same language and citing (pseudo-)Dionysius 
explicitly.272  
 What is interesting here is the explicit application of the Dionysian principle to 
virtue and vice, rather than to good and bad actions. Even in the SDB, where he applies it 
to virtue, Albert makes clear that his focus is the virtuous or vicious action (opus): what 
conditions must be met for an action to be virtuous? In the Super Ethica, by contrast, the 
Dionysian principle explains the taxonomy of virtues and vices. Why are there so many 
vices opposed to temperance? Because temperance has "parts": it involves regulating 
one's desires for food, and for drink, and for sex. The corruption of any one of these 
desires leads to a vice opposed to temperance.  
 Because it does not address the goodness or badness of action specifically, this 
formulation of the Dionysian principle does not address the questions raised by previous 
formulations. Specifically, it does not deal with the problem of which aspects of an action 
must be good in order for the action itself to be considered good. As I point out below, 
this problem is not addressed in Ethica either, but it arises again in Albert's Summa 
Theologiae. 
 The stages theory, on the other hand, does get a brief mention in Super Ethica. 
Albert considers an objection against the very idea of generic badness as an act that can 
be done well or badly. It argues that since the genus concerns the essence of the thing, 
                                                 
271 Compare the Super Ethica claim that virtue is "ex una tota et perfecta causa" with SDB (I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 
20-21): "bonum constat ex tota et sola causa, malum autem omnifarium," and with Sentences II (distinction 
41, B, Article 2, solution, p. 643): "sed bonum, sicut Dionysius dicit, ex una tota causa est." 
272 Super Ethica, p. 311, lines 63-67, obj.4, and p. 312, lines 16-22, ad 4. 
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anything generically bad will be essentially bad, and so incapable of being done well.273 
In reply, Albert insists, as he has done in his earlier works, that an act can be bad with 
respect to its matter, and yet done well in the circumstances: 
But if [a generically bad act] is inappropriate regarding the matter, it can be 
clothed with moral circumstances, by which it can be made appropriate, without 
which it is not appropriate; nevertheless it is not insofar as it is of this kind [viz., 
considered with respect to its circumstances] that it is inappropriate, because then 
it would always remain inappropriate, but [only] relative to inappropriate 
matter.274 
This is an explicit statement of the stages theory, and is clearly recognizable from 
Albert's earlier works. The terminology is different, however. In DNB, Albert argued that 
a generically bad act can be done well; in SDB, he stated that a generically bad act can 
become good in species. Here, he extends the use of the terms 'appropriate' (debita) and 
'inappropriate' (indebita), which in his earlier works he had applied only to the matter. 
Moral circumstances make appropriate an act that is inappropriate with regard to its 
                                                 
273 Super Ethica II.7, p. 124, #141, obj. 4. Sousa-Lara (2008) claims that, in his reply to this objection, 
Albert makes a distinction between malum in genere and malum ex genere: 
"Adultery, strictly speaking, is not a malum in genere, but a malum ex genere or a malum 
secundum se, because its finis operis is always contrary to virtue. According to Albert “what is 
evil ex genere, [...] is essentially evil, and such an act can never be done well,” as with adultery" 
(23). 
But this is a misreading. The passage Sousa-Lara quotes, without ellipses, reads: “illud quod est malum ex 
genere, secundum quod dicitur malum ex circumstantia, est essentialiter malum, et tale numquam potest 
bene fieri” (italics mine). That is, Albert is describing, in reply to an objection that assumes that what is 
generically bad must be essentially bad, one way the term 'malum ex genere' can be understood (not, 
incidentally, the way he usually prefers). Then he continues: "sed si malum in genere dicatur, quod potest et 
bene et male fieri, non tenet illa obiectio." Albert clearly takes the two terms to be interchangeable. Contra 
Sousa-Lara, malum ex genere is for Albert just another way of saying malum in genere. 
274 Super Ethica II.7, #141, ad. 4. The full response is: "Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud quod est malum 
ex genere, secundum quod dicitur malum ex circumstantia, est essentialiter malum, et tale numquam potest 
bene fieri; sed si malum in genere dicatur, quod potest et bene et male fieri, non tenet illa obiectio. Et 
similiter, si sit malum ex genere, inquantum materia vestita est moralibus circumstantiis, quae faciunt eam 
indebitam, non potest bene fieri. Sed si sit indebita secundum materiam, potest vestiri circumstantiis 
moralibus, quibus efficietur debita, sine quibus non est debita, non tamen inquantum huiusmodi indebita, 
quia sic semper permaneret indebita, sed quoad materiam indebita." 
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matter (i.e., generically bad). The act does not cease to have inappropriate matter in such 
a case. Rather, in some circumstances, it is appropriate to perform an act that is 
inappropriate with respect to its matter. Thus it is clear that Albert continues to maintain 
the stages theory in his Super Ethica. 
 
2.F Moral Circumstances in Ethica 
 Albert's Ethica is only a paraphrase and does not include any disputed questions. 
The lack of such questions eliminates one avenue Albert used in the Super Ethica to 
depart from Aristotle's text and introduce related ideas and concerns of his own. 
Nevertheless, Albert remains an independent thinker, and we find him making claims and 
arguments there that are neither mere expostulations of the Aristotelian texts, nor found 
in his earlier works.275 For this reason, Jörn Müller has claimed that "'Ethica' should be 
more definitely taken into consideration for the reconstruction of Albert's philosophical 
ethics."276 
 The Ethica contains an important change in Albert's account of circumstances, 
though it is easy to overlook.277 The paraphrase unsurprisingly lacks a systematic 
discussion of circumstances, of the sort we find in Albert's other ethical works. Indeed, 
what is initially most striking about the Ethica in this context is the wide variety of 
contexts in which circumstances are discussed. 
                                                 
275 See Jörn Müller's (2001) for the case that Albert gives extensive arguments in Ethica about the status of 
ethics as a practical science, arguments which we do not find elsewhere in Albert's corpus. 
276 Müller (2002), 46. 
277 Cunningham (2008), 127-138, provides an insightful account of Albert's views on circumstances in 
SDB, Sentences, and Super Ethica, but he doesn't mention the later developments in Ethica. 
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 Thus we find Albert appealing to circumstances while discussing the Aristotelian 
notion that virtue lies in a mean278, and more specifically that this mean concerns actions 
and passions.279 He also discusses circumstances with respect to voluntariness, and the 
extent to which an action done in ignorance may be voluntary.280 In this context, Albert 
lists "the circumstances in which there is an act ignorance of which makes it 
involuntary," and this list ends up neatly summarizing the lists of moral circumstances we 
find in DNB and SDB.281  
 We also see Albert relying on some of the same distinctions he had used decades 
earlier in those early works. As we saw, in the DNB Albert drew in particular on Cicero 
and Boethius for his list of circumstances. In this late commentary on Aristotle, Albert 
uses the same distinction he had drawn then between the circumstances related to agents 
(personarum), and those related to the business at hand (negotii).282 And he argues that 
deliberation (consilium) is especially about the latter.283 
 The first systematic discussion of circumstances in Ethica occurs when Albert is 
considering the end of ethics as a science, and quotes Aristotle's assertion that the 
purpose of ethical inquiry is not contemplation, but that we may become good.284 This 
leads to a digression in which Albert mentions that there are five different kinds of 
human good -- that is, five distinct goods that play a role in perfecting a human being. 
These goods are: 1) the generic good; 2) the moral circumstances; 3) moral virtue; 4) 
                                                 
278 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.II, tract.1, cap.8, p.161b. 
279 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.II, tract.2, cap.12, p.193b. 
280 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.8, p.204a-205a; and cap. 9, p.206a. 
281 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.208b. 
282 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.V, tract.3, cap.10, p.381b. 
283 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.19, p.224b. 
284 Ethica, Lib.1, tract.I, cap.VI. A critical edition of this passage has been prepared by Jorn Müller, and is 
included in his (2001), pgs. 353-354. I have used Müller's text, which improves upon the available Borgnet 
and Jammy editions. Aristotle's remark is from Nicomachean Ethics II.2 1103b26-29. 
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grace; and 5) glory. While each of these contributes to the perfection of a human being, 
the last three are more substantive and enduring than the first two. Nonetheless, the 
generic good and the good of circumstances are important in that they lead to virtue; 
Albert cites Boethius, calling them "certain scattered seeds of virtue, from which seeds, 
so to speak, fields of virtue arise."285 And he proceeds to outline them along with moral 
virtue, following the pattern he used to develop his stages theory in DNB and SDB. 
 For the most part, the Ethica depiction of the generic good mirrors the accounts 
found in Albert's earlier works. The generic good is the first subject (primum subiectum) 
in morals, and a first potentiality toward good; it can be done well or badly, depending on 
the circumstances; and it is defined as an act upon its proper matter. Albert lists some of 
his standard examples: feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, giving to the needy. Only 
one phrase stands out: Albert calls the generic good that "under which every moral good 
is included" (sub quo omne bonum moris comprehenditur). He doesn't explain this claim, 
but given that both the act clothed with the right circumstances and moral virtue are also 
moral goods, it could be taken to mean that every virtuous act must also be generically 
good. That is, if an act is not generically good, then it will not count as good in any other 
way, since it would not be included "under" the generic good.  
 Let us assume that this is in fact Albert's meaning. In that case, his claim would 
appear to contradict a passage in SDB regarding generic goodness. But it would also 
appear to cohere well with his formulation of the Dionysian principle in the SDB. So if 
my suggested interpretation of this passage in Ethica is correct, then it is important for 
two reasons: first, it points to a tension within the SDB itself, between some aspects of 
                                                 
285 Ibid., p. 353: "sparsa sunt virtutis quaedam semina, ex quibus tamquam seminibus seges virtutum 
exoritur." 
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the stages theory and the Dionysian principle; and second, it suggests that in his more 
mature works, Albert is favouring the Dionysian principle over the stages theory. Thus it 
is worth comparing the Ethica assertion with those two passages from the SDB. 
 In the first, Albert argues that there are some actions which are good and indeed 
virtuous, but which are not, under any description, generically good. These are acts for 
which there is no proportionate, appropriate matter – and there are many such acts.286 As 
examples, Albert gives killing and having sexual intercourse. Since there is no 
appropriate matter associated with these acts, they can never be generically good. And 
yet, done in the right circumstances, they become the acts of specific virtues, namely 
justice and conjugal continence. So although at the generic level they are always bad, the 
circumstances make it possible that they can be done well. This is an essential aspect of 
the stages theory, as developed both in the DNB and in the SDB. But what it gives us is a 
moral good -- an act of a specific virtue – which is not included under the generic good, 
thus contradicting the apparent Ethica requirement that every moral good be also 
generically good. 
 In the second SDB passage, Albert quotes pseudo-Dionysius' claim that the good 
is from one whole cause, but the bad is omnifarious. He then goes on to formulate the 
Dionysian principle, arguing that for the existence of virtue, three things are needed: all 
of the circumstances, the end, and the act upon its proper matter (actum super debitam 
materiam). For the bad and vice, on the other hand, it is sufficient for any one of these to 
be corrupted.287 What is striking is the inclusion of the act upon its proper matter as one 
                                                 
286 SDB I.2.4, ad 7, p. 30, lines 42-60. 
287 SDB I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 22-25: "Extrema autem sunt in particularibus privationibus et defectibus, sicut 
dixerunt Pythagorici et beatus Dionysius consentit in IV capitulo De divinis nominibus dicens, quod 
'bonum constat ex tota et sola causa, malum autem omnifariam', intelligens per hoc, quod ad exisentiam 
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of the factors that must be present in order for an act to be virtuous. The phrase "actum 
super debitam materiam" is one Albert frequently uses to describe the generic good, and I 
have not found any other meaning associated with it in his work. It follows that an act 
cannot be virtuous unless it is also generically good – and this seems to be what Albert is 
also claiming in Ethica when he says that every moral good is included under the generic 
good. 
  Thus Ethica can be seen as resolving a tension found in SDB, developing an 
account of generic goodness that is compatible with the Dionysian principle but which 
seems to rule out the stages theory. It also clarifies the connection between the act clothed 
with the right circumstances, and the virtuous act. Albert claims that it is the act clothed 
with circumstances that, when done frequently, eventually leads to the development of a 
virtuous disposition. He describes 
...the act clothed with circumstances, by which it [the act] has a higher potentiality 
to generate virtue, because through the circumstances one draws nearer to 
attaining the mean of virtue; and that act has the formative power (virtutem) of 
moral virtue in the soul, just as the seed of generation has the formative power for 
birth. And for this reason, from such frequent actions habitual virtue is generated 
in the soul. And from this third place a human being is made capable of acting in 
accordance with virtue, which is the third perfection of a human being.288 
The act clothed with the right circumstances is the sort of act the virtuous person would 
perform. The non-virtuous person who aims to become virtuous can make a correct 
judgment about the circumstances, and perform that action, though she may not do so 
                                                                                                                                                 
virtutis exiguntur omnes circumstantiae cum fine convenientes ad actum super debitam materiam, ad 
malum autem et ad vitium sufficit corruptio uniuscuiusque per se." 
288 Ethica, Lib.1, tract.I, cap.VI. Müller (2001), p. 354. 
124 
 
readily, or take pleasure in acting in this way. The generic good along with the 
circumstances are thus the essential components of the act qua act. To say that an act is 
virtuous is to say that it proceeds from a certain kind of character; that is, it tells us 
something about the agent who performs the act, and the genesis of the act. The nature of 
the act derives from its circumstances, and it is these circumstances that give it the 
"formative power" to generate virtue. 
 How precisely do circumstances determine the nature of an act? In the course of 
his discussion of ignorance, Albert raises the question: why do some circumstances make 
an action the sort of action that it is -- i.e., put an action into its "species" -- while others 
do not? In the previous section, we saw that in Super Ethica, Albert focused on quid as 
providing the object that accounted for moral species. He then specified further that this 
object was the end of the will (finis voluntatis), which he distinguished from the end of 
intention (finis intentionis).  
 In the Ethica Albert appears to take a different position. Here, after giving 
examples of several of the circumstances, he states that the most primary circumstances 
(principalissima) are what is done (quod operatur) and 'for the sake of which' (cuius 
gratia), the latter of which he identifies with 'for which end' (quo fine). Ignorance of these 
primary circumstances is most likely to make an action involuntary and to absolve the 
agent of responsibility for her actions, since they indicate what is most essential to her 
action. Still, there is a kind of involuntariness that can arise from ignorance of the other 
circumstances; this is evident from the fact that when we learn the truth about the 
circumstances of which we were ignorant, we often become sad or regretful about what 
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we did.289 Albert emphasizes that circumstances are integral to willing; the voluntary act 
without circumstances is "unformed", and it receives from the circumstances the "reason 
for willing" (rationem volendi). 
 Having set out the relation between ignorance, involuntariness, and circumstances 
in this way, Albert considers an objection to that last claim, that moral circumstances 
(even the apparently peripheral ones) are causes of our acts insofar as we will them: 
"And certain people object that there are many circumstances, but one form of 
any given thing. But one thing cannot be caused equally by many causes and 
according to one notion of causality. It should be said that it is this way in nature: 
that the quiddity of a thing is from the form and the end. Nevertheless, that which 
is caused (id quod fit) has many potentialities, from the maker, and from the 
matter, and from the time and place in which it is done, from which different 
[causes] it is worse and better, and similarly it has potentialities from the mode 
and the instrument by which it is done. Thus it is in morals that the 'what' (quid) 
and 'for the sake of which' (cuius gratia) give the species."290 
Here we see Albert claiming that two circumstances, quid and cuius gratia, give the 
species. Super Ethica, by contrast, had connected its discussion of moral species to the 
circumstances quid and circa quid, while staying silent about any relation between cuius 
gratia and moral species. Further, in Super Ethica Albert distinguishes between the end 
of the will and the end of intention, arguing that only the former can provide the basis for 
                                                 
289 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.210a. 
290 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.210a-b: "Et quod quidam objiciunt quod multae 
sunt circumstantiae, una autem forma uniuscujusque : unum autem a multis causari non potest aeque 
causantibus et secundum unam rationem causalitatis. Dicendum, quod sic est in natura, quod rei quidditas 
est a forma et fine : multas tamen habet potentias id quod fit, a faciente, et a materia, et a tempore, et loco 
in quibus fit, ex quibus diversis est pejus et melius, et similiter habet potentias a modo et instrumento 
quibus fit : ita est in moribus, quia speciem dant quid, et cujus gratia." 
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moral species. But cuius gratia suggests intention, that for the sake of which one acts. So 
Albert appears to be at least hinting at a change in his views here. 
 A closer look at the evidence shows that this is likely not the case, however. 
While the expression cuius gratia appears at least 19 times in Ethica,291 it is typically 
listed along with other circumstances, and without any explanation as to its meaning. In 
one passage where he does elaborate, he simply states that cuius gratia is "the same as 
'for which end'" (est idem quod quo fine).292 That short description is not sufficient to tie 
cuius gratia to intention, because the word 'end' (finis) here is ambiguous between the 
end of the will and the end of intention. Perhaps it might seem strange to say that the end 
of the will is that for the sake of which one acts, since as we saw the end of the will is the 
object of the action in question, or in other words the performance of that action. The end 
of intention, by contrast, is what the agent might describe when asked why she is 
performing this particular action. So cuius gratia might seem like a more natural fit for 
the end of intention. Still, depending on how one describes the action, it is possible to 
construe the end of the will as that for the sake of which one acts as well. In a homicide, 
for example, the end of the will might be "to kill that man", whereas a further end of 
intention might be "to exact revenge". If we want to ask what is the end for the sake of 
which the killer acts, both seem like possible answers, even if the second one is more 
satisfying. In short, it is not obvious that Albert is giving a new account of moral species 
here. And if he were, one might expect him to give an explanation of his new views; the 
                                                 
291 A search of the Ethica in the Alberti Magni e-corpus conducted on December 18, 2017, revealed 21 
paragraphs in which "cuius gratia" appears at least once (http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/cgi-
bin/cgiwrap/albertus/searchAlbertus.cgi). Of those, two were in fact alicuius gratia. It should also be noted 
that not all instances of cuius gratia refer to the moral circumstance. 
292 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.210a. 
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claim alone that cuius gratia gives moral species hardly licenses the reader to suppose 
that his thought has evolved in any important way. 
 At any rate, there is evidence in the same section that Albert is not using cuius 
gratia to refer to intention. After making the general point that ignorance of the 
circumstances can affect the degree to which one should be praised or blamed for one's 
actions, Albert gives examples of cases in which such ignorance arises. When he comes 
to cuius gratia, Albert gives two examples.293 In the first, a surgeon makes an incision 
with the goal of restoring the patient to health; as a result, however, the patient dies. 
Albert makes clear that this is not an example of negligence: the doctor "omits nothing of 
those things pertaining to the art", that is, the art of medicine. In the second example, a 
boxer "wanting to show or teach" the art of boxing, wounds and kills his sparring 
partner.294  
 In both these examples, the agent is supposed to be ignorant of the cuius gratia of 
his action. But what exactly is the agent ignorant of? It is clear in the examples that the 
agents have specific intentions which they fail to realize: the surgeon intends to heal the 
patient, and the boxer intends to teach the art of boxing. These are cases where someone 
accidentally brings about an outcome other than the one he intended; he is ignorant of the 
effect his actions will have. Thus to make sense of these cases as examples of ignorance 
of the cuius gratia, we will have to understand cuius gratia to refer to something like the 
state of affairs brought about as a result of the action -- in both cases, an unintended 
death. And when Albert says that cuius gratia means the same as "for which end" (quo 
fine), we should recall the Super Ethica distinction between the end of the will and the 
                                                 
293 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.210a. 
294 The word I translate as 'boxer' is pugil, which could also refer to a wrestler. 
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end of intention; cuius gratia here will refer to the former, not the latter. The surgeon is 
ignorant of that "for the sake of which" he is acting insofar as his action brings about the 
death of the patient, and he does not know that this will be the result. Similarly, the end 
the boxer is ignorant of is the death of his sparring partner; if he knew that this would be 
the result, he would not perform the action.  
 As these examples show, cuius gratia understood as the end of the will is difficult 
to distinguish from quid. Both refer to the outcome produced by the agent acting as he 
does. Indeed, one might say that quid refers to this outcome objectively, whereas cuius 
gratia refers to it from the point of view of the agent. At any rate, it seems clear that 
Albert is not proposing a new doctrine of moral species by saying that cuius gratia gives 
the species. On the contrary: the Ethica account of moral species follows the approach 
outlined in the Super Ethica. 
 In that same passage, Albert gives a short account of how circumstances 
determine the morality of an action. This account includes some details which we do not 
find in Albert's earlier works, and is evidence of a change in the way Albert thinks about 
circumstances. Recall that in the DNB, Albert had described generic goods and bads as 
capable of being done well or badly; whether they are done well or badly is determined 
by the circumstances, which "clothe" them. In the SDB, Albert went further by tying the 
importance of circumstances to their ability to make an act honourable (honestum): 
...such things [viz., circumstances] do not give being to an act inasmuch as it is an 
act, but they give being to it inasmuch as it is honourable or blameworthy, and for 
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this reason, although they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless they are not 
extrinsic to the honourable or the blameworthy.295 
Thus in the SDB Albert's position was that circumstances are extrinsic to the act, but 
nevertheless confer being on the act – specifically the being that makes an act honourable 
or blameworthy. 
 In his discussion of circumstances in Ethica, Albert does not mention the concepts 
of the honourable or the blameworthy, but instead speaks in terms of goodness and 
badness. And instead of conferring being, circumstances confer potentialities and forms. 
In this passage, Albert speaks about circumstances other than quid and cuius gratia, 
which give an act its species: 
But the other circumstances confer a potentiality to goodness or badness. Nor 
does this prevent circumstances from being called (as it were) extrinsic, although 
[goodness or badness] should be intrinsic to the form and potentiality of a thing. 
For although they are extrinsic to acting well or badly, which is in the agent, as 
was shown above, nevertheless they are intrinsic to the action to which they give 
the form and potentiality in respect of good and bad."296 
The difference between these two accounts can be summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                 
295 SDB 1.3.1, ad 1, 38. For further discussion of this passage see section II.A above. 
296 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.III, tract.1, cap.12, p.210a-b: "aliae autem [circumstantia] circumstantiae 
ad bonitatem vel malitiam conferunt potentiam. Nec obstat quod circumstantiae dicuntur quasi extrinsecae, 
cum formae rei et potentiae intrinsecae, esse debeant : quia quamvis sint extrinsecae ad bene et male quod 
in operante est, secundum quod in superioribus est ostensum : tamen intrinsecae sunt ad operationem cui 
formam dant et potentiam in bono et in malo." 
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SDB on Circumstances Ethica on Circumstances 
    
1. Extrinsic to act 1. Intrinsic to act 
2. Intrinsic to acting well or badly 2. Extrinsic to acting well or badly 
3. Confer being that makes act 
honourable/blameworthy 
3. Confer form and potentiality that make act 
good/bad 
 
The contrast between Albert's earlier and later views here seems stark, and Albert gives 
no explicit reasons for the change. It is not obvious from the text of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, which Albert is commenting on, that he is getting his new account from 
something in Aristotle. So why the reversal? The explanation, I will argue, lies in the fact 
that his new account of circumstances is a better fit with the Dionysian principle, which 
we saw Albert appealing to already in the SDB, but which becomes more important over 
the course of his career. 
 Recall that in the SDB Albert defends his stages account, according to which we 
evaluate actions first according to the generic quality, then with respect to the 
circumstances, and then finally with regard to the moral disposition from which the act 
proceeds. There he claims that what is first in morals is the voluntary act, willed through 
deliberation and choice.297 Understood at this basic level, the moral act does not yet admit 
of any moral evaluation; it is equally open to either good or bad. At the first stage of 
moral evaluation the act is taken at the generic level: as generically good, or generically 
bad, or indifferent. While this level is far from giving us an all things considered 
assessment of the act, it furnishes us with the description of the act from which that 
assessment can begin. The generically bad act is more ordered or inclined toward vice, 
whereas the generically good act is more ordered toward virtue. But to determine whether 
                                                 
297 SDB I.2.4, Solution. 
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the act is done well or badly, we will need to look at the circumstances surrounding this 
act. 
 Thus when Albert states in the SDB that circumstances are extrinsic to the act, 
this should be understood in contrast to what he takes to be intrinsic to the act, namely its 
generic quality. This simple set-up (generic goodness is intrinsic to the act, circumstances 
extrinsic) still allows him to claim that circumstances are intrinsic to acting well or badly, 
because on the stages account that is precisely what circumstances determine. The 
circumstances even determine which acts are proper to specific virtues and vices, and 
thus help to make acts honourable or blameworthy. 
 When Albert inverts this account of circumstances in the Ethica, asserting that 
they are now intrinsic to the act but extrinsic to acting well or badly, one should ask 
whether Albert hasn't radically altered his theory of moral evaluation, of which moral 
circumstances are merely a part. Or indeed whether Albert hasn't decided in favor of a 
quite different account of moral evaluation. While Albert doesn't state the Dionysian 
principle in detail in Ethica, his new account of circumstances suggests that it has 
become essential to his thinking about action.298 
 Instead of treating the moral act as divided between its intrinsic core – its generic 
quality – and the external features which determine whether it is done well or badly, 
Ethica conceives of the moral act as constituted by its generic quality together with its 
circumstances. The circumstances do most of the heavy lifting -- they place the act in a 
species, and give it specific forms, which make it either good or bad. Thus the 
                                                 
298  Albert does provide a short encapsulation of the principle, stating that "virtue and the good consist in 
unity, [while] the bad and vice are omnifarious" (virtus et bonum in unitate consistit, malum et vitium 
est omnifariam), in Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.I, tract.5, cap.15, p. 79b. Unlike in the SDB, Sentences, 
and the later Summa Theologiae, in Ethica he does not attempt to list the elements of an act that must be 
good in order for the act itself to be good. In this Aristotelian paraphrase, the full principle is only hinted at. 
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circumstances become intrinsic features of the act, not merely modifying it, as if from the 
outside, but constituting it as a moral act of a specific kind. It is the act clothed with the 
right circumstances that, when performed frequently and for the right reasons, eventually 
generates moral virtue. Indeed, the metaphor of circumstances "clothing" the act can be 
misleading, since the circumstances end up contributing more to the next potentiality to 
generate virtue than generic goodness does. 
 This way of thinking about actions fits remarkably well with the Dionysian 
principle. In the Sentences commentary, Albert argued that the morally good act is an 
integral whole, like a house. Certain elements of a house, like walls or a roof, are 
essential to it; remove any one of them, and there is no house. The same goes for a good 
act; it is constituted by a number of elements, each of which must also be good. If any 
one of those elements becomes bad, the act itself is bad. 
 If Albert has this picture in mind while writing Ethica, it can help to explain why 
he argues that circumstances are now intrinsic to the moral act. Together, they determine 
whether the act is good or bad. The Dionysian principle also helps to explain why he 
states that circumstances confer a potentiality toward goodness or badness (ad bonitatem 
vel malitiam conferunt potentiam); that any given circumstance is as it ought to be does 
not make the act good, but it contributes to the potential for that act's goodness. When all 
the relevant aspects of the act are as they should be, then that potential is actualized, and 
the act can be evaluated as morally good. 
 Why then does Albert say in Ethica that the circumstances are extrinsic to acting 
well or badly, when in SDB he said they were intrinsic to acting well or badly? In the 
SDB, the circumstances determine whether the generically good, generically bad, or 
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generically indifferent act is done well or badly. This is the traditional account that Albert 
inherits from his predecessors. The result is that even if you have determined whether an 
act has been done well, there is a further question whether it has been done virtuously -- 
i.e., from a stable disposition to perform such actions, for the right reasons and 
accompanied by the pleasure that the virtuous person takes in doing well.  
 In Ethica, on the other hand, the circumstances taken together (and perhaps other 
factors as well – this is not spelled out in Ethica) determine whether the action is good or 
bad. Albert is following the tendency that we saw already in his Sentences commentary to 
treat the circumstances as somehow external to the agent. By distinguishing more strictly 
between what is proper to the agent (dispositions, intentions) and what is proper to 
actions (object, instruments, time, place, etc.), he now excludes moral circumstances 
from the consideration of whether an act is done well or badly. The latter is assimilated to 
the question of virtue: whether an act is done well or badly depends on whether it is done 
virtuously or viciously. In a paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is unsurprising that 
the phrase "acting well or badly" (bene vel male agere) is much less prominent than it 
was in Albert's earlier works: with the exception noted above, where he merely repeats 
the standard account of generic goodness, it is effectively replaced by discussions of 
virtue. 
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2.G Generic Goodness and Moral Circumstances in Summa Theologiae 
 Traditionally, the two books of what is known as Albert's Summa Theologiae, 
likely written in the early 1270s, have been included in the corpus of Albert's works. 
Recent scholarly work has shed doubt on the authenticity of the second book299, and at 
least one researcher has argued that book I may not have been written by Albert either.300 
Others argue that Albert is not the author of book II, but that the author was strongly 
influenced by Albert, and possibly writing under his direction. Still others assume that 
Albert did in fact write both books. In a recent book chapter, Martin Tracey notes that 
modern readers "have puzzled over the prominence of Augustinian ideas and themes in 
the text", but nonetheless treats book II as Albert's, and does not call his authorship into 
question.301  
 Summa Theologiae contains important material both on generic goodness and on 
the Dionysian principle.302 Since it is at least possibly Albert's last work, I would be 
remiss not to cover it here. I make no claims about its authenticity. However, even if 
Book II turns out not to have been written by Albert, it would still be of interest to see 
                                                 
299 Prolegomena to vol. XXXIV, 1 of Ed. Colon. i.e. to the Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia dei, 
pages V-XVI contains an extended consideration of the authenticity of Summa Theologiae, and raises 
doubts especially about the authenticity of book II. 
300 P.A. Fries (1975) points to a number of positions Albert takes in Summa theologiae that contradict his 
earlier views. He takes this to be evidence that Albert is not the author of that work. For an assessment of 
Fries' arguments, see Wielockx (1990). 
301 Tracey (2013), 378. 
302 Cunningham (2008) claims that, as a work of theology, Summa theologiae is of minimal value for 
understanding Albert's natural moral theory. Cunningham dismisses its relevance to philosophical ethics 
both due to its "purely theological contents", and because "Albert's treatment of the virtues and the morality 
of acts reflects a later theological conservatism and retrenchment inasmuch as this Summa – his last and 
unfinished work – returns to and follows the traditional pattern laid down more than a century earlier in 
Peter the Lombard's Sentences" (44). It seems to me, however, that like Albert's DNB and his commentary 
on the Sentences, Summa theologiae is a work of theology that is not without interest for the moral 
philosopher. Indeed, while Albert occasionally draws a distinction between the perspective of the 
theologian and that of the ethicist (ethicus), it is more common for him to present philosophical arguments 
and scriptural examples side-by-side. At any rate, it is not obvious that a work of theology should exclude 
considerations relevant to natural morality, and I hope that what follows will show that Summa theologiae 
does not. 
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how a writer at least heavily influenced by him deals with these matters. For the sake of 
convenience, I shall write as if Albert were the author of both books, though the reader 
should not infer from this that Albert is in fact their author, since I take no position on 
this issue. I discuss both generic goodness and circumstances here because, unlike in 
many of his other works, Albert (or whoever the real author is) does not treat generic 
goodness and circumstances separately in Summa theologiae; they are too intertwined to 
be usefully discussed as distinct topics in different parts of this dissertation, so I have 
saved my discussion of generic goodness in Summa theologiae until now. 
 In book I of Summa Theologiae, Albert frames both generic goodness and the 
good of circumstances in terms of the fivefold division of goodness, which was also 
emphasized in Ethica: generic good, circumstances, political virtue, grace, and glory.303 
He describes the generic good mostly in ways that will be familiar: it is the first subject 
directed toward the good (ad bonum), and it conjoins an act to its appropriate matter; and 
he gives the usual examples of feeding the hungry and clothing the naked. However, he 
does not state, as he usually does, that the generic good is that which can be done well or 
badly. Indeed, the only place in either book of Summa Theologiae in which the generic 
good and bad are described as capable of being done well or badly is where Albert is 
describing the views of others, not giving his own solution.304 Instead, he states that the 
generic good is the first possible subject (subicibile) of a good form: 
                                                 
303 Summa theologiae (Editio Coloniensis), Pars I, tract.6, q.26, m.1, art.1, ad 2, p. 170, line 60 - p. 171 line 
10.  It is true that Albert speaks of moral virtue in Ethica, whereas in Summa Theologiae he speaks of 
political virtue. This is not an indication of a substantial change in his views, however; Albert frequently 
uses the words 'moral', 'civil', and 'political' to describe the same sort of virtues: namely, those acquired by 
habituation, through the right use of reason, and not requiring a special gift of grace. These are virtues that 
the pagans can acquire; they do not lead to meritorious action and thus do not lead to salvation. 
304 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I, tract.20, q.80, m.2, art.1, q. inc., p.866b. This passage 
is discussed below. 
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Therefore in every voluntary act this [viz., the generic good] is the first possible 
subject of a good form; and when it is determined to forms of good, it is made a 
perfect good; and if it lacks them, it is deprived of the form of perfect good.305 
The good forms that can be attached to the subject are, unsurprisingly, the circumstances 
and the habitual virtues. Now in DNB and SDB, Albert had argued that both the generic 
good and the generic bad can be the subject of good circumstances, which would result in 
either one being done well. By describing the generic good, the act conjoined to an 
appropriate matter, as the primum subicibile of these good forms, Albert seems to be 
implying that the generic bad is not a suitable subject of good forms. In other words, it 
seems that the generic bad can no longer be done well. If this is right, then Summa 
Theologiae seems to rule out the stages theory. Strikingly, Albert states that the generic 
good is the first subject of good forms in every voluntary act; there are no acts in which 
this is not the case. 
 What does it mean to say that good forms can bring about the perfect good from 
the generic good? The first forms are the circumstances, and Albert has little to say about 
them here that he has not said elsewhere. Finally there is the perfection of political virtue, 
by which the generically good act, formed by good circumstances, is done by a 
"connatural" operation. Albert quotes Cicero to describe virtuous actions as done "from a 
disposition, consenting to reason, in the mode of nature," and states that such actions will 
be done pleasurably and with joy.306 
                                                 
305 Summa theologiae (Editio Coloniensis), Pars I, tract.6, q.26, m.1, art.1, ad 2, p. 170, lines 73-77:"Hoc 
ergo est in omni actu voluntario primum subicibile formae boni, et cum determinatur formis boni, efficitur 
bonum perfectum, et si deficit ab illis, privatur forma boni perfecti." 
306 Ibid., lines 80-86: "Accedens his formis perfectio est, ut faciat hoc ex habitu in modum naturae rationi 
consentaneo, ut dicit Tullius. Tunc enim facit ex propria et connaturali operatione non impedita, et ita 
delectabiliter et cum gaudio. Et hoc est bonum virtutis politicae : et ideo virtutes politicae a Sanctis 
connaturales virtutes vocantur." 
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 If Albert is in fact claiming that an act must be generically good in order for it to 
be a subject of circumstances and of moral virtue, and his position here seems to be 
similar to that taken in Ethica, where he argued that all other moral goods are included 
"under" the generic good. Both works appear to be offering an account of generic 
goodness and circumstances quite different from the one given in DNB and SDB. The 
descriptions from these later works seem to rule out that stages theory, since they exclude 
the possibility of a generically bad act being done well.  
 However, Summa Theologiae I also includes a thorough discussion of generic 
badness, which distinguishes it from the per se bad and asserts that some generically bad 
acts are indeed done well. This discussion is presented in response to the question: "Can 
God command against the natural law and against the Decalogue which he wrote on the 
tablets?"307 Some well-known passages from scripture illustrate the problem. God 
commands the Hebrews to despoil the Egyptians, which seems contrary to the 
commandment not to steal (Exodus 12:36). He also commands Abraham to slay Isaac 
(Genesis 33:2-8). These and other examples lead Albert to consider a variety of solutions 
that have been put forth by others. A first solution distinguishes between three different 
kinds of natural laws, and argues that God can command things contrary to the second 
and third, but not the first, which aims only at the preservation of nature in the species 
and the individual.308 Since the despoiling of the Egyptians and the binding of Isaac do 
not infringe upon the preservation of nature in either of these ways, God can command 
them. 
                                                 
307 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I, tract.20, q.80, m.2, art.1, p. 863: "Utrum Deus possit 
praecipere contra jus naturale et contra decalogum quem ipse scripsit in tabulis?"  
308 Ibid., solution, p. 865. 
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 The second solution Albert considers, advanced by others (alii) and most relevant 
for our purposes, argues that God cannot command a per se bad, but he can command a 
generic bad, which can be done well or badly. The examples given of per se bads are 
fornication and adultery; examples of generic bads are killing and having sexual 
intercourse with a woman. Adultery is the sort of bad action that can never be done well, 
under any circumstances. Killing, on the other hand, can be done well if it is done for a 
good reason (ex causa). This account is familiar from the SDB: these others Albert is 
reporting articulate a version of the stages theory. Albert also notes an objection to this 
solution: even if we accept the distinction between per se bad and generically bad, to kill 
one's innocent, firstborn son can never be done well. But this is precisely what God 
commanded Abraham to do. So it seems that God has commanded an action which is per 
se bad, which (according to this solution) he cannot do, and so the problem remains. 
 After considering one more solution put forth by others,309 Albert gives his own 
view, "without a prejudgment as to the better opinion" (sine praejudicio melioris 
sententiae),310 though he considers each of the other proposed solutions later. His 
preferred response distinguishes between commands of execution, on the one hand, and 
commands of testing (tentatio) or instruction, on the other. In a command of execution, 
God intends that the commanded act should be done. In commands of testing or 
instruction, God does not intend the act; rather, he gives the command in order to test or 
to teach the person he is commanding. 
                                                 
309 The alii here define the bad as a corruption of mode, species, and order both with respect to God and 
with respect to one's neighbor. And they argue that God is not able to command against himself, but he can 
command a violation of the order between human beings. 
310 Ibid., p. 867. 
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 Having made this distinction, Albert can then apply it to the problem at hand: in 
Scripture God seems to command acts that are bad per se; but such acts can never be 
done well; therefore it seems that God should not have commanded them. Albert argues 
that God cannot command a per se bad by a command of execution; he cannot intend 
such acts. However, he can command per se bad acts with the goal of testing or 
instructing. The per se bad is not then something God intends, but something he uses, as a 
circumstance, in order to strengthen or teach someone. So God's command to Abraham to 
kill Isaac was not a command of execution, since God could never intend the killing of an 
innocent; rather, God issued this command in order to test Abraham, while ensuring that 
the act itself was never carried out. 
 So Albert's own solution to this problem does not appeal to generic goodness or 
badness. What does he think about the solution that distinguishes between per se bad and 
generic bad? His response begins by saying that that solution "is good enough" (satis 
bona est). He then goes on to point out its limitations, particularly when applied to the 
problem at hand. In the Bible God does not merely order the generic act of killing; he 
orders the morally specific act of killing of an innocent (Isaac), which can never be done 
well. For this reason, Albert will insist on his distinction between executive and testing or 
instructive commands. 
 Thus in Summa Theologiae I, we have a text that could reasonably be construed 
as inconsistent with the stages theory, which matches up well with a similar text in 
Ethica. At the same time, there is an explicit formulation of the stages theory which 
Albert attributes to others, in which he describes it simply as "good enough" – a curiously 
curt expression that does not shed much light on his views on the relation between 
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generic goodness and badness and the proper overall evaluation of actions. For this we 
must look for more evidence. 
 The second book of Summa Theologiae contains three references to generic 
goodness and moral circumstances. In the first, Albert claims that Christ had an 
inclination toward the generic good, which existed in multiple ways toward the good in 
species, but he has nothing further to say on this subject.311 In the other two instances, 
reference to generic goodness and circumstances is introduced in the preliminary 
arguments (or objections) of disputed questions. One is of little interest, theologically or 
philosophically; the objector is considering Augustine's division of goods into the three 
classes of lower, middle, and great goods. The virtues are great goods, our objector 
posits, while wondering why Augustine does not mention the threefold distinction of 
virtue into theological virtue, habitual virtue, and gift of the Holy Spirit, or the 
breakdown of habitual virtue into generic good, good of circumstance, and virtue.312 
Albert replies here that Augustine divides goods into lower, middle, and great according 
to the quantity of goodness that contributes to an upright life and good use. He remarks 
that it is given in opposition to Pelagius, and for this reason does not take into 
consideration the various genera and species of goodness, which the objector is interested 
in.313 
 The last mention of generic goodness in Summa Theologiae II occurs in a 
question on lust, in an article that asks whether every act of sexual intercourse between an 
unmarried man and an unmarried woman is a sin. The objector calls the generic good the 
                                                 
311 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.14, q.86, m.1, p.141. 
312 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.16, q.102, m.2, obj. 3, p.258b. 
313 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.16, q.102, m.2, solution, p.258b - 259a. 
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"one first subject of the good" (unum est primum subjectum boni).314 When it is clothed 
with circumstances and given the form of virtue, the good in species is produced. This 
description of the generic good as the one first subject of the good would seem to concur 
with the account given in Book I and discussed above, where Albert seems to hold that 
generic goodness is necessary for an act to become clothed with the right circumstances 
and performed from virtue. Thus it seems that the stages theory is again being called into 
question. However, given that this account is given in an objection and not a solution or 
reply, this passage is at most rather weak evidence for that claim. 
 The objector goes on to define the generic good as "the rational and voluntary act 
upon its appropriate matter" (rationalis et voluntarius super debitam materiam), and goes 
on to give an example: giving to the needy is a generic good, because the needy person is 
the appropriate matter of an act of giving. If done in the right circumstances and from the 
form of virtue, an act of the virtue of mercy comes into being, namely almsgiving. The 
objector then claims that an unmarried woman is the appropriate matter for an act of 
sexual intercourse, so that intercourse between an unmarried man in an unmarried woman 
is at least (ad minus) generically good. The objection concludes: "therefore it is never a 
sin" (ergo numquam est peccatum). If we take this to mean that no generically good act 
can be done sinfully, then this absolutely does not follow, since the objector 
acknowledges that a generic good must be clothed with the proper circumstances and be 
done from the form of virtue. The argument makes more sense if we understand the 
conclusion to be: this act, understood merely as generically good (i.e., conceptualized as 
prior to other circumstances) is not a sin. 
                                                 
314 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.18, q.122, m.1, art.2, obj. 3, p.396a. 
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 Albert's reply to this argument does not address the account given of generic 
goodness, or its relation to circumstances and virtue. He only argues that an unmarried 
woman is not the proper matter for an act of sexual intercourse: the proper matter can 
only be "she whom the law makes one's wife, with whom intercourse is not a sin."315 
Since man is a civic (civile) animal, and sexual intercourse is an act that can be ordered 
by law and political authority (civilitate), its proper matter will depend on the existence 
of a legal marriage. Since fornication lacks this relation to the law, it is disordered, and 
always a sin. 
 The evidence is mixed, but the accounts Albert gives of generic goodness in 
Summa Theologiae, and in particular where he is clearly giving his own view, suggests 
that he has a view of the role of generic goodness in his moral theory that is at odds with 
the stages theory. As in Ethica, Albert appears to claim that an act must be generically 
good in order for it to be clothed with all the right circumstances and done from virtue. In 
the DNB and SDB, the generic good was neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be 
done well. The view that is at least hinted at in his later works is stronger: the generic 
good is not sufficient, but it is necessary for an act to be done virtuously.  
 
 
                                                 
315 "...illa quam lex fecit suam, cum qua coitus non est peccatum." Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-
5), Pars II, tract.18, q.122, m.1, art.2, ad 3, p.397a. Albert's full reply is as follows: "Ad ultimum dicendum, 
quod mulier soluta non est propria materia coitus : et hujus ratio est, quia sicut dictum est, homo est animal 
civile naturaliter : et coitus est actus ordinabilis lege et civilitate : et ideo propria materia ejus non potest 
esse nisi illa quam lex fecit suam, cum qua coitus non est peccatum. Sed actus soluti cum soluta non habet 
legem, nec ordinem disciplinae. Ergo peccatum est, et semper mortale." 
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2.H The Dionysian Principle in Summa Theologiae 
 Albert's apparent late-career ambivalence about the stages theory in the Summa 
Theologiae accompanies a restatement of the Dionysian principle. This formulation is 
very similar to that found in the Sentences commentary. Summa Theologiae also includes 
a more general application of pseudo-Dionysius' dictum, which I will discuss first. What 
should be clear is that, in his final work, Albert is still very much committed to the 
Dionysian principle as a method for evaluating actions. 
 The first articulation in Summa Theologiae of the Dionysian principle, broadly 
speaking, occurs in a question that is more metaphysical than moral. Albert asks whether 
the bad is "wholly" (universaliter) a corruption of the good.316 He argues that since 
goodness is convertible with being, and nothing could be bad if it did not also exist, 
anything bad must also be good, at least to the extent that it has being. In the course of his 
argument, he appeals to the unity of goodness: 
For the good, as Aristotle and Dionysius say, is from one whole and sole cause, 
but the bad is omnifarious. Thus the bad is from particular and diverse causes; and 
for this reason it cannot wholly remove the good, but it can deprive with respect 
to this or that [good].317 
Here Albert attributes this idea both to Aristotle and pseudo-Dionysius, as he did in SDB 
but not in the Sentences commentary.  
                                                 
316 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I; tract.6; q.27; m.3; p.277b. 
317 Ibid., p. 278: "Bonum enim, ut dicunt Aristoteles et Dionysius, est ex una tota et sola causa, malum vero 
omnifariam. Unde ex particularibus et diversis causis est malum : et ideo non potest privare bonum 
universaliter : sed privat quoad hoc, vel quoad illud." 
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 In the same disputed question, Albert provides an example of a non-moral 
application of this principle.318 He takes up an objection that states that since the good is 
a simple disposition (simplex habitus), it can only be corrupted in one way – in toto. So if 
the bad is the corruption of the good, then the good must be corrupted "universally and in 
toto". Albert replies that although the good may be simple, it does not arise from one 
simple cause; rather, many different factors taken together give something the character 
(ratio) of goodness. Albert gives vision as an example of a good that is constituted from a 
number of causes; if any one of them is defective, vision will cease. Vision requires: 
-a good disposition of the visual spirit (bona dispositione spiritus visivi), which 
must be clear, unmixed, and directed toward the pupil; 
-the optimal disposition of the optical nerve; 
-the proper shape and position and clarity of the membranes (miringarum) of the 
eye; 
-the proper order of the optic humor (humoris crystallini). 
According to Albert's theory of visual perception, all these elements must be in place in 
order for vision to be possible. The loss of any one of them would mean the loss of 
vision. As he puts it, using Dionysian terminology: 
"The good eye comes about from that whole gathered together in this way. But 
the bad eye comes about omnifariously from many particular defects, although 
vision is a simple disposition."319 
This is the most detailed non-moral example of this principle in Albert's works, and it 
provides us with an analogy to a good action. 
                                                 
318 Ibid., 278-279. 
319 "Ex toto enim illo sic congregato fit bonum oculi. Malum autem oculi omnifariam fit ex quolibet 
particulari defectu, licet visus sit simplex habitus." 
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 Albert applies the more general Dionysian principle to the morality of actions 
twice in Summa Theologiae. The first instance is later in book I, where Albert attributes 
the positive claim that the good is from one whole cause to both Aristotle and Dionysius, 
while attributing the negative claim that the bad arises omnifariously to Dionysius 
alone.320 He expands on the idea that the good has a unified cause, calling that cause a 
totality gathered together from all the individual factors that cause a thing to be good 
(quae faciunt ad esse boni). With respect to action, Albert lists three requirements that 
must be met in order for it to be good: 1) it must be done from a good disposition, which 
both chooses and informs the act; 2) it must be clothed with the appropriate 
circumstances, and 3) it must be determined to the appropriate end.  
 These are essentially the same three requirements given in Albert's Sentences 
commentary, where he lists the form in the will, the circumstances, and the end. As we 
saw above, the form in the will is either of virtue or grace. When Albert says here that a 
good act must proceed "from a good disposition choosing and informing the act" (ex 
habitu bono actum eligente et informante), he is likewise referring either to virtue, or to 
an effect of God's grace. Elsewhere in Summa Theologiae Albert describes both virtue 
and grace as dispositions (habitus) that direct our acts. Grace is a disposition that makes 
both its possessor and her acts graced.321 And a definition of virtue that Albert gives 
frequently is from Cicero: "virtue is a disposition of the will, consenting to reason, in the 
mode of nature" (virtus est habitus voluntatis in modum naturae rationi consentaneus).322 
                                                 
320 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I, tract.20, q.80, m.1, p.859b-860a. 
321 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I, tract.6, q.26, m.1, art.1, p.231b -232a: "Gratia enim sic 
consuevit definiri, quod gratia est habitus gratum faciens habentem et opus ejus gratum reddens." 
322 This definition appears frequently in Summa theologiae, in addition to Albert's other works. See for 
example Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.22, q.136, p.458a. Cf. Cicero, De 
inventione II. 159: " Nam virtus est animi habitus naturae modo atque rationi consentaneus." 
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So the form of the will mentioned in the Sentences commentary is the same concept as 
the good disposition posited in Summa Theologiae. While it is not explained in terms of 
integral wholes, this formulation of the Dionysian principle is otherwise quite similar to 
that given in the Sentences commentary. 
 This interpretation is confirmed in a passage in Summa Theologiae II, where 
Albert again articulates the Dionysian principle as applied to actions.323 There, the first of 
the causes of a good act mentioned is "the form of the virtue eliciting the act" (virtutis 
forma elicientis actum). This condition is analogous to the form of the will in the 
Sentences commentary, and the good disposition in Summa Theologiae I. The main 
difference is that those two expressions leave open the possibility that the form or 
disposition directing the act might be either a virtue or some act of God's grace. By 
contrast, the version from Summa Theologiae II narrows the condition down to the cause 
of virtue alone. This does not necessarily mean that Albert means to exclude grace here, 
however: he may just be focusing on the case in which the good act is an act of virtue 
(and not, say, directed by a gift of the Holy Spirit). And at any rate, Albert holds that both 
the theological virtues and the infused cardinal virtues are caused by God's grace, which 
also makes the acts of those virtues graced (gratum). Regardless, Albert's claim here is a 
strong one: if an act does not proceed from virtue, it is not a good act. 
 There is another way the account of the Dionysian principle given in Summa 
Theologiae II differs from those given in both the Sentences commentary and Summa 
Theologiae I. Instead of three causes of the goodness of an act, Albert here provides four: 
                                                 
323 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars II, tract.22, q.138, m.2, p.464a. 
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the form of virtue, the circumstances, the will (voluntas), and the end.324 The new 
element here is the will; why does Albert include a good will here as a necessary 
condition for the goodness of an act? The context for this statement of the Dionysian 
principle is a disputed question that concerns whether an act is good from intention alone. 
Albert answers that it is not, although intention plays an important role. Given this 
context, it seems plausible that he is using the word voluntas in a broad sense here, to 
include intention. Albert tends to define intention as an act of the will directed toward an 
end. In this context – a question on intention – he seems to be pulling apart the two most 
basic elements of an intention, the act of the will and the end. Given that he mentions 
them side-by-side, we could even interpret him as meaning that the will together with the 
end (i.e., the intention) must be good. 
 Thus in both books of the Summa Theologiae, Albert states the Dionysian 
principle. And it is clearly his own principle; he does not present it merely as part of an 
objection, or as the opinion of others. While his views on the stages theory are at the very 
least ambiguous, at this late stage in his career Albert is still very much committed to the 
Dionysian principle. Further, his formulations of the principle here resemble the 
formulation he gives in the Sentences commentary. The major evolution, then, in his 
thinking about this principle occurs between SDB and the Sentences commentary, when 
he drops the requirement that an act be generically good and instead insist that it must 
proceed from a good form or disposition. Between the Sentences commentary and 
Summa Theologiae, Albert's views on the Dionysian principle are settled and consistent. 
 
                                                 
324 Ibid.: "Hoc est dictum, quod bonum in opere est ex omnibus causis bonitatis, sicut ex virtutis forma 
elicientis actum, et omnibus circumstantiis operis, et voluntate, et fine." 
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Chapter 3. The Stages Theory vs. the Dionysian Principle 
 By tracking the development of Albert's views on both generic goodness and 
moral circumstances over the course of his career, I have attempted to bring into focus 
the two different methods for evaluating actions morally that appear in Albert's works. 
The stages theory allows for mixed assessments of actions: good in one respect, but bad 
in another; perhaps an agent acted badly, though the action she performed remains a good 
action. The Dionysian principle does not necessarily rule out mixed assessments, but it 
focuses on the action as a whole: either an act is good in every morally relevant respect, 
and thus good all things considered, or it is bad in any such respect, and thus bad all 
things considered. Thus if an act is good, it is bad in no respect; if it is bad, then any 
sense in which it is good is overshadowed by the moral status of the act as a whole, since 
the corruption of any part of the act suffices for the corruption of the whole. 
 The stages theory is present from the beginning, receiving prominent treatment in 
Albert's first work, the De natura boni. He refines that early account in the SDB, 
especially by providing a more sophisticated account of generic goodness. In his later 
life, however, Albert shows some ambivalence toward the stages theory. While it is 
standard to describe both the generic good and the generic bad as "that which can be done 
well or badly", and such descriptions never entirely drop out of Albert's handling of the 
term, passages in Ethica and  Summa Theologiae suggests that Albert conceives of the 
generic good as necessary for an act to be good, all things considered. In other words, 
there is a question whether Albert retains a concept of the generic bad as something that 
can be done well. 
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 It seems unlikely that Albert's commitment to the stages theory would not be 
affected by his second method for morally evaluating actions: the Dionysian principle, 
which is first stated in the SDB, developed in the Sentences commentary, and reaffirmed 
in Summa Theologiae. Both accounts make use of the concepts of moral circumstances 
and moral virtue, and an early formulation of the Dionysian principle even includes 
generic goodness, which plays an essential role in the stages theory. Albert himself never 
explicitly compares the two methods. Doing so will thus require paying careful attention 
to the various formulations of both of them. In what follows I will first compare the 
accounts of each method given in SDB, arguing that they are in tension with one another. 
I will then proceed to the developments in the Sentences commentary, where both 
methods undergo important modifications. Then I will discuss the post-Paris works, in 
particular the commentaries, which give less systematic attention to these methods; this 
period culminates in the Summa Theologiae, however, which mirrors the Sentences 
commentary in its formulation of the Dionysian principle, but which seems to undercut 
the stages theory. Finally, I will examine some possible motivations for adopting each 
method, and draw some historical comparisons, in particular with Stoic ethics. 
 
3.A. Comparing the Stages Theory and the Dionysian Principle 
 Now it seems that there is a tension between Albert's stages theory as described in 
the DNB and elaborated on in the SDB, and the SDB version of the Dionysian principle. 
Before I argue that these two theories don't fit well together, I should note that there is a 
terminological problem here. The stages theory states that our moral evaluation of action 
should proceed according to the three levels or stages of 1) the act's generic quality, 2) 
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the moral circumstances, and finally 3) whether it is done from virtue. According to this 
theory, a generically good act can be done badly, and a generically bad act can be done 
well. Now the Dionysian principle mostly does not include an account of acts being done 
well or badly, instead aiming at an evaluation of an action as being bonum or malum, tout 
court. In order to avoid confusion here, I will refer to this final evaluation of an act as 
good or bad, all things considered, as opposed to the generic good or bad. 
 One further proviso: as noted in chapter 2, SDB includes two different versions of 
the Dionysian principle. One states that an act is virtuous just in case all the 
circumstances are good; the second mentions three conditions for the goodness of an act: 
1) the circumstances, 2) the end, and 3) the act upon its appropriate matter -- i.e., generic 
goodness.325 The first version appears in the SDB question on circumstances, where 
Albert is focused on the contribution that circumstances make to a good act. The second 
is found in a question on the substance and definition of virtue, where he is aiming to 
describe all of the factors that come together in a virtuous act. The second account thus 
seems more complete, and I will treat it as Albert's full expression of the principle in 
SDB.  
 The problem I see in reconciling the two methods is as follows. Recall that a 
generically bad act can be done well, if it is clothed with the right circumstances. Now if, 
according to the SDB formulation of the Dionysian principle, an act must be generically 
good in order for it to be good, all things considered, then it follows that every 
generically bad act is bad, all things considered. But if only its generic quality is bad, 
while all of its circumstances are good, then that same act might be done well, according 
to the Stages Theory. Thus it is possible that we can perform an act the final or all things 
                                                 
325 SDB, I.3.1, ad 6, 38, 68-70; SDB I.5.1, ad 22, 74, 22-25. 
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considered evaluation of which is that it is bad, but which is nevertheless done well. And 
that seems like an odd result. It is difficult to see what is added by claiming that, in 
addition to being generically bad, the act is also bad all things considered -- though it is 
still done well. 
 Further, it is difficult to see why a generically bad act, as described by the Stages 
Theory, must be considered bad, all things considered. Giving food to someone who is 
not hungry, for example, might be generically bad; the act is not brought to bear upon its 
appropriate matter. Nevertheless, Albert thinks that there are circumstances under which 
such an act can be done well, and if that's the case, why should the act still be considered 
bad all things considered, as the Dionysian principle would have it? Generic badness is 
not intrinsic badness, after all. What is it about generically bad acts that makes it the case 
that they must have this effect on our overall evaluation of the action? 
 These problems arise if we attempt to put the two theories together. But they don't 
seem designed to fit together, despite the fact that they use some of the same terminology 
(generic goodness, circumstances, etc.). For one thing, they each have a different term for 
the complete moral evaluation of an action: for the Stages Theory, the question is 
whether an act is done well or badly (bene vel male fieri); for the Dionysian principle, an 
act is determined to be either good or bad (bonum vel malum). Rather than attempting to 
put these two concepts together, as I did in the preceding paragraphs, it makes more sense 
to assume that they are roughly equivalent. Since Albert inherits the language of acts 
being done well or badly from earlier thinkers, it is not necessary to assume that he 
understood by it anything other than the all things considered moral evaluation of an act. 
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Albert's use of examples to illustrate the generic good and bad in the DNB provide 
further evidence that this is what he means by an act's being done well or badly.326 
 Let us assume that the concept of an act's being done well or badly (in the Stages 
Theory) does capture more or less what it means for an act to be good or bad, all things 
considered according to the Dionysian principle. If that's right, then the conflict between 
the two theories can be understood like this: according to the Stages Theory, generic 
goodness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an act to be done well. Not 
all generically good acts are done well, and not all acts that are done well are generically 
good. Similarly, the Stages Theory says that generic badness is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for an act to be done badly. The Dionysian principle, as laid out in the SDB, 
gives a quite different result. According to that theory, generic goodness is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for an action to be good, all things considered. The Dionysian 
principle says that certain features must be present for an act to be good, all things 
considered, and generic goodness is one of those features. However, if another one of 
those features is missing, for example good circumstances, the act will be bad, all things 
considered, even if it is generically good. Finally, on the Dionysian principle, generic 
badness is a sufficient but not necessary condition for an act to be bad, all things 
considered. Any generically bad act will be bad all things considered, but some acts that 
are not generically bad will also be bad, all things considered. The differences can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                 
326 See footnote 10 above. 
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Stages Theory 
 
Generic good is neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be done well. 
Generic bad is neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be done badly. 
 
Dionysian Principle 
 
Generic good is necessary but not sufficient for an act to be all things considered good. 
Generic bad is sufficient but not necessary for an act to be all things considered bad. 
 
If I am right to think that being done well (or badly) on the Stages Theory is roughly 
equivalent to what I've called good (or bad), all things considered on the Dionysian 
principle, then the two methods for evaluating actions found in the DNB are plainly 
incompatible. On the other hand, even if there is some nontrivial difference between an 
act being done well and an act being good, all things considered, trying to put the two 
methods together leaves us in a theoretical muddle, as I showed above. But why would 
Albert advance two theories that appear to be in this much tension? Was he merely 
confused? 
 If we assume that in the SDB Albert did not have a fully worked out theory, but 
instead was committed to two quite different doctrines, then we can explain the 
awkwardness of the result. Albert was committed to evaluating actions in terms of their 
generic goodness or badness when he wrote the DNB, his earliest known written work, 
and this continues in his writings in the 1240s. At the same time, he was clearly 
impressed with the Dionysian principle, and invokes it on two different occasions in the 
SDB. The Dionysian principle requires that every aspect of an action that can be good 
must be good in order for the action to be good, all things considered. Since the generic 
character of an action is one of those aspects, it quite naturally falls under the principle. 
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 As noted above, Albert's Sentences commentary contains a crucial change in the 
account of the Dionysian principle. Generic goodness is not listed, but the form in the 
will is. That form will usually be the form of a virtue, though it could also be a form of 
grace. This requirement remains in his much later Summa Theologiae II, though 
expressed explicitly as the form of a virtue. If the second book of the Summa Theologiae 
was in fact written by Albert, then this change became a permanent aspect of Albert's 
thought on the matter. If it is not an authentic work, the fact that its genuine author 
followed the Sentences commentary and not the SDB formulation is some evidence that 
the former was seen as his more definitive position. This is sensible if only because the 
Sentences commentary was written later. The evolution of the principle can be 
summarized as follows: 
Dionysian Principle: Conditions to be met for an act to be good, all things considered 
Summa de bono I.3 Summa de bono  I.5 Sentences Commentary Summa Theologiae II 
  Generic goodness Form in the will Form of virtue 
Circumstances Circumstances Circumstances Circumstances 
   End End End + Will 
 
 As for the stages theory, we find it expressed in the Sentences commentary as 
well. While there is some doubt as to how strongly Albert is committed to it at this point, 
since he doesn't refer to it in places where it would be natural for him to do so, he 
nevertheless clearly and explicitly formulates the position that a) a generically good act 
can be done badly, b) a generically bad act can be done well, and c) in neither case does 
the act cease to be generically good or bad. And he presents the basic structure from the 
DNB and SDB: generic good-- good from circumstance-- good of virtue, though the 
middle stage now seems to be divided into two, with the good deriving from the external 
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circumstances distinguished from the good from the end. Whether there are three or four 
stages, the theory is recognizable from his earlier works. 
 A large part of the trouble in reconciling the stages theory with the Dionysian 
principle, as found in the DNB and the SDB, resulted from the role that generic goodness 
and badness played in each. According to the stages theory, a generically bad act can be 
done well; according to the Dionysian principle, a generically bad act cannot be good all 
things considered. Putting those two theories together requires that we accept some odd-
sounding propositions; the theories seem to be in tension with each other. But in the 
Sentences commentary, generic goodness plays no role in the Dionysian principle. Does 
this make it easier to hold both at the same time? 
 While generic goodness is now absent from the Dionysian principle, the two 
theories still overlap, since they both include circumstances and moral virtue. Here again 
is how Albert puts the Dionysian principle in the Sentences commentary: 
...for the constitution of the good it is necessary to bring together all the 
circumstances and the end and the form in the acting will. And it is constituted 
only by all these things together in the mode of an integral whole, which is 
constituted by all its parts taken at the same time. But the bad, as Dionysius says, 
is omnifarious, that is, from any particular defect, just as an integral whole is 
destroyed by any given part taken separately. And thus it is that the good does not 
exist without a good intention, although it is not good from intention alone; just as 
a house does not exist without a wall, although it does not exist from the wall 
alone.327 
                                                 
327 Sentences II, distinction 41, B, Article 2, solution, p. 643: "Dicendum, quod bonum et malum in opere 
non causantur uno modo : sed bonum, sicut Dionysius dicit, ex una tota causa est, id est, ad constitutionem 
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Can this account be more easily reconciled with the stages theory? 
 Of course it is possible that the different vocabulary indicates that Albert has in 
mind two different sorts of assessment that are orthogonal to each other; that whether an 
act is done well or badly has no bearing on whether it is good or bad, all things 
considered. Perhaps these are two independent ways of looking at actions, and it isn't a 
problem if they diverge.  
 It is probably true that Albert began thinking about these theories independently 
of each other. The stages theory grows out of a long history of thinking about generic 
goodness; the Dionysian principle likely derives from a reading of Eudes Rigaud. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that Albert is aiming to articulate and defend a unified moral 
theory, and not merely describe a number of loosely related ways of evaluating actions, 
these theories should at least be consistent with each other, and we should be able to say 
how they relate to each other. Further, for reasons mentioned above, it doesn't seem 
plausible that being done well or badly (according to the stages theory) is just a different 
concept from being a good action (according to the Dionysian principle). Both appear to 
aim to give an all things considered moral assessment of actions, and they both use the 
concepts of circumstances and moral virtue. The main reason for the different vocabulary 
seems to be their sources, not any important conceptual difference. 
 Nevertheless, the fact that generic goodness is no longer included the Dionysian 
principle means that the stages theory could be telling us something interesting about an 
act, something not captured by the Dionysian principle. That is, since according to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
boni oportet convenire omnes circumstantias et finem et formam in voluntate agente : et non constituitur 
nisi ab omnibus his simul per modum totius integralis, quod constituitur ab omnibus suis partibus simul 
acceptis. Malum autem, ut dicit Dionysius, fit omnifariam, id est, ex quolibet particulari defectu : sicut et 
totum integrale destruitur qualibet parte divisim destructa. Et ideo est, quod bonum non est sine intentione 
bona, licet non sit bonum ex sola intentione : sicut domus non est sine pariete, licet non sit ex solo pariete." 
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latter it is no longer necessary that an act be generically good in order for it to be good all 
things considered, an act could be generically bad but still fulfill all the requirements for 
a good action. In such a case, both theories would give the same result – the action is 
good, or done well – but the stages theory would also give the sort of mixed assessment 
that is, in this kind of act, not available under the Dionysian principle. 
 Perhaps it will be objected that this approach, if it does not violate the letter of the 
Dionysian principle, still seems to violate its spirit. Albert states that a bad action results 
from any particular defect; and generic badness is a defect, at least insofar as it is closer 
to vice than to virtue. So shouldn't Albert insist, as he did in the SDB, that an act must be 
generically good for it to be good, all things considered? Since generic goodness is a 
moral concept relating to the moral status of actions, isn't the Dionysian principle 
incomplete if it does not include it?  
 I think this is a misreading of that principle. When Albert, quoting pseudo-
Dionysius, says that the bad is from particular defects, he means only the absence of any 
one of the necessary elements of a good action. Since an action can be good without 
being generically good, the Dionysian principle will be silent about it. Albert's house 
metaphor is relevant here: a good end is like the walls of the house; remove them, and 
you no longer have a house. Generic goodness, by contrast, is like a wood stove or 
granite countertops; nice to have, but not essential. 
 Still, it is important to remember that generic goodness is not prima facie 
goodness; it is a real feature of an action, and an act does not cease to be generically good 
even if it is done badly. Neither is generic goodness a kind of natural goodness; it is not a 
metaphysical feature of an action that can be separated from an act's moral standing. 
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Albert insists that generic goodness is a moral good. So holding both the stages theory 
and the Dionysian principle simultaneously requires that we accept both that a morally 
good action is an integral whole, composed of the moral goodness of its parts, but 
nevertheless that it can also be morally bad in one respect (i.e., generically bad). And this 
may seem like an awkward position to hold. 
 Regardless, it is possible to imagine an act that is good, all things considered, 
according to the Dionysian principle, but which is nevertheless generically bad – an 
insight gained from the stages theory. Instead of conflicting with each other, the two 
theories end up complementing one another. Still, one might wonder whether the stages 
theory is adding anything useful here. If the Dionysian principle can tell us whether an 
act is morally good or morally bad without referring to its generic goodness, then what 
good is generic goodness? 
 It seems to me that the stages theory can make two contributions to the evaluation 
of an act, beyond the Dionysian principle. First, recall that generic goodness is more 
ordered or inclined toward virtue, whereas generic badness is more ordered toward 
vice.328 So if we are evaluating an act, be it our own or someone else's, or even 
deliberating about whether to perform some act, it is useful to consider whether the act is 
generically good or bad. Indeed, such knowledge may frame the way we think about the 
surrounding circumstances. If the act is generically good, then we will need to pay 
attention to whether any circumstances vitiate the basic goodness we know the act 
possesses. An act like feeding the hungry is good generically; but it is easy to do for the 
wrong reasons, so we will want to inspect our motivations before concluding that the act 
was good overall. On the other hand, the fact that an act is generically bad gives us a 
                                                 
328 SDB I.2.4, solution, p. 29, 49-53. 
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reason not to do it, and to be suspicious of any justifications for it. Of course, there may 
be strong reasons to do the act, depending on the circumstances. But in such cases, we do 
well to examine the circumstances carefully, to make sure that we are really acting well. 
 A second advantage of the stages theory is that it can explain the regret or 
remorse an agent might have over performing an act that he is morally required to 
perform. Take Albert's example of a bad act done well from the DNB: a judge is 
compelled to put an innocent man to death (a generically bad act) because of allegations 
and a trial that go against him.329 This case could be framed in contemporary terms as a 
resolvable moral dilemma. There is a conflict between two principles: 1) one should 
never kill an innocent person, and 2) a judge should follow proper procedures. Albert 
thinks that this conflict can be resolved, since he holds that the judge's obligation to 
follow proper procedures overrides his duty not to kill someone he knows to be innocent. 
Nevertheless, we should expect the judge to feel sorrow and remorse over having to 
sentence this man to death. If the judge were gleeful and relished the opportunity to kill 
an innocent person, this would surely be a sign of serious flaws in his character. A 
virtuous judge would be somber and regretful, even if in this case his action is good 
overall. 
 The stages theory can explain this regret or "moral residue" in terms of the 
mismatch between the act at the generic level and the moral circumstances.330 The act is 
                                                 
329 DNB II.1, p. 9, lines 15-20. I will discuss this case in more detail in the section on Aquinas. Albert 
seems to have changed his mind about this sort of case by the time he writes his Summa theologiae, where 
he states flatly that the killing of an innocent cannot be done well (occisio innocentis non potest bene fieri) 
(Pars I, tract.20, q.80, m.2, art.1, q. inc., p.869b). 
330 Williams (1965) and Marcus (1980) give accounts of moral dilemmas involving moral residue. In her 
(1996), Marcus distinguishes between emotions like guilt, regret, and remorse, and the sorts of situations in 
which they would be appropriate (pages 32-33). A doctor who is prevented from seeing a patient because 
of a hurricane might feel regret, although there is nothing she could have done differently to avoid this 
situation. The man in Sartre's famous example who must choose between joining the Free French forces 
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generically bad, and this badness is a real feature of the act. On the other hand, the 
circumstances dictate that it must be done, and so it is done well. The Dionysian 
principle, on the other hand, seems to have no explanation for the (entirely appropriate) 
feelings of sorrow and regret that follow up on sentencing the innocent man to death. It 
states that the act is good in every way necessary for it to be good as an integral whole. 
So if the act is completely and unqualifiedly good, why should one regret it? Based on 
the information we have from the Dionysian principle, such an attitude makes little sense. 
Information about the act's generic badness, on the other hand, helps to fill in the picture, 
explaining not only what an agent ought to do, but how she ought to feel about doing it. 
 Given these advantages, we might approach the problem of putting these two 
theories together from the other direction: why do we need the Dionysian principle? The 
stages theory seems capable of doing more than that Dionysian principle, but when paired 
with the former, the latter begins to seem superfluous. What advantages does the 
Dionysian principle have? 
 Before answering that question, I will turn to the work of Albert's best-known 
student, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas takes the Dionysian principle from Albert, and 
incorporates it into his own ethics. At the same time, he repudiates the stages theory. 
Thus considering Aquinas' ethics will help to bring into focus an ethics that accepts the 
Dionysian principle while rejecting the stages theory. 
 I should also reiterate here that Albert's commitment to the stages theory becomes 
increasingly ambivalent in his later works. As I noted in chapter 2, there are passages in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(thereby avenging his brother who had been killed by the Germans) and caring for his elderly mother might 
feel a stronger emotion, like remorse, whichever option he chooses (see Sartre (1957), 295-298). It seems 
to me that Albert's judge should also feel remorse, since he would regret not only the situation, but his own 
action of sentencing an innocent man to death. Guilt would be inappropriate, however, since the dilemma is 
not self-imposed, and the judge acts well, performing the right action in the circumstances. 
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both the Ethica and the Summa Theologiae  that seem to suggest that every act which is 
good with respect to its circumstances must also be generically good. Thus in the Ethica 
Albert says that the generic good is "that under which every moral good is 
comprehended" (sub quo omne bonum moris comprehenditur).331 The wording is hardly 
clear, but a reasonable interpretation is that every morally good act must be generically 
good, with generic goodness providing a sort of umbrella under which all good acts are 
included. Of course, it will also contain bad acts, since generically good acts can be done 
badly. Perhaps tellingly, Albert does not state in the Ethica what he had insisted upon in 
his earlier works, namely that generically bad acts can also be done well. Of course, this 
is not incontrovertible evidence that Albert has abandoned his stages theory, but at the 
very least it suggests that he might have, or that he is no longer confident in advancing it. 
 The Summa Theologiae is likewise unclear. There Albert calls the generic good 
the first possible subject (subicibile) of a good form – that is, of good circumstances and 
virtuous acts.332 It is not obvious from the text whether or not the generic bad could also 
play this role. Albert does discuss the generic bad in Summa Theologiae, where it is even 
defined as that which can be done well or badly; but he attributes this account of generic 
badness to others, never advancing it in his own voice. And when he assesses it, he 
simply says that it is "good enough" (satis bona).333 He appears to see no problem with 
using this account of generic badness, but he does not endorse it either. At the same time, 
Albert states the Dionysian principle in both books of the Summa Theologiae, and he 
advances it as his own view. If there is a doubt whether he still accepts the stages theory 
                                                 
331 Ethica (ed. Borgnet, 1891), Lib.I, tract.1, cap.6, p.14. 
332 Summa theologiae (Editio Coloniensis), Pars I, tract.6, q.26, m.1, art.1, ad 2, p. 170. 
333 Summa theologiae (ed. Borgnet, 1894-5), Pars I, tract.20, q.80, m.2, art.1, q. inc., p.869. 
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in his later works, there is no doubt that he thinks the Dionysian principle is the right way 
to morally evaluate actions. 
 
3.B Comparing Albert to Thomas Aquinas 
 There is a danger involved in discussing both Albert and Aquinas in the same 
study. We are far removed from Gilson's dismissal of Albert as someone whose writings 
are largely unoriginal and whose views do not change in any important way over the 
course of his writings.334 Nevertheless, contemporary scholarship on Aquinas dwarfs the 
research done into Albert's writings, particularly outside of Germany. The Albert scholar 
must thus be careful not to read Albert merely through the lens of his most famous 
student, as if his writings were merely provisional upon Aquinas completing (or refuting) 
them. Alain de Libera has gone so far as to say that if we wish to understand Albert, "Il 
faut enfin, et c'est le plus délicat, tenter d'oublier Thomas d'Aquin."335 
 It would be a mistake, however, to treat the writings of Albert and Aquinas as 
though they were unrelated to each other. That Albert influenced Aquinas is beyond 
dispute336, and it is not unreasonable to think that Aquinas' writings also influenced his 
teacher. Certainly Albert was devoted to Aquinas, even after the latter's death. 
Bartholomew of Capua, an important though not always reliable source of biographical 
material on Aquinas, relates that Hugh of Lucca informed him directly of the trip Hugh 
undertook along with Albert to Paris in 1277. Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, 
issued his condemnation of 219 philosophical and theological theses on March 7 of that 
                                                 
334 Gilson (1955), 278. 
335 De Libera (2005), 17. Italics in the original. 
336 For example, see René-Antoine Gauthier's detailed study of the ways Albert's Super Ethica influenced 
Aquinas' moral thought in Gauthier (1969), 235-257. 
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year, and positions adopted by both Albert and Aquinas appear to have been 
condemned.337  Later that same month, two separate doctrinal inquiries were launched, 
one against Giles of Rome, the other against Thomas Aquinas.338 According to 
Bartholomew, Albert traveled to Paris in order to defend Aquinas' writings.339 While it is 
true that, as Zimmerman points out,340 Albert's appearance in Paris would have given him 
the opportunity to defend his own writings, as well as those of Aquinas, the fact that 
Albert went with the stated goal of defending Aquinas indicates that he was at least 
familiar with Aquinas' writings.341 It is thus plausible that Albert had Aquinas' views and 
arguments in mind when composing his own later works. 
 Even if Albert were not influenced by Aquinas, however, it would still be of 
interest to compare the two writers. Aquinas is of course familiar with Albert's thought, 
and is influenced by him. He develops and systematizes ideas found in Albert; at other 
times, we find him disagreeing with his teacher. A careful reading of Aquinas can even 
illuminate Albert's thought, insofar as their disagreements shed light on what is at stake  
in their theorizing. 
 Aquinas arrived in Paris in 1245, the same year Albert graduated as a master in 
theology and took up a Dominican chair in the faculty of theology at the University of 
Paris. When Albert was sent to Cologne in 1248 to establish a Dominican studium 
generale, Aquinas went with him, remaining there until 1252, when Aquinas returned to 
                                                 
337 On the condemnation of 1277, see Hissette (1977) and Thijssen (2016). 
338 The thesis of a separate investigation launched against Aquinas, which was never completed, was first 
put forward by Wielockx (1988), and is now generally accepted by scholars. The details are disputed, 
however. See, among others, Hissette (1998), and Wippel (1995) and (1997). 
339 Hissette (1982), 229; Zimmerman (1980), 474-479. 
340 Zimmerman (1980), 469. 
341 One might question the details of Bartholomew's account, however. Bartholomew was a contemporary 
of Aquinas and Albert, and is considered a major source for biographical information about his life. But De 
Libera (2005) suggests that both he and Hugh were too affected by admiration for Aquinas to give an 
unbiased account of their relationship (p. 16). 
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Paris. By 1256, Aquinas had completed the requirements to become a master of theology 
himself, and began teaching at the University of Paris. Thus Aquinas spent a good 
number of his formative years studying under Albert. 
 We find Aquinas' earliest account of moral actions in his commentary on the 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, which he likely began in 1252, and completed in 1257.342 
He would significantly develop this account later in his life, fleshing out a complex 
theory of the interrelations between the different aspects of an action in his Questiones 
disputatae de malo (c.1266–1270) as well as his own Summa theologiae (c.1265–1273). 
This theory has received considerable attention in recent decades, and there has been a 
lively scholarly debate about its precise nature and implications. Contemporary 
theologians and philosophers have also appealed to Aquinas to defend various positions 
on the issue whether there are any action types which are bad per se, or whether the 
badness of an action depends on its "proportion" to an intended end. Aquinas' action 
theory has also been an important source in debates about the doctrine of double effect, 
an official teaching of the Catholic Church.  
 The result is an enormous secondary literature.343 It would be foolish for me to 
stake out a position on the various controversies that surround Aquinas on moral action, 
or even to attempt to summarize them, because it would take me too far afield. I will aim 
to focus on those areas in which Aquinas' ideas mirror or develop or contradict those 
found in Albert, specifically as regards the moral evaluation of actions. This will mean 
zeroing in on Aquinas' accounts of generic goodness and the Dionysian principle, in 
particular, though it will also require me to examine concepts and distinctions that do not 
                                                 
342 Aquinas' dates are from Davies (2012), 533-535. 
343 Important recent treatments of Aquinas' action theory and its implications for ethics can be found in 
Brock (1998), Pilsner (2006), Jensen (2010), and Long (2015). 
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appear in Albert, such as the distinction between the interior and exterior act. I will begin 
by briefly examining an important passage in Aquinas' Sentences commentary, before 
turning to the mature theory of De Malo and Summa theologiae. I will argue that Aquinas 
makes explicit what we find only suggested in Albert: namely, the rejection of the stages 
theory in favor of the Dionysian principle. 
 
3.C Generic Goodness and the Dionysian Principle in Aquinas' Sentences 
Commentary 
 Aquinas appears to have begun working on his Sentences commentary in 1253, 
the year after he returned to Paris from Cologne, where he had spent four years studying 
with Albert. Scholars have noted that Aquinas' first work "bears ample witness to his 
teacher Albert's influence."344 It is also a useful place to begin comparing Aquinas to 
Albert, since Albert wrote his own commentary on the Sentences the previous decade. I 
will focus on an article that contains both a careful articulation of Aquinas' views on 
generic goodness and badness, and a clear assertion of the Dionysian principle. 
 The article in question concerns the division of goods found in book 2 of 
Lombard's Sentences.345 There Lombard reports on the opinion of certain people, who 
say that every act, insofar as it is an act, is good -- i.e., an act is good from its essence. 
These people also argue that an act can be good with respect to its genus, and Lombard 
gives the example of feeding the hungry; and finally that some acts are "absolutely and 
perfectly" good, which proceed from a good will and are directed toward a good act.346 In 
                                                 
344  Herdt (2013), 117. 
345 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 36 q. 1 a. 5.  
346 Lombard, In II Sentent., dist. XXXVI, K: "Addunt quoque quosdam non tantum essentia, sed etiam 
genere bonos esse, ut reficere esurientam, qui actus est de genere operum.misericordiae: quosdam vero 
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his commentary Aquinas uses this text as an opportunity to introduce the three levels of 
goodness which we find in Albert's stages account, though with an important alteration. 
 Aquinas approaches the question of the goodness of an action by asking about its 
determinatio, that is, about how an act is specified or particularized. An action's "proper" 
determination comes from its object. Since the word 'object' takes on a significance in 
Aquinas' theory that it does not have in Albert's early works, it is worth pointing out that 
it is a technical term that had only recently become standard.347 In the early 13th century, 
it was common to use obiectum to mean an objection, but not as the object of a power. 
This latter meaning seems to be a 13th century innovation; two early instances of this 
usage are Robert Grosseteste's De anima (ca. 1208-1210)348, and the anonymous De 
potentiis animae et obiectis (likely written between 1220 and 1230). Grosseteste draws 
on Aristotle's tripartite distinction between powers, activities, and what is acted upon, 
translated by James of Venice as potentiae, actus, and opposita.349 Instead of opposita, 
however, Grosseteste writes obiecta, arguing that powers are distinguished according to 
their proper acts, and that acts are distinguished according to their objects.350 He supplies 
three examples: the object of the rational power is truth, the object of the concupiscible 
power is the good, and the object of the irascible power is the arduous. The later De 
potentiis animae et obiectis states that powers have objects, and gives the example of 
colour, which is the object of the visual power.351 
                                                                                                                                                 
actus absolute ac perfecte bonos dicunt, quos non solum essentia vel genus, sed etiarn causa et finis 
comrnendat : ut sunt illi qui ex bona voluntate proveniunt, et bonum finem metiuntur." 
347 I rely here on Dewan's article "Obiectum", as reprinted in his Wisdom, Law and, Virtue (2008). 
348 I follow Dewan in treating this work as Grosseteste's, although scholars have doubted its authenticity. 
349 De anima 2.4, 415a17-23.  
350 See the edition published by Bauer (1912), 265, lines 21-26; see also Dewan, "Obiectum", 406. 
351 Dewan, "Obiectum", 410-411. The author of the De potentiis animae et obiectis states that there is a 
power – the divine power – which does not have an object distinct from itself, and Dewan argues 
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 By the time Albert writes his commentary on the Sentences in the 1240s, 
obiectum is increasingly being used to mean that toward which a power or activity is 
directed. Albert himself uses it liberally: for example, he claims that the good is the 
object of the theological virtue of charity,352 and that the object of the will is that which is 
willed (volito).353 But he does not use it to name that which a moral action is directed at, 
preferring for that purpose the term materia, as we have seen. This changes in the Super 
Ethica, however: there Albert claims that an act receives its species from its object.354 
Nevertheless, much of the discussion in that work revolves around how moral objects 
tend to be specified and qualified by circumstances, especially the circumstance quid. So 
when Aquinas begins his inquiry into an act's goodness by focusing on its object, he is 
following Albert's lead, to a certain extent. But moral objects play a much more central 
role in specification for Aquinas, particularly in his mature theory. 
 How does an act's object contribute to its moral goodness, according to Aquinas 
in his Sentences commentary? The most basic "determination" of an object is that which 
places it in a genus; for this reason, Aquinas says that the first determination of an act 
according to its object is the "good from the genus", or generic good (bonum ex genere -- 
compare Albert's bonum in genere).355 This account is familiar from Albert, and Aquinas 
cites the traditional example of generic goodness, feeding the hungry. In a generically 
good act, the object is "proportionate" to the act, which receives from the object a certain 
"ulterior goodness" (quamdam ulteriorem bonitatem). This object can be more fully 
                                                                                                                                                 
convincingly that this does not mean that the divine power does not have an object, but only that the object 
of the divine power is not distinct from the power itself. 
352 Super IV libros Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.I, dist.42, art.2, p.359a. 
353 Super IV libros Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.I, dist.48, art.2, p.473b. 
354 Super Ethica III, 1, #167, solution. 
355 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 36 q. 1 a. 5: "Et quia prima determinatio qua aliquid determinatur, est determinatio 
per formam generis; ideo hujusmodi actus ex determinatione objecti bonitatem habentes, dicuntur boni ex 
genere." 
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specified by other circumstances, however, which contribute a further goodness to the 
act. Finally we arrive at perfect goodness, which comes from a disposition which informs 
the act -- viz. a virtue. 
 Thus far, the account is similar to the stages theory found in Albert's DNB and 
SDB. However, in that account, the generic good could be done badly, and the generic 
bad could be done well; generic goodness was neither necessary nor sufficient for an act 
to become virtuous. Aquinas tells a different story, however: an act must be good at each 
stage in order for it to be good at the next stage. He lists four levels of goodness: 1) 
essential goodness; 2) generic goodness; 3) good from circumstances; 4) good of virtue. 
Each is a necessary prerequisite for the next level: 
For the first goodness, which is from the essence of an act, is common to all acts. 
Therefore it stands under all the other goodnesses, among which the goodness 
which is from the appropriate matter (debita materia) supervenes on it first; on 
which again another goodness is induced, which is from the end, and the other 
circumstances, and from the form of a disposition; and if the second goodness is 
removed, there cannot be the third; but nevertheless if the second is present 
(posita), the third will not necessarily be added (ponitur). And for this reason it 
happens that an act has goodness from the matter, and nevertheless it is done 
badly on account of inappropriate circumstances.356 
                                                 
356 Ibid.: "Prima enim bonitas, quae est ex essentia actus, communis est omnibus actibus: unde ipsa 
substernitur omnibus aliis bonitatibus; inter quas primo supervenit sibi bonitas quae est ex debita materia; 
super quam iterum inducitur alia bonitas quae est ex fine, et aliis circumstantiis, et ex forma habitus: et 
secunda bonitate subtracta, non potest esse tertia; sed tamen posita secunda, non necessario tertia ponitur: et 
ideo contingit actum habere bonitatem ex materia, et tamen eum male fieri propter indebitas 
circumstantias." 
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Here we see Aquinas claiming quite explicitly that if the act is not generically good, it 
cannot be good from the circumstances. This is a position that Albert appears to hold in 
his later works, though he never states it as clearly as Aquinas does. A generically good 
act may be done badly, lacking good circumstances, but it cannot be done under the right 
circumstances if it is not also generically good.357 
 A corollary of this position is that the generic bad can never be done well. To 
make this point, Aquinas invokes the Dionysian principle: 
To the second it should be said that one defect suffices for something to be said to 
be bad; but one perfection does not suffice for something to be unqualifiedly 
(simpliciter) good. For the good results from one perfect cause, but the bad is 
from particular defects, as Dionysius says. And therefore what is generically good 
is not necessarily unqualifiedly good, but it can be done badly; but what is 
generically bad is unqualifiedly bad, and cannot be made good.358 
Here we find Aquinas identifying the concept of generic badness with per se badness -- 
these are now acts which cannot be done well. He also introduces the notion of 
unqualifiedly good or bad acts. A generically good act remains good, albeit in a limited 
way, even if it is done badly. It is only unqualifiedly good if it meets all of the specified 
requirements: it must be generically good, good from circumstances, and done from 
virtue. By contrast, every generically bad act is unqualifiedly bad, since it is impossible 
for it to be done in the right circumstances or from virtue. 
                                                 
357 In Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 36 q. 1 a. 5, ad 1, Aquinas clarifies that even when done badly on account of the 
circumstances, a generic good act does not cease to be generically good. 
358 In Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 36 q. 1 a. 5, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod unus defectus sufficit ad hoc 
quod malum aliquid esse dicatur; sed non una perfectio sufficit ad hoc quod simpliciter sit bonum: quia 
bonum contingit ex una et perfecta causa: sed malum ex particularibus defectibus, ut Dionysius dicit: et 
ideo illud quod est bonum ex genere, non est necessarium quod simpliciter sit bonum: sed potest male fieri: 
quod autem est malum ex genere, simpliciter est malum, nec bonum fieri potest." 
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 It is worth pausing here to consider how Albert discusses the same passage in 
Lombard's Sentences. As we saw in chapter 1, Albert reproduces much of the account he 
gave in SDB on the generic good. He calls it a potentiality toward the good of 
circumstances, and says that it is that which can be done well or badly.359 Unlike 
Aquinas, he does not address whether the generic bad can be done well -- though recall 
that in DNB, he argued at length that generically bad acts could be done well, and gave 
examples. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable to suppose that when Albert says in his 
Sentences commentary that the generic good can be done well or badly, he is using 
"generic good" as a shorthand to mean "generic good or generic bad". On the other hand, 
as I argued above, the tension between the stages theory and the Dionysian principle does  
suggest a reason for Albert to deny that the generic bad can be done well, and abandon 
the stages theory. However, Albert does state in book IV of the Sentences commentary 
that the generic bad can be done well, thus affirming the stages theory. 
 One place where Aquinas seems to be disagreeing with Albert directly is in the 
former's insistence that an act must be good generically in order for it also to be good 
from circumstances. Albert denies this in his Sentences commentary, not on the basis that 
generically bad acts can be done well (the argument he makes in DNB), but rather 
because some acts have no appropriate matter that can be identified independently of the 
circumstances.360 This is a claim we also find in the SDB361: acts like killing and having 
sexual intercourse have no matter which is naturally proportionate to them. In order to 
give an account of such acts in which they turn out to be good, it is necessary to give a 
rich description of them, including enough circumstances to make them acts of specific 
                                                 
359 Super IV libros Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.36, K, art.6, p.592. 
360 Super IV libros Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.36, K, art.7, p.593, solution. 
361 SDB I.2.4, ad 7, p. 30, lines 42-60. 
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virtues (such as justice and conjugal continence). Thus some acts can be done in the right 
circumstances and from virtue, although they are not generically good. Albert 
underscores this claim when he states that the act which is "an absolute, unqualified 
good" (bonum absolutum simpliciter) is the one which is good according to a good form 
(i.e., virtue), from the circumstances and the end – but not necessarily good 
generically.362 
 Thus in his first work, Aquinas explicitly denies the claim Albert made in the 
DNB, that the generic bad can be done well. He also affirms a position that Albert rejects 
both in the DNB and in the Sentences commentary: namely, that it is necessary that an act 
be good generically in order for it to be good from circumstances. The upshot of this is 
that he could not and does not accept the stages theory; he does, however, endorse the 
Dionysian principle. Given the years Aquinas spent studying under Albert, it seems 
entirely possible that he was aware of Albert's two methods for evaluating actions, and 
decided in favor of the Dionysian principle, as opposed to the stages theory.  
 
3.D Aquinas' Mature Theory 
 Although the essential elements from Aquinas' Sentences commentary remain in 
his mature works, Aquinas adds considerable sophistication in his later life. Both the De 
Malo (c.1266–1270) and Summa theologiae (c.1265–1273) provide considerable 
reflection on the nature of moral actions, and his commentary on Aristotle's 
Nichomachean Ethics (1271–1272) is of more limited interest. In what follows I will 
sketch his theory in broad outlines, in order to examine the role that generic goodness – 
                                                 
362 Super IV libros Sententiarum (ed. Borgnet, 1893-4), Lib.II, dist.36, K, art.7, p.593, ad 2. 
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now identified with the good in species – plays within it, as well as its appropriation of 
the Dionysian principle. While Aquinas continues to affirm the Dionysian principle in his 
later works, he gives a new account of the interrelationships between the conditions for 
an act's goodness, which leads to a subtler application of the principle. 
 Aquinas' mature account of moral actions includes many of the same concepts we 
find in Albert: generic goodness, moral circumstances, and the Dionysian principle. 
However, Aquinas incorporates these ideas into a broader account of moral action; in 
order to understand the role they play in this account, it will be necessary to look at the 
broader structure of moral actions as he describes them. This structure, which provides 
the framework for moral evaluation of actions, rests in particular on the distinction 
between interior and exterior acts. 
 
Interior and Exterior Acts 
 
 Already in his earliest work, Aquinas distinguishes between the interior act and 
the exterior act.363 These are not two different moral actions, but are rather two different 
aspects of the same action. In the Sentences commentary, the distinction corresponds to 
Lombard's distinction between a sinful will and the sinful action (actio) which the will 
chooses. Aquinas argues there that with respect to sins, every exterior act will have a 
corresponding interior act, but not vice versa, since some sins occur only in thought, and 
so consist only in the interior act.364 In all other sins, both the interior act (the formal 
                                                 
363 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 42 q. 1 a. 1 co. 
364 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 42 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1 ad 2. 
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element) and the exterior act (the material element) have the nature (ratio) of sin.365 We 
even find Aquinas applying this analysis to good acts, arguing that each of the two acts 
cause the goodness of the other.366 Thus Aquinas has a fairly robust account of the 
difference between interior and exterior acts in his Sentences commentary. The structure 
of the work prevents him from giving the sort of systematic account that we find him 
giving later on, however. Further, he does not explore in this early work how the 
distinction between interior and exterior acts relates to the concepts of generic goodness 
and moral circumstances. We must turn to his later works for an attempt to unify these 
ethical concepts into a single theory. 
 As in the Sentences, Aquinas continues to hold in his later theory that there are 
some moral actions which consist in an interior act alone, without an accompanying 
exterior act.367 Such actions do not go beyond an agent's thought, however, and Aquinas' 
focus is on actions that contain both an interior and exterior act. And he insists that both 
of these are one action, considered morally. For this reason, the exterior and interior acts 
should be thought of as two components or aspects of a given, single moral action.368 The 
interior act is an act of the will. Its object is the end at which it is directed. The exterior 
act, on the other hand, is that which is commanded by the will. Its object is "what it is 
about" (id circa quod est).369 Stephen Brock clarifies that an exterior act is not an act as it 
might be described by an observer; the point is not to distinguish descriptions that include 
the agent's internal states from those that don't. Rather, the exterior act is "an action 
                                                 
365 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 35 q. 1 a. 4 co. 
366 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 40 q. 1 a. 3 co. 
367 ST I-II 6.3. See Gallagher (1990), 123, note 15. 
368 ST I-II 20.3. 
369 ST I-II 17.4 and 18.6. 
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exercised by some faculty or member other than, but under the command of, the will."370 
Thus acts of thinking or imagination will count as exterior acts, insofar as they are not 
elicited acts of the will. Such acts are caused efficiently by the will, and their goodness is 
derived from the goodness of the will.371  
 This distinction between interior and exterior acts is essential for understanding 
how Aquinas conceives of moral specification. Actions are specified by what is intended 
per se.372 Aquinas uses the word intentio in different ways, however. An intention is an 
act of the will directed toward an end. But ends can be either proximate or remote. If I 
give money to charity in order that I might be thought well of by others, my proximate 
end is to give money to charity; my remote end is to be esteemed. As we saw above, 
Albert usually reserves the word intention for the willing of the remote end-- particularly 
in his Sentences commentary. 
 Aquinas also uses this terminology at times, but when he says that the intended 
end gives the moral species, he is referring to the proximate end.373 What precisely is the 
will's proximate end? To ask this question is to ask about the will's object: Aquinas 
identifies the object of the will with its end.374 And he states that the object of the interior 
act of the will is the exterior act.375 He further clarifies that in a bad action, the interior act 
is called bad because of the exterior act, which is its object.376 And yet he also says that 
the exterior act receives its goodness from the act of the will which causes it. Thus far, 
                                                 
370 Brock (1998), 173. 
371 ST I-II 20.1 ad 3. 
372 De Malo 1.3 ad 15. 
373 ST II-II 111.3 ad 3, De Malo 2.7 ad 8; see Jensen (1993), 78. 
374 ST I-II 72.3. 
375 De Malo 2.3. 
376 De Malo 2.3 ad 8. 
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the relation between the interior act, the exterior act, and the object of each is hardly 
clear. 
 This muddle is only apparent, however. Aquinas distinguishes between the 
exterior act insofar as it is apprehended and ordered by reason, and the exterior act "in the 
order of execution" – i.e., insofar as the act is performed.377 In its execution, the exterior 
act is subsequent to the act of the will, which causes it efficiently. However, insofar as it 
is apprehended, the exterior act is prior to the will's intending it. In this way, the exterior 
act is proposed to the will by reason, and is the object of the will.378 
 Because exterior acts can be considered in these two different ways, they can also 
be good or bad in two ways. They can be good or bad "in regard to the genus, and the 
circumstances connected with them." By genus, Aquinas means the generic good, and he 
gives the classic example of giving alms.379 By circumstances, he means the so-called 
"external" circumstances – i.e., those that exclude the intention of the end; Aquinas 
makes the same distinction Albert does in his Sentences commentary, between the 
circumstances and the end. If an act of giving alms is done at the right time, in the right 
place, etc., it is good, and this is a goodness the exterior act has "of itself" (secundum se). 
This goodness does not derive from the will, but rather from reason, which apprehends 
and orders it. So when the will adopts this exterior act as its object, it "receives" from the 
(apprehended) exterior act the goodness of that act. There is thus a transference of 
goodness from the exterior act qua apprehended to the interior act of the will.380 
                                                 
377 ST I-II 20.1. 
378 ST I-II 20.1 ad 1. 
379 ST I-II 20.1: "aliqui actus exteriores possunt dici boni vel mali dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum genus 
suum, et secundum circumstantias in ipsis consideratas, sicut dare eleemosynam, servatis debitis 
circumstantiis, dicitur esse bonum." 
380 Ibid. 
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 Exterior acts can also be good or bad on account of their relation to the end, as 
when someone gives alms in order that he might be more greatly esteemed. Since this is a 
bad end, the interior act, which aims at that end, will be bad. And since the will chooses 
the exterior act for the sake of accomplishing this bad end, the exterior act will also be 
bad. Now giving alms in the right circumstances does not cease to be good; insofar as it is 
ordered by reason, it remains a good exterior act. In the order of execution, however, it is 
becomes bad on account of the end toward which it is directed. So there is a transference 
in the other direction: the exterior act qua executed or performed receives goodness or 
badness from the interior act. 
 So the exterior act derives goodness or badness both 1) from the will which tends 
to the end, and 2) from the matter (i.e., the act's generic goodness) and circumstances, in 
which case the exterior act itself constitutes an end for the will.381 Now Aquinas thinks 
that some exterior acts will not be in themselves morally valenced; these are action types 
that are morally indifferent (discussed further below). If the exterior act is of this sort, 
that it's entire goodness or badness results from its relation to the end: the goodness of the 
will which aims at the end, and of the external act which is directed toward it, is one and 
the same. But if the exterior act is of itself good or bad, then the goodness of the exterior 
act will be distinct from that of the will.382 At the same time, the two acts will influence 
each other as described above. 
 The distinction between the interior and exterior act, and the ways in which the 
goodness or badness of each can affect the other, provide the structure within which the 
elements of a moral action can be understood. What are those elements? The interior act 
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177 
 
is defined by the will's relation to the end, so that the end is a key ingredient of a moral 
action. The exterior act is composed of the circumstances and either the genus or the 
materia – Aquinas uses these terms interchangeably when describing the exterior act, to 
describe the generic quality of an act. The end, the generic good, and the circumstances 
are also essential elements of a moral action in Albert's writings. It will thus be useful to 
examine in more detail how these factors contribute to the overall evaluation of an action, 
and to compare them to their treatment in Albert. 
 
Generic Goodness 
 In a question in his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas examines the different sources of 
the goodness or badness of a moral action.383 And the first such source is the action's 
object. Aquinas argues that the "first goodness" of a moral act is derived from the suitable 
object, and this gives him the opportunity to identify his views about objects with what 
"certain people" (quibusdam) have called the generic good: 
... it is also called a generic good (bonum ex genere) by some people; for example, 
to use one's own belongings. ... the first bad in moral actions is what is from the 
object, such as to take what belongs to another (accipere aliena). And it is called 
the bad from the genus (malum ex genere), with genus taken to mean species, in 
the mode of speaking by which we call the human genus the whole human 
species.384 
                                                 
383 ST I-II 18. 
384 ST I-II 18.2: "Et ideo sicut prima bonitas rei naturalis attenditur ex sua forma, quae dat speciem ei, ita et 
prima bonitas actus moralis attenditur ex obiecto convenienti; unde et a quibusdam vocatur bonum ex 
genere; puta, uti re sua. Et sicut in rebus naturalibus primum malum est, si res generata non consequitur 
formam specificam, puta si non generetur homo, sed aliquid loco hominis; ita primum malum in actionibus 
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Here Aquinas identifies the generic good with the specific good, or good in species. In 
the 1240s, Albert distinguished between these two; the generic good was the first 
potentiality toward goodness, whereas the good in species was the act of a particular 
virtue, and it was given this specificity by particular circumstances. These remained 
separate concepts in Albert's Super Ethica, where Albert first proposed that a moral 
action receives its species from its object. Aquinas makes no such distinction. The 
generic good just is the good in species, and the generic bad just is the bad in species. In 
Albert both concepts had referred to action types, though at different levels of 
description. Aquinas' typology has no such levels or stages. 
 By this point, bonum ex genere is no longer Aquinas' preferred term; he attributes 
it to others, and more commonly refers to it as the moral species. His examples of 
suitable and unsuitable objects here give us nontraditional examples of generic goods and 
bads: using what is one's own (uti re sua), and taking what belongs to another (accipere 
aliena). And indeed, Aquinas elsewhere gives examples of moral species that go far 
beyond what Albert accepted as generic goods and bads, such as "knowing one's wife" 
and "knowing a wife not one's own".385 For Albert, the latter two acts would be good and 
bad in species, as distinct from generically good. By doing away with this distinction, 
Aquinas is also effectively ruling out the stages theory, since acts of " knowing a wife not 
one's own" cannot be done well, but only badly, whereas the stages theory requires that 
an act at the generic level be capable of being done well or badly. 
 In the vast literature on Aquinas on moral acts, it has become commonplace to 
note that he describes the species as deriving from, variously, the object, the end, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
moralibus est quod est ex obiecto, sicut accipere aliena. Et dicitur malum ex genere, genere pro specie 
accepto, eo modo loquendi quo dicimus humanum genus totam humanam speciem." 
385 De Malo 2.4 ad 6. 
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matter, and to treat each of these in detail. A careful reading of Aquinas helps to clarify 
the relationship between these terms; he states, for example, that the object of an act just 
is the proximate end of the will – as distinct from the more remote end, toward which an 
agent might direct his act.386 If I take money that belongs to another in order to give it to 
the poor, the proximate end of my act will be the same as the object: to take someone 
else's money. The act of taking joined with that particular object gives us an action type – 
a moral species – that is by nature bad, namely theft. The remote end will be to give that 
money to the poor. This end is distinct from the object, and although it is good, it cannot 
make the action good. In other passages, Aquinas explicitly identifies the object which 
gives the species with an act's matter.387 
 Frequently, however, scholars have become puzzled over the emphasis on matter 
in accounts of the moral species. Steven Jensen complains that, in Aquinas' account, 
"'improper material' is a fairly empty term."388 Jensen attempts to give his own account of 
appropriate matter in Aquinas, but admits that, since Aquinas doesn't offer a direct 
account of what he means by matter in these texts, he can provide little textual evidence 
for his account.389 Joseph Pilsner remarks on the terms debita and indebita, which modify 
materia in accounts of moral species and genus: "These two adjectives, which invoke the 
language of justice, intimate that matter in this passage has a meaning specially relevant 
to moral concerns."390 Yet while it is true that debita and indebita also appear in Aquinas' 
discussions of justice, it would be wrong to say that Aquinas invokes the language of 
justice when he uses them to describe the matter of a moral act. Albert makes this point 
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explicitly in his SDB, where he distinguishes between the debitum iuris, which pertains 
to justice, and the debitum proportionis, which pertains to the generic good. While the 
former concerns what agents owe to each other and to God, the latter implies "the right 
proportion of the act to the matter according to its own nature."391 Here as elsewhere, 
Albert's works can help to illuminate those of Aquinas.392 
 There is a difference in emphasis between Albert and Aquinas when describing 
the generic good. Albert pointed to the natural proportion between the act and the matter 
that accounts for generic goodness. Aquinas points instead to reason as the principle that 
grounds generic goodness. An act like clothing the naked is generically good because it is 
in accord with reason (conveniens rationi), whereas taking what belongs to another is 
generically bad because it is discordant with reason (discordans a ratione).393 Cashing 
out what Aquinas means by "in accord with reason" would take us beyond the scope of 
this dissertation; the requirement that acts, dispositions, and even passions be in accord 
with reason is enormously important for Aquinas. He states that the "proximate rule" in 
things done by the will is human reason, which must be measured only against the 
"supreme rule", God's eternal law.394 Ultimately, reason plays an important role both 
because it discerns what the ultimate end consists, and because it deliberates about the 
means to that end.395 Since the goal of human life for Aquinas is to attain the ultimate end 
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cites only secondary sources; see Pilsner (2006), 153. 
393 De malo, q. 2 a. 5 corpus. 
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of our nature, conformity with reason or its absence will determine the goodness or 
badness of those things directed toward the end – in particular, human actions.396 
Moral Circumstances 
 Aquinas calls circumstances "supervening accidents". He draws an analogy with 
natural things, which have substantial forms that place them in a particular species, but 
which are also characterized by accidental characteristics. These accidents also contribute 
to the goodness of those things. Likewise, moral actions have what is substantial or 
essential to them – their species. But they also have accidents that make a moral 
difference.397 Unlike Albert, Aquinas does not provide a systematic account of moral 
circumstances. 
  One aspect of Aquinas' account of moral circumstances is particularly important 
for our purposes. In one passage, Aquinas seems to embrace something like the stages 
theory – where he appears to say that an action can be bad in its species, but can become 
good in the right circumstances. This is an article where he argues that circumstances 
sometimes place a moral action in a good or bad species.398 The reason is that, unlike 
natural things, whose species are constituted by natural forms, the species of moral 
actions are constituted by forms as conceived by reason. Unlike the natural order, reason 
is "not determined to any one thing." "Aquinas explains: 
                                                 
396 Commentators have contrasted Aquinas' emphasis on the role of reason in determining the goodness of 
an action with the apparently smaller roles that reason plays in Albert's theory – see Hoffmann (2003), 88. 
Still, it is important not to overlook Albert's own insistence that ethics be grounded in reason. For instance, 
in his first work Albert states: "And I call 'right reason' what happens according to law and according to the 
nature of virtue." ("Et dico 'rectam rationem', quia fit secundum ius et secundum rationem virtutis." DNB 
p.29, lines 17-19). And in another place: "But this life ought to be in agreement with reason, because all 
acts are measured by reason with respect to justice and the honourable." ("Debet autem haec vita 'rationi' 
esse 'consona', quia opera omnia mensurantur ad rationem rectam iuris et honestatis." DNB p.30, lines 68-
70). 
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And for this reason, that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to 
the object that determines the act's species, can again be taken by the directing 
reason as the principal condition of the object that determines the act's species. ... 
And in this way, whenever a circumstance relates to a special order of reason, 
either for or against, it is necessary that the circumstance give the species of the 
moral act, whether good or bad. 399 
So there are cases where the usual distinction between the object (or the matter) and the 
circumstances breaks down – where a circumstance becomes "a principal condition" of 
an object, and thus specifies the act. 
 Commenting on this text, Lawrence Dewan writes: "We see here that the change 
can go either way, and thus a new circumstance can change a bad act to good or a good 
act to bad. Everything depends on recognition of the order of reason."400 Dewan gives the 
example of the difference between capital punishment and murder: "That the man 
executed is a criminal adds a circumstance of the sort that constitutes a new and good 
rational order."401 Thus we have an example of a bad act which is made good by a 
circumstance. If this is Aquinas' view, then his theory appears similar to Albert's stages 
theory, in which a generically bad act can be done well under certain circumstances.  
 The example distinguishing murder from capital punishment seems to suppose 
that the moral species for an act of capital punishment is killing a human being, which is 
bad, and that a further circumstance then makes it good. But the act killing a human being 
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is not sufficiently described to be a moral species – is not yet a moral act, but only a 
natural act.402 The act of murder might be defined as the premeditated killing of an 
innocent person; the object of the act is the innocent person.403 By contrast, the object of 
an act of capital punishment is a condemned criminal. The circumstance that the person 
being killed is a criminal is what Aquinas calls "a principal condition of the object", but it 
does not necessarily imply that there is a prior, morally valenced object to which the 
circumstance is added, and which can change the act from bad to good. 
 Consider a different example of a species of moral actions: knowing one's own 
wife, and knowing a woman who is not one's wife.404 Both are examples of the natural 
act of having sexual intercourse. Yet the object of each of the moral actions – one an act 
of conjugal continence, the other of adultery – contains an important circumstance, 
namely, that the woman in question either is or is not the agent's wife. This circumstance 
is "a condition of the object", one which ceases to function as a circumstance (i.e., as a 
"mere accident" of the act) and instead contributes to the moral specification of the act.405 
It is not surprising that circumstances play this role. As I pointed out in chapter 2 
regarding Albert, it is impossible to describe a generically good act without referring to at 
least some circumstances; even the simplest examples require it. 
 Now when he outlines how a circumstance might place a moral action in a given 
species, Aquinas gives only one example, and it is not of a circumstance specifying a 
natural act which as a result becomes moral. Rather, it is an act that is already morally 
bad in species (theft), which, when we add the additional circumstance that it is done in a 
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holy place, takes on an additional species, becoming also an act of sacrilege.406 That it is 
an act of sacrilege does not of course mean that it ceases to be theft; Aquinas sees no 
reason for thinking that an act could not be in several different moral species.407 Because 
stealing from a holy place is especially contrary to reason, the circumstance of place 
takes on a specifying role. But nothing about this example indicates that a bad act can 
become good. 
 
The Dionysian Principle 
  In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas divides the goodness of a human action into 
four kinds:  1) the act's essential goodness, which pertains to it in so far as it has being 
(and every action as being simply qua action); 2) the good from the species (or genus  – 
in this context, Aquinas treats these two terms equivalently), that is, deriving from the 
suitable object; 3) the good deriving from the circumstances, or the act's "accidents"; and 
finally 4) the good proceeding from the end.408 Having identified these four different 
ways in which an act can be good, Aquinas provides a succinct formulation of the 
Dionysian principle: 
...nothing prevents an action from having one of the above-mentioned goodnesses, 
[while] lacking another. And accordingly, it happens that an action which is good 
according to its own species or according to the circumstances, is ordered to a bad 
end, and conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good unqualifiedly (simpliciter) 
unless all the goodnesses concur, because a singular defect causes the bad, but the 
                                                 
406 ST I-II 18.10, corpus. 
407 See ST I-II 18.10 ad 3. 
408 ST I-II 18.4 corpus. 
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good is caused from the whole (integra) cause, as Dionysius says in chapter 4 of 
On the divine names.409 
Again, Aquinas distinguishes between unqualifiedly good acts and those which are good 
only in a certain respect: it is possible for an act to be good in species, but done in the 
wrong circumstances, or done in the right circumstances, but for a bad end. The 
Dionysian principle does not mean that an act ceases to be good in species if it is done for 
a bad end. In this way, Aquinas is able to give the sort of mixed assessments Albert could 
provide with the stages theory – good in one way, bad in another, but bad overall. 
However, the overall assessment of such actions is that they are bad, all things 
considered. An act which is good simpliciter must be good in every respect. 
 It might be objected that this point is uninteresting, because it expresses the only 
thing Aquinas could possibly mean by the unqualifiedly good: of course an act that is 
good simpliciter must be good in every respect. That is simply what simpliciter implies! 
But this does not prevent him from saying that acts can be good in a qualified sense, 
which is also what the stages theory says. So there is no real difference between the 
Dionysian principle, as Aquinas presents it here, and Albert's stages theory. 
 What this objection misses is the stages theory's insistence that generically bad 
acts can sometimes be done well. In certain circumstances, it is not only permissible but 
even required that one perform generically bad acts, as Albert makes clear in the DNB. 
By contrast, Aquinas claims that a human act is either right or sinful (habeat rationem 
rectitudinis vel peccati) just insofar as it is good or bad (ST I-II, 21.1). An act that is bad 
                                                 
409 St I-II 18.4 ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictarum 
bonitatum, deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel 
secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, 
nisi omnes bonitates concurrant, quia quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex 
integra causa, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom." 
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in any respect is a bad act, and thus also a sinful act. Since sins are always bad and never 
permissible, every act which is not good simpliciter is blameworthy. And this is simply 
not true of Albert's stages theory, especially as presented in the DNB. There is a real and 
important difference between Albert's early stages theory, and Aquinas' mature account 
of the Dionysian principle. 
 This is clear in another formulation of the Dionysian principle, from the De Malo. 
This formulation differs in the number of items required, specifying only two: the act and 
the end. However, there is no significant difference there. Aquinas does not need to 
mention an act's essential goodness, since this is true of every act, and can never be 
lacking. It can therefore be assumed in the evaluation of any action. Meanwhile, it is not 
uncommon for Aquinas to use the word 'act' (actus), or more commonly 'exterior act', to 
encompass both the species (or genus) and the attached circumstances – two elements 
which are mentioned separately in the Summa Theologiae.410 We can summarize the two 
accounts as follows: 
Summa Theologiae: essential goodness + species + circumstances + end 
De Malo: act (i.e. species + circumstances) + end 
There is thus no significant difference in the elements mentioned in Aquinas' late-career 
accounts of the Dionysian principle. 
 Here is how Aquinas puts it in the De Malo: 
But the good, as Dionysius says, is from one whole and integral cause, but the bad 
is from singular defects. And for this reason whichever of these is bad, whether 
the act or the disordering (inordinatio) of the act toward the end, the whole is 
judged bad. But the whole is not judged good unless both are good; just as a 
                                                 
410 For example, in ST I-II 20.1. 
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human being is not judged beautiful unless all of his members are seemly, but is 
judged ugly if even one of his members is unsightly. And it follows that a bad act 
cannot be done well; for an integral good cannot be from that which is a bad act; 
but a good act can be done badly, because [for an act to be done badly] it is not 
necessary that it be in integral bad, but it suffices that it be bad in a particular 
way.411 
This passage makes it clear that Aquinas is not merely interested in distinguishing the 
unqualifiedly good act from that which is good in a qualified sense; rather, the key 
judgment is whether an act is good or bad as a whole. The whole good (bonum totum) 
derives from all the relevant factors being good; the whole bad (malum totum) from the 
lack of any one of those factors. By drawing attention to the integral good (integrum 
bonum), Aquinas is using language reminiscent of Albert's Sentences commentary, where 
Albert described the morally good act as an integral whole. The moral act cannot be 
judged only with respect to each its component parts, noting which are good and which 
bad; it must be judged as a whole, and if any of those component parts is bad, the act as a 
whole will be bad. This formulation thus clears up any ambiguity arising from the use of 
the word simpliciter in the Summa Theologiae version of the Dionysian principle. 
 In Aquinas' mature works, therefore, he continues to reject the stages theory while 
affirming the Dionysian principle. There is an important difference between his earlier 
and later formulations of the principle, however. In his Sentences commentary, the good 
                                                 
411 De Malo 2.4 ad 2: "Bonum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, est ex tota et integra causa, malum autem ex 
singularibus defectibus. Et ideo quidquid horum sit malum, sive actus, sive inordinatio actus in finem, 
totum iudicatur malum. Non autem totum iudicatur bonum nisi utrumque fuerit bonum; sicut nec iudicatur 
homo pulcher, nisi omnia eius membra fuerint decora; turpis autem iudicatur etiam si unum eius membrum 
fuerit deforme. Et inde est quod actus malus non potest bene fieri; ex quo enim actus malus est, non potest 
esse integrum bonum; sed actus bonus potest male fieri, quia non requiritur quod sit integrum malum, sed 
sufficit quod sit particulariter malum." 
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of virtue is one of the elements that must be present for an act to be good. This 
requirement disappears in his later works. We can summarize the different accounts as 
follows: 
Dionysian Principle: Conditions to be met for an act to be good (Aquinas) 
Sentences Commentary Summa Theologiae De Malo 
Essential goodness Essential goodness   
Generic goodness Species Act 
Circumstances (including end) Circumstances   
Virtue End End 
 
As we have seen, actus in the De Malo account likely includes both the species or genus 
and the circumstances. Further, the act's essential goodness can be taken for granted, 
since no act will lack it. The reference to generic goodness in the Sentences Commentary 
correlates with the (good) moral species in the Summa Theologiae, since Aquinas treats 
these concepts as equivalent. All three accounts include the circumstances and the end. 
The key difference, then, is the Sentences Commentary requirement that an act to be 
virtuous, which the later works lack. 
 In this respect, Aquinas' early account is closer to Albert's. In his own Sentences 
Commentary, Albert includes the "form in the will" as one of the elements of the 
Dionysian principle; in his later Summa Theologiae, he specifies this form as a form of 
virtue. Why does Aquinas include this element in his earliest work, but omit it in his later 
works? He does not answer this question explicitly, but it seems that he is attempting to 
distinguish the moral goodness of an action from that of morally good dispositions. It is 
possible to perform a good action even though one lacks the virtue that will allow one to 
perform those actions regularly, easily, and with pleasure. 
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 This happens in the case of continent actions. Aquinas, following Aristotle, calls 
continence "that by which someone resists wicked desires, which are vehement in 
him."412 Unlike the virtuous person, whose desires have been trained so that they are in 
harmony with reason, the continent person must fight against strong desires to perform 
bad actions. But, importantly, she resists them, and does what is right. Her actions are 
praiseworthy, and may even be called virtuous, broadly speaking.413 
 By omitting virtue in his later formulations of the Dionysian principle, Aquinas 
appears to affirm that we can assess actions without referring to the moral character of 
the agents who perform them. If an action is good in species, done in the right 
circumstances, and for a good end, then it can be evaluated as an integral or whole good. 
The agent may be virtuous, performing the action from a stable disposition in harmony 
with reason; or the agent may be continent, doing it in spite of vehement desires to the 
contrary. But this is irrelevant to the assessment of the act itself. 
  On the other hand, Albert in both his Sentences Commentary and his Summa 
Theologiae, and Aquinas in his own Sentences Commentary, make it a requirement for a 
good action that it be done from a virtuous character. Indeed, Albert refers to this  
requirement as the form of virtue; the disposition from which it is done in some way 
informs the action. The trouble with this view is that any act which is not so informed is 
bad, all things considered. This would have the consequence that continent acts are, when 
judged as a whole, bad acts. And this seems like a difficult position to defend. Even if 
                                                 
412 ST II-II 155.1: "Alii vero dicunt continentiam esse per quam aliquis resistit concupiscentiis pravis, quae 
in eo vehementes existunt. Et hoc modo accipit philosophus continentiam, VII Ethic." Aquinas recognizes 
another common meaning of continentia, as complete abstinence from sexual pleasures, but this is not his 
focus in question 155. 
413 Ibid.: "Largius tamen accipiendo nomen virtutis pro quolibet principio laudabilium operum, possumus 
dicere continentiam esse virtutem." 
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one accepts that the virtuous act, which is done without significant opposition from the 
passions, is more praiseworthy than the continent act, which is done in the face of 
opposition from the passions, it still seems wrong to say that the latter is a bad act.414 It is 
not clear whether Albert ever considered this problem with his view, but Aquinas avoids 
this problem by separating the assessment of actions from that of moral dispositions. 
 
Moral Indifference in Albert and Aquinas 
 We have seen Aquinas holding that an action must be good in species (or 
generically good) in order for it to be good as a whole. He puts this most starkly in his 
Sentences Commentary, where he states that an act cannot be good from the 
circumstances unless it is also generically good. His more mature theory qualifies this 
claim: while he continues to maintain that a generically bad act cannot be done well, he 
now denies that an act must be generically good in order for it to be done well. The 
reason is that some action types are indifferent. These are acts which are neither in accord 
with reason, nor discordant from reason; Aquinas gives the examples of picking up a 
straw from the ground and going for a walk in the fields.415 But while there are action 
types that are indifferent, no individual action can be indifferent, because there will 
always be a circumstance that makes it either good or bad – if nothing else, the intention 
                                                 
414 The question whether it is more admirable to do what is right in spite of the fact that it is difficult to do 
so, or to do it from virtue which makes it easy to do, is typically framed as a dichotomy between Kant, who 
claimed that the action having genuine moral worth was one done from duty and not inclination, and 
Aristotle, who privileged virtue over continence. Nevertheless, Foot (2002), 8-18, and Hursthouse (1999), 
91-107, among others, have argued that these two accounts complement each other more than a conflict. 
415 De malo, q. 2 a. 5; ST I-II 18.8. 
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(something every human action has) will either be directed toward a due end, in which 
case it is in accord with reason, or not, in which case it is contrary to reason.416 
 This is an issue Albert discusses at length, both in his SDB and his Sentences 
commentary. As noted in chapter 2, Albert argues that the ethicist (ethicus) will give a 
different answer from the theologian as to whether some acts can be indifferent.417 Both 
can accept that there are acts which are indifferent generically or specifically -- that is, 
that there are action types which are neither good nor bad. The ethicist, however, can also 
accept that there are individual actions that are indifferent, whereas the theologian cannot. 
The reason is that the ethicist will have no virtue which acts as a "general mover" 
covering all voluntary actions. Rather, each virtue will have its own "matter" -- courage 
will be about dangers of death, chastity will be about sexual pleasures, etc. Since acts that 
are indifferent in species have no virtue to cover them,  it is possible for them to remain 
indifferent when performed in concrete circumstances. Of course, it is also possible to 
perform them well or badly: for example, picking up a straw will be done badly if that is 
the signal I have arranged with my fellow brigands to attack travelers on the road. 
 The theologian, on the other hand, recognizes the theological virtue of charity as a 
general mover in relation to all voluntary acts. So the theologian will hold that any act 
performed by a baptized Christian which is not also a charitable act is blameworthy. So 
no individual act can be indifferent, since every act either expresses love for God, in 
which case it is good, or it will not, making it bad. This sounds like an unreasonably 
demanding position for a theological ethics, and Albert immediately moves to soften it. 
The theologian will condemn everything indifferent as idle (otiosum), but a great many 
                                                 
416 ST I-II 18.9. 
417 SDB 1.2.7, p.34-35; In II Sentent. Dist. XL, B, Art. 2, P. 627. 
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seemingly idle acts will turn out to be permissible. Following Gregory's definition of 
idleness as "what lacks the character of just necessity or pious usefulness", Albert goes 
on to list numerous apparently indifferent acts which are in fact necessary or useful for 
oneself or others, and thus not idle.418 These include activities which respond to our need 
for rest by alleviating weariness or sadness, such as physical exercise, conversations, 
singing, and games which are not illicit. So although charity must be at the root of all our 
actions, many different types of actions (including those which the ethicist would call 
indifferent) can become charitable. 
 When Aquinas approaches this question, he rejects Albert's distinction between 
what the theologian should say, and what the ethicist should say. He points out that every 
act aims at some end. But that end will always be good or bad, thus making the act either 
good or bad, even according to the moral philosopher: 
But that end is the good suitable to a human being either with respect to the soul 
or with respect to his body, or also with respect to external things, which are 
ordered toward both. And this good, unless it is contrary to that good which is the 
good of a human being in accordance with reason, has the rightness of civil virtue. 
... And for this reason it should be said differently from others, that no act 
proceeding from a deliberative will can exist which is not good or bad, not only 
according to the theologian, but also according to the moral philosopher.419 
                                                 
418 Gregory, Moralia, liber 7, cap. 17, n. 68 (PL 75, 800C). 
419 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 40 q. 1 a. 5 co.: "Finis autem ille est bonum conveniens homini vel secundum 
animam vel secundum corpus, vel secundum etiam res exteriores, quae ad utrumque ordinantur; et hoc 
quidem bonum nisi sit contrarium illi bono quod est hominis bonum secundum rationem, rectitudinem 
virtutis civilis habet: ... Et ideo aliter secundum alios dicendum est, quod nullus actus a voluntate deliberata 
progrediens potest esse qui non sit bonus vel malus, non tantum secundum theologum, sed etiam secundum 
moralem philosophum." 
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The "others" with whom Aquinas is disagreeing here clearly include Albert. Aquinas has 
a more expansive conception of civil virtue (the sort of virtue that we can attain naturally, 
without a special infusion of grace). Civil virtue regards the good of a human being in 
accordance with reason; any end we aim at that is not contrary to that good as the 
rightness (rectitudo) associated with civil virtue.  
 What might Aquinas say in response to Albert's contention that unlike the 
theologian, the ethicist can point to no "general mover" in morals, because in moral 
philosophy each virtue is restricted to its own special "matter"? Take the example of 
picking up a straw; if that could be an act of civil virtue, which virtue would it be 
associated with?  
 We do not find Aquinas addressing this argument directly. Nevertheless, we can 
imagine how he might respond: first we would need to know why the agent picked up the 
straw: what is my aim in picking it up? It is possible, if not likely, that my reason for 
picking up the straw is related to one of the standard virtues; perhaps picking up random 
objects helps to distract me from my desire to drink in excess, in which case the action 
would be associated with the virtue of temperance. Suppose, on the other hand, that I 
picked it up simply with the aim of throwing it in the air and watching the wind take it. 
Such an act does not seem to have a connection with any particular virtue. Nevertheless, 
Aquinas could subsume it under the virtue of prudence, the special matter of which is 
agibilia – "things that can be done".420 This is a virtue so universal as to pertain to any 
human act, since human acts are those that involve reason and will, and prudence 
                                                 
420 ST II-II q. 47 a. 5 co. 
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involves reasoning about how to reach the end in our actions.421 So Aquinas can hold 
that, even from the point of view of the moral philosopher, every act is done for the sake 
of some end, that end will be either good or bad, and if the act is ordered toward a good 
end, it has the potential to be an act of civil prudence. Of course, it may not be, if the 
agent has not yet acquired the virtue of prudence; in that case, the act will still have the 
rectitudo associated with prudence, and will still be good as a whole. 
 Given that Aquinas accepts that there are indifferent acts at the level of the moral 
species (though not at the level of individual actions), he can accept that some acts need 
not be good in species, though they can be good as a whole. It is even possible that an act 
can be good neither in species nor from the so-called external circumstances, but still 
good as a whole. It is necessary, however, that it not be bad in either of these respects, 
and badness in either case would make the act bad as a whole. But if an exterior act is 
indifferent both with respect to its species, and with respect to its circumstances, then 
Aquinas will say that the exterior act derives goodness or badness only from its relation 
to the end, not having any goodness or badness of itself.422 
 So the Dionysian principle must be qualified, both for Albert and for Aquinas. For 
Aquinas, the qualification is limited. While it is true that an act that is bad in any of the 
                                                 
421 It may be objected here that Albert could say the same thing. After all, he says in the SDB that the 
matter of prudence is "that which can be chosen for a right act" (eligibile ad opus rectum) (SDB IV.1.3, 
solution, page 230, lines 3-4). So prudence has the same universal reach for Albert that it does for Aquinas, 
which makes it seem odd that Albert would claim that for the ethicist, there are some morally indifferent 
acts which do not fall under the matter of any civil or political virtue. However, the eligibile ad opus 
rectum counts as the matter of prudence only in a secondary sense; primarily, it is about pleasures and 
pains, the special matter of courage and temperance.  Albert reasons that, since prudence and justice play 
the role of ruling and ordering the virtues of the lower powers, they must be about the same matter as those 
other virtues.  Prudence and justice establish reason in the matter of courage and temperance: they 
determine what we ought to do when faced with various passions.  So prudence and justice are also about 
pleasures and pains: they concern pleasures and pains "universally", whereas courage and temperance 
concern them "particularly" (SDB I.4.1 ad 2 pg. 45, 33-55). It would seem, then, that when Albert claims 
that some acts are indifferent for the ethicist because there is no virtue that pertains to them, he means that 
there is no virtue that pertains to them in particular. 
422 ST I-II 20.3. 
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relevant respects is bad of the whole, it can fail to be good in one of those respects and 
still be good as a whole. Nevertheless, every act must be either good as a whole, or bad as 
a whole; if nothing else, one's act will be good or bad in virtue of its end. 
 Albert's conceptions of the morally indifferent has a further implication. Not only 
is it true that an act can fail to be good or bad generically or specifically, but even 
individual actions can be indifferent, from the perspective of the ethicist. Since the 
Dionysian principle only concerns good or bad acts, these acts will fall outside of its 
purview altogether. Or one could add another clause to the principle: for an act to be 
morally indifferent, all things considered, it must be indifferent in every respect. Adding 
this clause would enable us to capture those actions which the principle otherwise does 
not catch. Of course, this is all only true from the perspective of the ethicist; from the 
perspective of the theologian, Albert and Aquinas are in agreement that every act must be 
either good or bad, all things considered, even if it is indifferent with respect to its genus 
or species. 
 
3.E Revisiting the Judge who Condemns an Innocent Man 
 We have seen that in his earliest work, Albert advances what I have called the 
stages theory, according to which actions that are good or bad at the first stage (the 
generic level) can be done well or badly at the second stage (moral circumstances). In 
subsequent works, he also puts forward a different method for evaluating actions, the 
Dionysian principle, which seems to be in tension with the stages theory. And while in 
those later works he appears to move away from the stages theory, he never rejects it 
explicitly. Aquinas, on the other hand, rejects the stages theory outright, arguing that a 
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generically bad act (which he also identifies as an act bad in species) can never be done 
well. Instead, he makes the Dionysian principle his own, using it throughout his works. 
 Given this disagreement between (at least) the early Albert and Aquinas, it would 
be worthwhile examining an example that could help illuminate the primary point of 
contention between them: is it possible for an act to be bad in kind, but nevertheless the 
right act given the circumstances? In chapter 1, we saw that Albert in his DNB provides 
two examples of generically bad acts being done well. The first is rather obscure. Albert 
states that the generic bad is done well "when one gives to someone to whom there 
should be no giving in the name of a prophet, and in order that nature be preserved for 
penance."423 The generically bad act in this example is "giving to the one to whom there 
should be no giving." This is not very clear; giving what? And why would it be bad to 
give to this person, except in the name of a prophet? A lot of detail would need to be 
added for this example to shed any light on the stages theory. 
 Happily, Albert's second example contains more specifics. A generic bad is done 
well, he writes, in the case of: 
... killing someone who should not be killed because allegations and a trial which 
goes against him demand it. For a judge is compelled to proceed according to 
allegations, and therefore even knowing in his own conscience alone that [the 
accused] is innocent, he is compelled to kill an innocent person, whom the 
allegations and testimony of witnesses, according to the order of the law, have 
found guilty.424 
                                                 
423 DNB II.1, p. 9, lines 12-15: "malum in genere bene fit, ut dare, cui non dandum est, in nomine 
prophetae, et ut natura servetur ad paenitentiam." 
424 DNB II.1, p. 9, lines 15-20:"occidere non-occidendum, quia sic poscunt allegata et probatio, quae est 
contra eum; iudex enim secundum allegata procedere cogitur, et ideo etiam conscientia sua sola sciente 
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The generic bad in this case is occidere non-occidendum, killing the one who should not 
be killed. It is formulated using the method I criticized in chapter 1, joining an infinitive 
to the (negated) accusative gerund of the same verb. But if non-occidendum is not 
particularly descriptive, it could easily be replaced with "killing an innocent person". The 
judge in this case sentences the innocent person to death because he is obliged to by law; 
the circumstances make it the case that this is in fact the right thing to do. So the judge 
acts well, despite the fact that his act is generically bad. 
 When Aquinas considers this example in his Summa Theologiae, he frames it as 
an act of killing an innocent person (occidere innocentem). Since Aquinas thinks that one 
is never justified in killing an innocent person, this seems to be a counterexample to his 
view, and he puts it thus in an objection: 
But sometimes someone is compelled to kill an innocent person in accordance 
with the order of justice, for example, when a judge who must judge according to 
the allegations condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent, [but] is 
convicted by false witnesses; and it is similar with the executioner who kills the 
unjustly condemned man in obedience to the judge.425 
The similarities between the objection given here, and the positive point Albert makes in 
the DNB, are striking. Both describe the judge as compelled (cogitur) to give a judgment 
against the innocent man. They also characterize the case as depending on allegations 
(allegata) given by witnesses (testes), which require the death of an innocent person 
                                                                                                                                                 
innocentiam occidere compellitur eum quem allegata et testimonia testium secundum iuris ordinem 
nocentem comprobaverunt." This case is found in Abelard (Scito te ipsum 81), though he uses it for 
different reasons. For Abelard, this example shows that (earthly) punishments and sin can come apart, and 
that we should not be surprised to see someone punished who committed no sin. 
425 ST II-II 64.6, obj. 3.: "Sed quandoque cogitur aliquis secundum ordinem iustitiae occidere innocentem, 
puta cum iudex, qui debet secundum allegata iudicare, condemnat ad mortem eum quem scit innocentem, 
per falsos testes convictum; et similiter minister qui iniuste condemnatum occidit obediens iudici. Ergo 
absque peccato potest aliquis occidere innocentem." 
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(innocentem). The objector in Aquinas' text adds that the executioner (minister), since he 
is acting in obedience to the judge, also performs the act of killing without sin. 
 Since Aquinas is committed to the view that killing an innocent is the sort of act 
that is bad in kind, and therefore which can never be done well, he cannot accept Albert's 
solution from the DNB. It might seem reasonable for him to hold that the judge ought not 
to condemn the innocent man, regardless of what the witnesses say. Perhaps he could 
recuse himself, and request that another judge preside over the trial. Aquinas thinks that 
this will not always be practical, and is willing to say with Albert that in some cases the 
judge should condemn the innocent man to death. However, his analysis of this action 
differs in crucial respects from Albert's. 
 Here is Aquinas' response to the above objection (emphasis mine): 
... a judge, if he knows that someone is innocent who is convicted with false 
witnesses, ought to very diligently examine the witnesses, in order that he may 
find an opportunity to liberate the innocent person, just as Daniel did. But if he 
cannot do this, he should send him to a higher [judge] to be judged. If he cannot 
do this either, he does not sin by bringing a judgment according to the allegations, 
because he does not himself kill the innocent person, but those who assert that he 
is guilty [kill him]. If the judgment contains an intolerable error, then the 
executioner (minister) under the judge who has condemned the innocent person 
should not obey; otherwise the executioners (carnifices) who killed the martyrs 
would be excused. But if it does not contain a clear injustice, he does not sin by 
carrying out the order, because he himself is not permitted (non habet) to 
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scrutinize the judgment of a superior; nor does he himself kill the innocent person, 
but the judge to whom he renders his services does.426 
Aquinas stresses (and Albert would surely agree with this much) that giving the death 
sentence in such a case should be an absolute last resort. The judge ought first to examine 
the witnesses, seeking ways to discredit their testimony (which he knows to be false) that 
will allow him to free the accused. If this fails, he should pass the case on to another 
judge, should this be possible. Only if these other avenues have been exhausted should 
the judge proceed to give the sentence of death. If he has done all he can to cast doubt on 
the witnesses, and if there is no option of recusing himself, the judge does not sin by 
giving the sentence. 
 Thus far, there is no conflict with (early) Albert. Nevertheless, their descriptions 
of the judge's act are very different. According to Albert, the judge commits a bad action. 
Killing an innocent person is generically bad, and remains so regardless of the 
circumstances. In these circumstances, however, the act is done well, because the 
circumstances require the judge to proceed according to the allegations. The stages theory 
allows him to describe the act as bad in one respect, but nevertheless done well. Aquinas 
rejects the stages theory, and so does not have that option. Instead, he claims that the 
judge does not kill the innocent person; even more strikingly, he maintains that the 
executioner does not kill him either. How might Aquinas defend these counterintuitive 
claims? 
                                                 
426 ST II-II 64.6 ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod iudex, si scit aliquem esse innocentem qui falsis testibus 
convincitur, debet diligentius examinare testes, ut inveniat occasionem liberandi innoxium, sicut Daniel 
fecit. Si autem hoc non potest, debet eum ad superiorem remittere iudicandum. Si autem nec hoc potest, 
non peccat secundum allegata sententiam ferens, quia non ipse occidit innocentem, sed illi qui eum asserunt 
nocentem. Minister autem iudicis condemnantis innocentem, si sententia intolerabilem errorem contineat, 
non debet obedire, alias excusarentur carnifices qui martyres occiderunt. Si vero non contineat manifestam 
iniustitiam, non peccat praeceptum exequendo, quia ipse non habet discutere superioris sententiam; nec 
ipse occidit innocentem, sed iudex, cui ministerium adhibet." 
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 The answer is actually simpler in the case of the executioner. In a previous article 
in the same question, Aquinas argues that it is licit for persons having public authority to 
kill an evildoer (malefactor), when doing so is necessary to preserve the common good of 
the whole community.427 Given that those in authority usually delegate such killing, 
should we hold the executioners morally responsible? Aquinas cites pseudo-Dionysius to 
the effect that "he does something under whose authority it is done."428 And he quotes 
Augustine's City of God: "he does not kill who is obliged to obey the one who 
commands, just as a sword is an instrument of its user."429 So when a soldier kills an 
enemy under the authority of a princeps, or the executioner kills a criminal under the 
authority of a judge, they are not morally responsible for it, and in an important way the 
killing is not their act. 
 This does not mean that those acting under authority do no wrong so long as they 
obey orders. Their intentions still matter; if the executioner kills a condemned criminal 
from a desire for vengeance, or because he gets a perverse pleasure from killing, his 
action would be blameworthy. Further, Aquinas allows that there are some circumstances 
in which the executioner is morally obligated to disobey the judge's order: if the 
judgment contains an "intolerable error", then he ought not to obey it. While Aquinas 
doesn't spell out what would make a judge's error intolerable, it would have to be 
obvious, and such that someone without legal training could notice it. Ordinarily, the 
executioner does not have the right to scrutinize (discutere) the judge's decisions. But the 
fact that in some situations, the executioner not only can but must disobey the judge's 
                                                 
427 ST II-II 64.3 corpus. 
428 ST II-II 64.3 ad 1: "ille aliquid facit cuius auctoritate fit". 
429 De civitate dei I, cap. 21: "non ipse occidit qui ministerium debet iubenti sicut adminiculum gladius 
utenti." Quoted in ibid. 
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orders indicates that being under authority does not absolve one of all responsibility for 
what one does. Still, in the case where there is no intolerable error in the judge's decision, 
the answer to the question, "who killed this man?", where we are seeking to know who is 
morally responsible for killing him, is: not the executioner, but the judge. 
 But in the case quoted above, the judge does not kill the innocent man either. If he 
has carefully examined the witnesses, and is unable to pass the case on to another judge, 
the judge who condemns to death a man he knows to be innocent based on the allegations 
of false witnesses does not kill him. Rather, the witnesses who testify that the innocent 
man is in fact guilty do so. The explanation here cannot be that the judge is subject to 
authority, because he is the authority. Instead, the judge seems bound to follow proper 
procedures. A legal system that is broadly perceived to be fair and impartial is a public 
good; a judge who frees an accused man in spite of the evidence against him endangers 
that good. So the judge is bound to follow these procedures which preserve the common 
good, even though he knows that they result in the death of an innocent man. Thus, the 
executioner cannot be held responsible because he is bound, most of the time, to follow 
the judge's orders, and the judge cannot be held responsible because he is bound to follow 
the procedures that govern trials. Those who kill the man are the false witnesses, whose 
testimony against him send him to his death. 
 So Aquinas can conclude that the judge does not perform a bad act – killing an 
innocent man – because he does not perform that action at all. Aquinas does not clarify, 
however, precisely how we should describe the judge's action, or the executioner's action. 
Albert in the DNB describes the judge as performing a generically bad act, under the 
right circumstances, for the right end, with the overall judgment that he acts well. How 
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should Aquinas characterize it? If the moral act is not "killing an innocent person", then 
what is it? 
 It is tempting to analyze this case using the doctrine of double effect. Aquinas 
explains that killing in self-defense is sometimes licit. In such cases, one's act has two 
effects: saving one's own life, and the death of the aggressor. In a legitimate act of self-
defense, the intention is to save one's own life, whereas the killing of the aggressor is 
"beyond the intention" (praeter intentionem). Since moral acts take their species from the 
agent's intention, the object of the act will be saving one's own life, whereas killing the 
aggressor will be a mere unintended side effect.430 Might the judge's act be similar? 
Perhaps he does not intend the death of the innocent person, but rather to follow proper 
judicial procedures. So his act would not be an act of killing, though it has the unintended 
side effect that an innocent person is killed. 
 While this looks like a tidy way to explain the judge's action, it is doubtful 
whether it is Aquinas'. Gareth Matthews has argued convincingly that Aquinas' limited 
claims about self-defense do not amount to the "doctrine of double effect" in the modern 
sense, though they did lead Thomistic philosophers to formulate versions of that 
doctrine.431 And Aquinas makes no mention of the double effect in his discussion of that 
judge, despite the fact that it comes one article before his account of self-defense. If he 
conceives of the judge as acting in such a way that the death of the innocent man is 
praeter intentionem, then why would he not describe it in this way? 
 On the other hand, it seems true in some sense that the judge does not aim at 
killing the innocent man. In cases where a public authority puts a criminal to death in 
                                                 
430 ST II-II 64.7. 
431 Matthews (1998). 
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order to safeguard the common good, Aquinas holds that the public authority (or an agent 
of the authority) licitly intends the killing of the criminal. In the case where the judge 
knows the man to be condemned as innocent, however, he does not believe the accused to 
be a threat to the common good, so he cannot order his death in order to protect the 
common good. But the judge may also believe that following proper procedures is 
necessary to safeguard the common good, such that that is his primary aim, even though 
he knows that doing so requires sentencing an innocent man to death. So the judge's 
action might be fittingly described as judging according to the evidence and allegations 
presented at the trial. It can also be described as sentencing an innocent man to death, but 
when we take into account the judge's intention, this is not the primary moral description 
of the act. And of course, this holds true only in so far as the judge is motivated as we 
have supposed: desiring to follow proper procedures so that faith in the judicial system 
might be maintained, which is necessary for the common good. If the judge follows all 
the correct judicial procedures, but is also motivated by the desire to take revenge on the 
innocent man over a property dispute, his act will be bad, and blameworthy. 
 In describing the judge's act in this way, we can also make sense of Aquinas' 
claim that the witnesses who put forward the accusations against the innocent man are the 
ones who kill him. In making their false accusations, they intend the man's death. Thus 
their act is not only one of bearing false witness, but also of murder. Since the end gives 
the species, it is possible to describe the witnesses as killing the innocent person, even 
though they neither performed nor ordered the execution. 
 Above I argued that Albert's account of this case in the DNB can be characterized 
as a resolvable moral dilemma. On Albert's telling, the judge must either refrain from 
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killing an innocent person, or follow proper judicial procedures, but he cannot do both. If 
he lets the accused go free, he has failed in his obligations as a judge. If he sentences the 
accused to death, following the allegations made at the trial, then he kills someone who 
should not be killed. So he has two significant moral obligations here, but he cannot 
fulfill both of them. This dilemma is resolvable because for Albert, one obligation 
overrides the other: the circumstances make it the case that the judge ought to perform 
the generically bad act of killing the innocent man. Nevertheless, it is not a self-imposed 
or prior fault dilemma, in that it does not arise because of some misdeed the judge 
previously committed. The judge finds himself in an unenviable position through no fault 
of his own, and some moral residue will be appropriate regardless of which option he 
chooses.432 
 For Aquinas, on the other hand, the judge is not in a moral dilemma. As long as 
he has done everything he can to avoid having to send the innocent man to death, his act 
will not be described as killing him. There is thus no conflict between principles or 
obligations; the judge does not violate the precept not to kill; rather, it is those putting 
forth the allegations who kill the accused. This is consistent with Aquinas' denial that 
there are any non-prior-fault dilemmas.433 
                                                 
432 In describing this case as a moral dilemma, I should note that Albert himself does not describe it as a 
case of perplexitas, the medieval term that best approximates the concept of a moral dilemma. While Albert 
does not describe the judge as perplexus, his account of the case is such that it can be fairly described as a 
moral dilemma, where an agent has two moral obligations but cannot fulfill them both. 
433 Aquinas distinguishes between perplexity simpliciter and perplexity secundum quid. The latter refers to 
cases in which a conflict of obligations arises from a prior morally bad act performed by the agent, whereas 
the former results from no prior fault. While some scholars (notably Mann (1991)) have argued that both 
sorts of perplexity are possible for Aquinas, Dougherty (2011) has shown that this position is untenable 
(pages 136-141). While Aquinas allows that there are cases of perplexity secundum quid, he rules out 
definitively perplexity simpliciter. Dougherty points to two texts in which Aquinas denies that there can be 
cases of perplexity simpliciter: Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 39 q. 3 a. 3 ad 5, and Super Romanos, cap. 14, 2, 
§1120. 
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3.F. Stoic Connections 
 In his Sentences commentary, Albert argues that the specific moral virtues are not 
connected; there, his primary foil is the Stoic doctrine of the unity of the virtues, as 
summarized by Augustine and as found in sources like Seneca and Cicero.434 Later, in 
Ethica, the situation is reversed. There, Albert sets out to defend a (limited) connection of 
the virtues, and he presents the Stoics as denying that the virtues are connected. This is 
the result of a misreading of Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics VI.13, where Aristotle 
describes Socrates' view of the virtues as rational principles (rationes in Grosseteste's 
translation), then sets out to refute a dialectical argument to the effect that the virtues can 
exist in separation from each other. In his commentary, Albert calls Socrates the foremost 
among the Stoics (Stoicorum princeps), and then attributes to Socrates (and by extension 
the Stoics) the dialectical argument against the unity of the virtues, which Aristotle aimed 
to refute.435 
 These confusions notwithstanding, Albert was clearly interested in the Stoics, 
even if he often disagreed with what he took to be their views, seeing them as the 
opponents of Aristotle and Augustine, his intellectual heroes. Given this background, I 
wish to briefly explore in this last section some other connections between Stoic ethics 
and Albert's and Aquinas' views. In particular, there is a Stoic antecedent to each of the 
stages theory and the Dionysian principle. I do not wish to claim that Albert was 
influenced by or even aware of these Stoic views (although his familiarity with some of 
                                                 
434 Super IV libros Sententiarum, Lib.III, dist.36, art.1, p. 665. 
435 Ethica, Lib.VI, cap.4, p. 460-461. 
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Cicero's texts leaves open both possibilities). But the comparison is interesting in its own 
right, and should help to shed light on Albert's theories.436 
 I will take the stages theory first. This theory, as presented in DNB and SDB, 
proposes that we examine an act morally in three stages:  
1) generic goodness or badness;  
2) moral circumstances;  
3) virtue.  
An act can be generically good, but performed in the wrong circumstances, with the 
result that it is a bad act; for example, an act of feeding the hungry could be done from 
vainglory. An act can also be generically bad, but nevertheless the right action in the 
circumstances, as in the example of the judge who puts an innocent man to death because 
the allegations at the trial require it. Further, an act can be performed in the right 
circumstances, but fail to be virtuous, if it does not proceed from a stable disposition. 
Note that each of these levels involves genuine moral goodness or badness. And this 
goodness or badness cannot be removed or canceled out at a later stage: a generically 
good act does not cease to be good, in that respect, even if it is done in the wrong 
circumstances; a generically bad act does not cease to be bad, even if in the 
circumstances it is the right thing to do. Nevertheless, full moral evaluation of any action 
will require considering all three stages. 
 The Stoics also distinguish three levels on which an act can be evaluated.437 These 
are:  
                                                 
436 I owe the idea for comparing Albert to the Stoics, as well as many of the details, to Charles Brittain. Any 
errors in the depiction of Stoic views here are of course my own. 
437 My presentation of this theory depends mostly on its presentation in Cicero, in particular De finibus III, 
and also De officiis I. 
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1) value (aestimatio, Greek axia), also translated as 'worth';  
2) officia (Greek kathekonta), often translated as 'duties', but I will use Raphael 
Woolf's translation of officia as 'appropriate actions';  
3) right actions (recta, recte facta; also honeste facta; Greek katorthômata). 
The superficial similarity with Albert here is the threefold evaluation of actions. How do 
the elements of the Stoic distinction compare to Albert's three stages? To answer this 
question, it will be necessary to consider each of these elements in turn. 
 In De finibus III, Cicero gives the defense of Stoic ethics to Marcus Cato, who 
describes what is valuable (aestimabile) as what is in accordance with nature, or what 
brings about something that is in accordance with nature.438 An act will have value, then, 
if it is in accordance with nature. This requires a fit between the action type and the 
overall order of the universe. In Stoic cosmology, the world is composed of two 
principles: a passive principle, matter (hule), and an active principle, reason, which is 
identified with God.439 As the active principle, reason pervades the cosmos, giving it 
order and unity. For an act to be in accordance with nature, in the sense required for it to 
have value, is for it to be of the sort that in general fits into the overall, rational order of 
the world. Health is an example of something that generally accords of nature and so has 
value, with the result that actions that tend to bring about health, like eating vegetables 
and getting exercise, are valuable.440 By contrast, action types that tend to bring about 
pain or sickness are non-valuable (inaestimabile); these acts are in general not according 
to nature. Finally, there are action types which are neutral, being neither valuable nor 
non-valuable. 
                                                 
438 De finibus 3.20. 
439 Sauvé Meyer (2008), 138-139. 
440 De finibus 3.51. 
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 Now actions that have value are in general worth performing.441 In the Ciceronian 
technical language, they are to be selected, whereas non-valuable actions should be 
rejected. An act's worthiness of selection or rejection, however, does not mean that it is 
worth performing for its own sake. At the level of value, all actions, whether they be 
valuable, non-valuable, or neither, are morally indifferent. The goodness of selected 
actions, then, as well as the badness of rejected actions, is merely prima facie.442 They are 
neither good nor bad. 
 Valuable actions are thus similar to Albert's generically good actions in that they 
are action types of the sort that we have good reason to perform. But they differ in that 
they are not in themselves morally good. Albert is clear that generic goodness is a kind of 
moral goodness; a generically good act is good in a moral respect, even when it is done 
badly. For the Stoics, on the other hand, a valuable action has no moral valence. If it is 
also a right action, then it is altogether good; if it is also a bad action, then it is altogether 
bad. Like Aquinas, the Stoics reject the possibility that a good action might be bad in 
some respect. 
 The second element of the Stoic theory is appropriate actions (officia). These are 
determined in part by an act's value; they "originate from natural principles."443 In Cicero, 
these actions are defined as those such that a reasonable explanation can be given of their 
performance.444 "Reasonable" here is not meant to leave open the possibility that various 
alternatives might be defended, and so appropriate. Rather, the reasonable action is the 
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442 I take this to be a plausible reading of the Stoics on selected and rejected actions, though I recognize that 
it is controversial. 
443 De finibus 3.23. 
444 De finibus 3.58. 
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one the Sage – the fully virtuous agent – would perform.445 This will depend, as the act's 
value does not depend, on the circumstances. Taking care of one's health is valuable, and 
will also often be appropriate. But there are circumstances in which mutilating oneself, or 
even committing suicide, is the appropriate action. Thus there can be valuable actions 
that are not appropriate, and non-valuable actions that are appropriate. Analogously, 
Albert holds that there are generically good actions that are done badly due to the 
circumstances, and generically bad actions that are done well. 
 A valuable action for the Stoics is in general worth selecting; and appropriate 
action is the one that should be selected in the circumstances. Nevertheless, not all 
appropriate actions are morally good. Cicero divides appropriate actions into middle and 
complete. Complete appropriate actions are right actions (recta); they are done honorably 
and from virtue. The middle appropriate actions, on the other hand, are "shared", because 
they can be performed both by the Sage and the non-Sage.446 It is possible to perform 
appropriate actions for the wrong reasons, for example, for the glory that accompanies 
them.447 In themselves, appropriate actions are, like valuable actions, neither good nor 
bad. Here again, the contrast with Albert is obvious: for Albert, an action done in the 
right circumstances is genuinely, morally good. This is not the case for the Stoics; 
although the Sage consistently performs appropriate actions, one need not be a Sage to 
perform them, and only the Sage is morally good. 
 The third part of the Stoic theory leads us to right actions – those which are 
honorable and virtuous, and which alone are good. Only the Sage performs such actions; 
and only the Sage is virtuous and good. What action is right, in this sense? It must be the 
                                                 
445 Brennan (2005), 170. 
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appropriate action in the circumstances. But the agent who performs it must also be fully 
virtuous, so that she selects the appropriate action in a way that is continuous, stable, and 
"in agreement with nature".448 It must also be performed from a perfect motivation; for 
example, the right action is always honourable (honestum), but is never undertaken for 
the sake of false glory, which is acclaim from anyone who is not completely reliable as a 
judge of character. Anyone who performs appropriate actions for this reason is not acting 
rightly or virtuously.449 
 Like Albert, then, the Stoics hold that an action that is right in the circumstances 
can fail to be virtuous. They also have in common that a virtuous action must be done 
from a stable disposition. As for the way the Stoics tend to consider appropriate actions 
independently from motivations, which are the key factor in determining whether the act 
is a right action, Albert is of two minds about this. In his earlier works, Albert treats an 
agent's intentions as one of the circumstances of the act; an act good from the 
circumstances will be done with the right intentions, though it may not be virtuous. But 
beginning with his Sentences commentary, we see Albert distinguishing the "external" 
circumstances from intentions. So Albert's views tend to converge on the Stoics' views on 
this matter over time. 
 The differences between the Stoics and Albert on this point are also instructive. 
The Stoics hold that appropriate actions are morally indifferent. Only virtuous, right 
actions are good actions, and no moral goodness attaches to appropriate actions qua 
appropriate actions. For Albert, on the other hand, the goodness that derives from 
circumstances is, like generic goodness, a genuinely moral goodness. Even if an act fails 
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to be virtuous, it does not thereby cease to be good from its circumstances. The Stoics set 
a much higher bar for moral goodness; only the Sage, who is perfectly virtuous, can 
perform actions that are morally good in any way. While Albert would agree that only the 
virtuous agent can perform virtuous actions, he holds that a non-virtuous acts can still be 
morally good in some respect. 
 According to Albert's stages theory, a generically bad act can be done well in the 
circumstances. Since generic badness is moral badness, Albert's position is that an act 
might be morally bad in some respect, but still right overall. As I argued above, such acts 
may leave moral residue, in the form of remorse or regret. The Stoics, on the other hand, 
do not seem to allow for such mixtures of moral goodness and badness in a single action. 
They hold that an act can be non-valuable, and still appropriate in the circumstances. But 
since value is morally indifferent, this claim is quite different from Albert's. 
 There are thus some interesting parallels between the stages theory and the Stoics' 
threefold account of action, along with some important differences. The Dionysian 
principle also has a parallel in Stoic theory, in the form of the Stoic claim that right 
actions (recta) are those which "contain all the numbers of virtue" (omnes numeros 
virtutis continent).450 A.A. Long traces this claim to the Stoic idea that happiness consists 
in living harmoniously, which in turn suggests an analogy with music.451 Long presents 
evidence that when the Stoics speak of a harmonious life, they choose language that 
refers to Greek musical theory, which leads him to propose that the Stoics "regarded a 
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451 Long (1991). As will be obvious, Long's paper is the main source for my account of the Stoics in this 
section. 
212 
 
harmonious mental disposition as exactly analogous to the well tempered constituents of 
a musical scale."452 
 How does this analogy work? The Stoic Sage is the one who possesses right 
reason (orthos logos). For the Stoics, right reason involves "precise, numerical or 
quantitative discriminations", of the sort found (in the opinion of the ancient Greeks) in 
music, as well as in mathematics, sculpture, etc.453 Further, the Stoics claimed that the 
Sage possesses a particular craft, which Stobaeus compares to that of the flute-player or 
the lyre-player.454 Both the Sage and the lyre-player possess expertise in imposing a 
particular rational structure: the lyre player on musical sounds, and the Sage on moral 
action.455 The Sage's right reason is similar to the musician's craft in that both deal in the 
exact quantities and proportions. Since the Stoics sought an exact moral science, musical 
harmony provided a useful analogy with harmonious living. Long contrasts the Stoic 
approach to that of Aristotle, who famously cautioned against seeking too much precision 
in ethics. Aristotle's comparison of ethics to medicine, drawing parallels between health 
of the body and health of the soul, is particularly apt for him; it would be odd to see 
Aristotle comparing ethics to music, since the latter has a strong numerical basis. Not so 
for the Stoics.456 
 Various Stoic writers use tension (tonos) as an ethical descriptor to describe states 
of a human being. Chrysippus said that the virtuous agents soul have good tension 
(eutonia), whereas the soul of the vicious agent is characterized by a lack of tension 
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(atonia).457 In music, tonos can refer to a raised or lowered pitch. It can also refer to "the 
character of a structure (e.g. a tetrachord) in which some crucial element has been raised 
or lowered."458 For the ancient Greeks, tetrachords are four-note series in which the first 
and last note are separated by a perfect fourth; putting two tetrachords together gives one 
a musical scale. A scale which has good tonos, which we may also describe as being well 
tempered, is one characterized by a consonance or harmony between numbers (i.e., the 
intervals between the notes). If the human soul's tension is like that of a tetrachord or 
scale, then we would expect it to somehow also have the right numbers. 
 This brings us to the claim about virtuous actions having "all the numbers". This 
claim is standard among Stoic writers,459 and is explained by the Stoic Cato in Cicero's 
De finibus: 
Just as actors and dancers are not assigned arbitrary roles or steps but certain fixed 
ones, so too life is to be led in a certain fixed way, not in any way one pleases. 
This is the way we refer to as consistent and concordant. We do not think that 
wisdom is like navigation or medicine. Rather it is like acting or dancing that I 
just mentioned. Here the end, namely the performance of the art, is contained 
within the art itself, not sought outside it. Yet even these latter arts are in another 
way different from wisdom. In their case, when something is rightly done it does 
not include all the parts (omnes partes) of which the art consists. But what we 
might call – if you approve – either "right actions" or "rightly performed actions" 
                                                 
457 Galen, On Hippocrates' and Plato's Doctrines 4.6.2-3 = Long and Sedley (1987), 65T. 
458 Long (1991), 107. 
459 Ibid., 105. Long notes that "no other school that adopted the inter-entailment of all the virtues appears to 
have used it." 
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(the Stoics call them katorthômata) contain all the numbers of virtue. Only 
wisdom is directed at itself in its entirety; this is not the case with other arts.460 
Wisdom, on this account, is similar to acting or dancing in that their end is not distinct 
from their performance. Unlike navigation or medicine, which aim at goals beyond 
themselves, wisdom has no external goal beyond itself. At the same time, those things 
which are "rightly done" (recte facta) in acting or dancing do not contain all the "parts" 
of those arts, and this is not true of wisdom. The actions associated with wisdom – that is 
to say, virtuous actions, Cato's "right actions, or rightly done actions" (recta aut recte 
facta) – contain (continent) all the parts of wisdom. What are these parts? The somewhat 
obscure "numbers of virtue". 
 The number in question might be the number four. There are four cardinal virtues, 
and every right action in some sense "contains" all of them. But why then refer to 
"numbers" in the plural? Long points out that the Stoics specified subordinate virtues for 
each of the four cardinal virtues, and speculates that these are what the Stoics have in 
mind as the numbers of virtue.461 Stobaeus provides lists of subordinate virtues for each 
of the cardinal virtues; for example, the virtue subordinate to prudence are good sense, 
good calculation, quick-wittedness, discretion, and resourcefulness. Further, the number 
of subordinate virtues listed by Stobaeus differs from one cardinal virtue to another: 
prudence and courage both have five, while temperance and justice have four.462 So the 
claim that right actions contain all the parts of wisdom, or all the numbers of virtue, 
amounts to the claim that they express all the cardinal virtues, along with all of their 
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respective subordinate virtues. While a given virtuous action will instantiate one virtue 
primarily, it will include all the other virtues in a secondary way.463 
 On the analogy with music, a right action is like a scale in which all the intervals 
between notes (i.e., all the "numbers") are correct. Commenting on a quotation from 
Aristides Quintilianus on the role of numbers and ratios in music, Long comments that he 
passage 
...shows the supreme appropriateness of music as the craft to characterize a 
system in which numerical completeness is an all-or-nothing matter. A verse with 
a false quantity or a musical scale with one interval defective is not marred by 
merely one blemish, while having everything else in order. The single numerical 
error is enough to wreck the whole harmony.464 
Both actions and musical scales must be perfect in every way, or they are completely bad. 
 The parallel between this Stoic account of action and the Dionysian principle 
should now be clear. The Dionysian principle specifies the ways in which an action can 
be morally good or bad, and then requires that the action be good in all of those ways in 
order for it to be good overall; if it is bad in any respect, it is bad overall. The Stoic claim 
that a right action "contains all the numbers of virtue" requires that it be consonant with 
all of the virtues. Like a musical scale ruined by a single wrong note, an act that is 
inconsistent with any virtue at all is bad and vicious. Both the Dionysian principle and the 
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"perspectives". The primary perspective of courage is the appearance governing courageous action. 
However, courage also has a secondary perspective: the theorems governing action specific to the other 
virtues. The unity of moral knowledge guarantees that each virtue requires more than simply the wisdom 
specific to that virtue. 
464 Long (1991), 110. 
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Stoic theory states that an act must be good in every morally relevant respect in order for 
it to be good as a whole. 
 The Stoic account also brings together the two separate strains in Aquinas which I 
argued above reflect a more fundamental approach to ethics: evaluation of actions using 
an all-or-nothing principle, and the connection of the virtues. Like Aquinas, the Stoics 
hold that the presence of one moral virtue entails all of the other moral virtues. This inter-
entailment is illuminated by the claim that right actions fill all the numbers. Stoic theory 
holds that every right action is a virtuous action. It also requires that every action which 
instantiates a particular virtue also be consistent with every other virtue. So no virtue can 
exist in isolation from the others; they are all involved in every right action. 
 Unlike Aquinas, the Stoics defend the unity of the virtues by arguing that the 
virtues are all moral sciences. On the Stoic picture, every moral virtue is a form of 
knowledge. That knowledge forms a unity, such that the theorems of any given virtue 
make reference to the theorems of the other virtues, at least in a secondary way. So one 
virtue could not exist independently of the others. For both Albert and Aquinas, on the 
other hand, only prudence is a form of knowledge, while the other virtues are "with 
knowledge" insofar as they are all accompanied by prudence. Aquinas' defense of the 
connection of the virtues rests on different arguments and assumptions, as we have seen. 
 When Aquinas formulates the Dionysian principle, virtue is not one of the 
conditions that must be met for an act to be good. He treats the evaluation of actions as 
distinct from the evaluation of agents; a continent person can perform a genuinely good 
action, even if he lacks the virtuous dispositions necessary to perform such an action 
readily, with pleasure, etc. Nevertheless, we could imagine Aquinas including as one of 
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the conditions for the Dionysian principle that an act be virtuous, and then arguing that, 
because the virtues are connected, every good action must be consistent with all the 
moral virtues. 
 At least, it is easy to imagine Aquinas including virtue within the Dionysian 
principle, because Albert does it. In his Sentences commentary, Albert holds that a "form 
in the will" is a necessary condition for a good action. In his Summa theologiae, he 
specifies that this form is the form of a virtue. Since Albert denies that all of the moral 
virtues entail each other, his account of the Dionysian principle does not extend to the 
Stoic claim that a right action contains all the numbers of the virtues; although he holds 
that a good action must also be a virtuous action, he thinks that it is possible to possess 
one moral virtue without possessing all of them. 
 To summarize: both the Dionysian principle and the Stoic requirement that right 
actions contain all the numbers are all-or-nothing principles. They both provide list of 
conditions to be met for an act to be good (or right); if any of those conditions is not met, 
action as a whole will be bad. As for the specifics, the differences between Albert and 
Aquinas reflect the way each agrees or disagrees with the Stoics. Like the Stoics, Albert 
holds that for an act to be good, it must also be virtuous; unlike the Stoics, he denies that 
each of the moral virtues entails the others. It is the reverse for Aquinas: he does not 
require that an act be virtuous in order that it be good, but he does hold that the moral 
virtues entail each other.465 
 
 
                                                 
465 I am simplifying both Albert and Aquinas for the sake of clarity here. The reader should keep in mind 
the distinctions from the previous section distinguishing general and specific virtue, perfect and imperfect 
virtue, etc., along with Albert's peculiar account of perfect prudence as a unifier of the virtues. 
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Conclusion  
 This dissertation began by considering an interpretive problem in Albert: how 
might we reconcile two different methods for morally evaluating actions which, while not 
inconsistent with each other, at least appear to be in tension? Answering this question 
required exploring different formulations of the two methods over the course of Albert's 
career, embedded as they are in his understanding of the key moral concepts of generic 
goodness and moral circumstances. It also led me to consider Aquinas, who rejects one of 
Albert's methods while embracing the other. Aquinas denies the key insight of Albert's 
stages theory: that an act can be bad in kind and nevertheless done well. This 
disagreement between Albert and Aquinas leads them to characterize particular examples 
of actions in starkly different ways. What is at stake is not merely an argument over 
which philosophical or theological sources should be privileged, or which method is 
more congenial for arriving at predetermined results. Rather, it is a question about more 
fundamental approaches to ethics. 
 The stages theory is introduced in the De natura boni, Albert's earliest work. 
There he outlines the basics of the account: an act should be evaluated in three stages, 
beginning with its generic quality, continuing to the moral circumstances, and ending 
with virtue or vice. At the generic level, Albert describes action types that are morally 
valenced – they are either good or bad, and this goodness or badness is not merely prima 
facie. Nevertheless, these actions can be done well or badly, depending on the 
circumstances. Feeding the hungry is generically good, but it could be done in the wrong 
place – in such a way as to humiliate the hungry person, for example – or for the wrong 
reasons. Conversely, killing an innocent person is generically bad, but even this act can 
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be done well, as in the case of the judge who is compelled to sentence a man he knows to 
be innocent to death because the evidence presented at trial goes against him. The final 
stage involves considering the moral disposition from which the act arises. An act might 
be done well, but not from virtue, if it is not done with ease, readily, and with pleasure, 
the characteristic marks of a virtuous act. 
 While Albert would add considerable complexity to this account in his later 
works, refining his understanding of generic goodness, describing a category of morally 
indifferent acts, and adding the concept of goodness in species, the De natura boni 
provides the clearest version of the stages theory to be found in his works. The important 
idea is not that generically good acts can be done badly; this is uncontroversial. The claim 
that generically bad acts can be done well is much more significant. From this it follows 
that even an act that is done well, and which is the right act in the circumstances, might 
nevertheless be morally bad in a certain respect. At least some such acts can be analyzed 
as resolvable, non-self-imposed moral dilemmas. The judge who sentences the innocent 
man to death has an obligation not to kill an innocent person, but he cannot fulfill this 
obligation in the circumstances. For this reason, a kind of moral residue will be 
appropriate for him, in the form of remorse or regret. The stages theory thus allows for 
complex evaluation of difficult cases. 
 The other method for evaluating actions is the Dionysian principle, which states 
that an act must be good in every one of a number of ways, or it is bad as a whole. Albert 
introduces this principle in the Summa de bono, and one of his formulations of it there 
includes an act's generic quality as one of the ways in which it must be good in order for 
it to be good as a whole. Formulated in that way, the Dionysian principle looks 
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inconsistent with the stages theory, which allows that an act can be generically bad but 
still done well. Later versions of the Dionysian principle, however, do not include generic 
goodness, leaving open the possibility that the two methods can be reconciled, as I 
discussed in chapter three. Albert himself never explains how these methods relate to 
each other, which is odd, given that they use some of the same terms. Later in his career, 
Albert appears ambivalent about the stages theory in two of his last works. That 
appearance may not reflect Albert's actual views, however; the works in question are 
Ethica, which is a paraphrase of Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics, thus making it difficult 
to separate Albert's own views from what he takes to be Aristotle's,466 and Summa 
theologiae, the authenticity of which has been called into question. But at the very least, 
it is unclear how Albert thought the two methods should be harmonized. 
 Aquinas, on the other hand, is quite clear. He rejects the stages theory, and 
embraces the Dionysian principle. Doing away with Albert's distinction between the 
generic good and the good in species, Aquinas identifies the two terms, and states that 
goodness in species (or genus) is a necessary condition for an act to be considered good 
as a whole. Aquinas incorporates the Dionysian principle into a more elaborate 
framework of interactions between the interior and exterior act. These two acts, which 
should be understood as two different aspects of a single moral act, affect each other, 
each contributing to the moral goodness or badness of the other. This makes Aquinas' 
more theory more complex than Albert's. Nevertheless, Aquinas describes the exterior act 
in terms of an act's genus and circumstances, and the interior act in terms of its end, and 
these are the three essential ingredients of the Dionysian principle, as formulated in his 
                                                 
466 On this problem in the Aristotelian paraphrases more generally, see Weisheipl's classic (1980), Albert's 
Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Paraphrases. A more recent, useful contribution is Moulin's (2009). 
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Summa theologiae.467 Notably, Aquinas rejects Albert's claim that a generically bad act 
can be done well. 
 This theoretical disagreement with Albert leads Aquinas to describe the case of 
the judge who sentences an innocent man to death quite differently from Albert. 
Although he agrees with Albert that such an act, in extreme circumstances, may be 
required of the judge, Aquinas does not describe it as a generically bad act that is done 
well. Instead, he states that neither the judge nor the executioner can be said to kill the 
man. The judge does not perform a bad act, since if he did, it could not be morally 
required. 
 I have argued that the divergence between Albert in his defense of the stages 
theory, and Aquinas in his rejection of it, is significant. This is not only true with respect 
to its consequences (e.g., for the way we describe actions); it also reflects a deeper chasm 
in their respective approaches to ethics. We can see this in their views on the inter-
entailment, or connection, of the virtues. Aquinas argues that the specific virtues, insofar 
as they are perfect or complete, are connected: we cannot possess one without all the 
others. Albert denies the connection of the virtues in his early works. Later, even when he 
is commenting on Aristotle's explicit position in favor of that connection, he still 
manages to allow that one can possess one of the moral virtues other than prudence 
without possessing the others. For Aquinas, a virtuous agent must be virtuous in every 
way it is possible for an agent to be virtuous, just as a good action must be good in every 
way it is possible for an action to be good. For Albert, a courageous agent might not 
possess temperance, just as an act done well in the circumstances might be generically 
                                                 
467 ST I-II 18.4 also mentions the good an act derives from its genus, as distinct from its species; but 
"genus" here refers to the genus of actions, not to specific action types. Every action has this goodness 
simply in virtue of being an action. 
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bad. For Aquinas, both good agents and good actions must be good in every respect; for 
Albert, a mostly good agent might still possess a vice or two, and a good action might be 
bad in its generic quality. This disagreement does not look superficial. 
 This dissertation focused on developments within Albert and Aquinas. I have not 
undertaken to trace the development of the stages theory or the Dionysian principle in 
their successors. How do these ideas appear in later medieval thinkers? Does the 
Dionysian principle dominate, or is the stages theory still viable after Albert's death? The 
methods I have identified provide avenues for further research. 
 The contrast between Albert and Aquinas discussed in this dissertation should not 
obscure the deeper harmony between them. Aquinas is obviously indebted to Albert for 
his account of the Dionysian principle. Moreover, the disagreement between is clearest 
with respect to Albert's early works (De natura boni, De bono, the Sentences 
commentary). Albert may have been moving away from the stages theory in his later life, 
and though the evidence is not conclusive, it is possible that Albert himself recognized 
the tension between the two methods, and was committed to keeping the Dionysian 
principle at the expense of the stages theory. If this is true, then Albert and Aquinas may 
have held similar positions by the late 1260s. Their dispute would thus lead, eventually, 
to a convergence of views. 
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